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I. INTRODUCTION 
Politics constrains the federal taxing power, of course: a 
candidate’s promise to raise taxes across the board is generally 
thought to be political suicide, as is breaching a promise not to raise 
taxes. The conventional wisdom, however, is that the Constitution 
imposes no significant legal limitations on the taxing power.1 If 
Congress is willing to take the political flack, it can do what it wants, 
or so it is assumed. Similarly, in construing what Congress has done 
on a tax issue, a court can usually proceed without meaningful 
references to the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                 
1
 The Constitution imposes real restrictions in special situations. For example, the Export 
Clause provides that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State,” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5, and that Clause has been enforced. See United States v. U.S. Shoe 
Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 366–70 (1998) (holding that the Harbor Maintenance Tax, which obligates 
exporters to pay a percentage of the value of cargo shipped, was a tax on exports and therefore 
unconstitutional); United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 861–62 (1996) 
(holding that the Export Clause categorically bars Congress from imposing any tax on exports); 
see also Erik M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2003) (detailing the historical 
importance of the Export Clause and observing that, although the Export Clause is enforced by 
modern courts, its effect is largely invisible in the lives of ordinary Americans). 
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In the widely noted case of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service,2  
a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit ultimately reached a result consistent with 
conventional wisdom, concluding that a whistleblower’s recovery for 
emotional distress was properly includable in the income-tax base.3 
But the court followed a torturous path to get there, and Murphy 
provides an opportunity to revisit some basics of taxation. At bottom 
one of the questions in Murphy was “What is income?” and you 
cannot get more basic than that. 
A. Murphy I and the Hyperventilating Blogosphere  
Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg’s opinion on Murphy’s first  
go-round in August 2006 (Murphy I), which unanimously concluded 
that the emotional-distress recovery was not income within the 
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and, as a result, could not be 
reached by the federal income tax,4 characterized the government’s 
arguments as resting on a “breathtakingly expansive claim of 
congressional power.”5 Although the panel must have known that 
striking down an exercise of the taxing power would be noteworthy, it 
apparently did not realize how controversial its conclusion would be. 
Murphy I did not have a long shelf life; the negative reaction was 
immediate—the decision “shocked the tax community”6—and 
effective. Tax professors generally were appalled (some refusing to 
read the opinion, or so they said, because the result was so bizarre), 
and cries were heard that the decision was not only dumb but also 
catastrophic.7 If an emotional-distress recovery were not income,  
then logically, it was argued, wages were not either. Remove 
compensation for services from the income-tax base, and the base 
would be gutted. 
                                                                                                                 
2
 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
3
 Id. at 171. 
4
 Murphy v. IRS (Murphy I), 60 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 
4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). The panel included two Republican appointees and one 
Democratic. If this decision had partisan political overtones, they were not obvious. 
5
 Id. at 87. The breathtaking claim was that any receipt of value could be reached: “The 
Sixteenth Amendment simply does not authorize the Congress to tax as ‘incomes’ every sort of 
revenue a taxpayer may receive. As the Supreme Court noted long ago, the ‘Congress cannot 
make a thing income which is not so in fact.’” Id. (quoting Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. 
Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925)). 
6
 Joseph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of 
Non-Excludable Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369, 370 (2007) [hereinafter Dodge, 
Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment]. 
7
 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Full Court May Weigh Taxation of Damages, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 
30, 2006, at 1 (quoting officials and commentators, one of whom called Murphy I 
“outrageous”). 
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Obviously embarrassed by the reaction—according to Professor 
Paul Caron, the court was “prodded by the tax blogosphere”8—the 
panel on its own motion vacated its judgment in December 2006.9 
New briefs were filed, the case was reargued, and in June 2007 the 
same panel unanimously held, on the basis of an issue “belatedly 
raised” and “newly argued”—the court was covering its backside—
that the recovery had been properly taxed.10 
The panel’s abrupt turnaround left rubber on the road. With the 
decision in Murphy II, most of the tax professoriate and the tax bar 
gave a sigh of relief. And when the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in April 2008,11 the Republic appeared safe. 
Or maybe not. Not all critics were mollified. For example, 
Professor Caron has written that “the panel could not unring the bell 
and undo much of the damage caused by its original decision.”12 By 
ignoring the Supreme Court’s good sense in Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co.13—which, half a century earlier, had “appeared 
to establish the term ‘gross income’ as a catch-all phrase reaching all 
accessions to wealth, regardless of source”14—the panel “turned what 
should have been a run of the mill tax dispute . . . into a threat to the 
very survival of the income tax.”15 Strong stuff. Murphy I might have 
no legal effect, but Caron and others worried that it encouraged tax 
protesters.16 Moreover, since the opinion had been printed in the 
                                                                                                                 
8
 Paul L. Caron, The Story of Murphy: A New Front in the War on the Income Tax, in 
TAX STORIES 55, 91 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009). Caron presents instant analysis from the 
post-Murphy I period, see id. at 70–71, and makes the case for blogs’ centrality in modern tax 
policy. See id. at 90–91. 
9
 See Murphy v. IRS, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
A petition for rehearing en banc had been filed. The panel vacated the judgment before the 
petition was acted upon, but the panel relied in part on the argument in the petition. See Murphy 
v. IRS (Murphy II), 493 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
10
 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 173. 
11
 Murphy v. IRS, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). Had the panel reaffirmed its original decision 
and had the full court accepted that conclusion, the Supreme Court might have granted cert. As 
it was, the result was mundane. 
12
 Caron, supra note 8, at 56. 
13
 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
14
 Caron, supra note 8, at 55. In fact, Glenshaw Glass did not say a personal injury 
recovery is an “accession to wealth.” The Court distinguished taxable punitives, which “cannot 
be considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes,” from “[d]amages for personal 
injury [which] are . . . compensatory only.” Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8. By implying 
that such recoveries might be nontaxable, the Court contributed to the confusion Caron blamed 
on Murphy I. See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text. 
15
 Caron, supra note 8, at 91. 
16
 I have been accused of that too, because of an article that antedated Murphy. See Joseph 
M. Dodge, Letter to the Editor, Jensen’s Missiles Don’t Get Off the Ground, 107 TAX NOTES 
131, 132 (2005) [hereinafter Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles] (accusing me of taking “dangerous” 
positions and evidencing “sympathy with tax protesters” in arguing that not all recoveries for 
nonphysical personal injuries are taxable). 
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Federal Reporter, it can cause mischief for eternity.17 
Phooey. I agree with James Reardon that “[t]he scholars and 
commentators should lighten up a bit.”18 Although Murphy I 
contained an amazing number of howlers, and deserved criticism,  
the result was defensible. It was not clearly right, but it was not 
clearly wrong either, particularly if the purposes behind the  
Sixteenth Amendment matter. It is hard to prove what was in peoples’ 
minds in the early twentieth century, but I have no doubt that 
Amendment proponents would have been horrified to think an 
emotional-distress recovery might be “income.”19 Most people 
outside the academy would be horrified at that idea today.20  
Indeed, I will go further than the panel did: all or part of the  
recovery, which was assumed to have no replacement-of-earnings 
component,21 might not even have been “gross income” within the 
                                                                                                                 
17
 Even if not printed—hard copy no longer guarantees availability for eternity—the 
opinion would have survived electronically. The vacated opinion is available on the D.C. 
Circuit’s Web site. See Murphy v. IRS (Murphy I), No. 05-5139 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2006), 
available at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200608/05-5139a.pdf. 
18
 James D. Reardon, Marrita Murphy: The Flip Side of the Economic Substance 
Doctrine, 112 TAX NOTES 1167, 1170 (2006); see also Robert W. Wood, Letter to the Editor, 
Wood Looks at the Flip Side of Murphy v. IRS, 113 TAX NOTES 188, 188 (2006) (“I am tired of 
endless potshots at Murphy . . . .”). A student or two supported Murphy I, see, e.g., Russell F. 
Romond, Note, Income, Taxes and the Constitution: Why the D.C. Court of Appeals Got It Right 
in Murphy, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 587 (2007), but what do they know? 
19
 Cf. Merchs.’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) (“In 
determining the definition of . . . ‘income’ . . . this court has . . . refused to enter into the 
refinements of lexicographers or economists and has approved, . . . what it believed to be the 
commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people 
when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment . . . .”). For additional discussion of this point, see 
Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 
33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057 (2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Meaning of Incomes] (discussing the 
Amendment in enough detail to cause emotional distress). 
20
 Cf. Philip Mullock, The Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts as Income, 53 MINN. L. 
REV. 247, 254 (1968) (questioning whether gifts could be included in income-tax base); Steven 
T. O’Hara, Thinking Outside the Code, 116 TAX NOTES 679 (2007) (discussing the different 
meanings of “income” and urging consideration of such issues). The physical-nonphysical 
distinction of income has been challenged on policy grounds. See, e.g., Laura Sager & Stephen 
Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, 
Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447 (1998); Vivian Berger, End the 
Inequity, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 17, 2007, at 23. Although he signed the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, President Clinton disapproved of 
taxing personal injury recoveries, which “are designed to make victims whole, not enrich them.” 
Statement on Signing the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1317, 
1318 (Aug. 20, 1996). Professor Hubbard has challenged the distinction on constitutional 
grounds. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing 
Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725 (1997). But see Douglas 
A. Kahn, The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for Mental Distress When 
There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 128, 129 (1999) (arguing this 
distinction raises no constitutional problem). 
21
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81 (noting that “compensation for a non-physical personal injury 
is not income under the Sixteenth Amendment if, as here, it is unrelated to lost wages or 
earnings”). 
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meaning of section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Most important, I shall argue that, if Murphy I had survived, it 
would not have done irreparable damage to the income tax or the tax 
system as a whole. The narrow issue—taxation of emotional-distress 
recoveries—has no significant revenue effects.22 The decision would 
have stood only for the proposition that ratifiers of the Sixteenth 
Amendment did not think Congress can characterize anything as 
income (and maybe also that Congress, in defining “gross income,” 
did not intend to pick up all receipts of value). Concluding that 
“income” is not an empty vessel into which any content can be 
poured is not revolutionary; it takes language seriously.23 
The idea that tax protesters gained traction from Murphy I was 
especially overdone in the commentary. Protesters need no 
encouragement to see systemic flaws. And, if encouragement to 
frivolousness developed, it came more from critics than from the 
Murphy I opinion.24 It was the critics who said Murphy I might mean 
that wages (and other clearly taxable items) are not income.25 Wages 
and emotional-distress recoveries are not the same,26 and, in any 
event, no one can seriously argue that wages are off-limits in the 
income tax.27 Murphy I might have been problematic, but hyperbole 
                                                                                                                 
22
 Cf. Caron, supra note 8, at 91 (“Although questions about the taxation of damage 
recoveries will not bring down the income tax, the willingness of so many to shake its 
foundations may ultimately prove its undoing.”). 
23
 In criticizing Murphy I, Professor Theodore Seto argued that “[t]he single most 
problematic aspect of constitutionalizing the definition of income is that doing so threatens to 
deprive Congress of the flexibility needed to make a tax system work.” Theodore Seto, Bank of 
America as an Alternative to Originalism in Murphy, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/ 
2006/08/seto_bank_of_am.html (Aug. 28, 2006), quoted in Caron, supra note 8, at 71. 
Constitutions are supposed to limit flexibility, and I am bewildered that we should not 
“constitutionalize” a term in the Constitution. 
24
 Vacated opinions give no penalty protection. Cf. Suder v. Comm’r, No. 3245-06S, T.C. 
Summ. Op. 2008–97, at 1–2 (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOp 
Historic/suder.sum.WPD.pdf (“Pursuant to [Internal Revenue Code] section 7463(b), the 
decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated 
as precedent for any other case.”). 
25
 See, e.g., Caron, supra note 8, at 78–79 (recapitulating a number of critics’ concerns 
that Murphy I would lead to the end of the income tax). The notion that a protester would 
connect emotional-distress recoveries and wages is far-fetched. He would need help: “Hey, Bud, 
did you see what that Big State tax prof said? A new case says Uncle Sam can’t tax our salaries. 
Sounds right to me.” 
26
 See infra Part VI.E. 
27
 “Compensation for services” is listed in Code section 61(a)(1). See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) 
(2006). The Sixteenth Amendment was not directed at wage-earners, but compensation was 
understood to be part of the tax base. See Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 
Stat. 509, 553 (reaching “gains, profits or income” above $4,000, “whether said gains, profits, or 
income be derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, or salaries, or from any 
profession, trade, employment, or vocation . . . or from any other source”); Revenue Act of 
1862, ch. 119, §§ 89–93, 12 Stat. 432, 473–75 (imposing a 3% tax on “annual gains, profits, or 
income of every person residing in the United States” above $600, with a 5% rate applicable to 
amounts over $10,000); see also Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881) (approving 
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seems to overwhelm common sense in discussions like this.28 
Finally, I shall argue, Murphy II contained its own complement of 
questionable propositions—questionable partly because they are 
inconsistent with prior authority. For one thing, the D.C. Circuit 
advanced a conception of the relationship between the meaning of 
“incomes” in the Sixteenth Amendment and the meaning of “income” 
in the Internal Revenue Code that was contrary to decades of 
Supreme Court authority. 
As a matter of first principle, it is not absurd to think that the 
statutory definition of “income” can include items that are not income 
under the Amendment as long as other constitutional authority 
supports taxation.29 But the Court has many times said the two 
documents should be interpreted consistently.30 (Indeed, Judge 
Ginsburg in Murphy I noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that 
the word ‘incomes’ in the Amendment and the phrase ‘gross income’ 
in § 61(a) of the IRC are coextensive.”31) In Murphy II, however, the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that the whistleblower’s recovery could 
constitutionally be reached by section 61 regardless of whether it was 
“income” under the Amendment.32 In addition, the panel concluded 
the recovery could be taxed even though it might not have been 
                                                                                                                 
 
unapportioned 1862 income tax). But see Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 
158 U.S. 601 (1895) (striking down unapportioned 1894 income tax). 
28
 Responding to an article in which I argued that recoveries for nonphysical injuries are 
not automatically taxable, a critic accused me of “giving aid and comfort to tax protestors who 
claim that wages are not income under section 61.” Joseph M. Dodge, Letter to the Editor, Of 
Course Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries are Taxable!, 106 TAX NOTES 986, 987 (2005) 
[hereinafter Dodge, Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries] (responding to Erik M. Jensen, Are 
Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries Automatically Taxable?, 105 TAX NOTES 1439 (2004) 
[hereinafter Jensen, Automatically Taxable?]). 
29
 See Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of 
Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 191 (2007) (“It is . . . possible for 
Ms. Murphy’s award to constitute ‘income’ under the I.R.C., but not . . . under the Sixteenth 
Amendment, for the I.R.C. has an evolving meaning changeable by Congress . . . .”). 
30
 It had always been understood that Congress might exercise less than full power, by 
exempting items that could be taxed. In that respect, the statutory definition of “gross income” 
could be narrower than the constitutional meaning of “incomes.” The possibility that the 
statutory definition might be broader had been hypothesized, but, until Murphy II, it had not 
been accepted. See Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 376 (“[N]o 
court (including the Murphy [I] panel decision) has . . . taken such a view, and so it must be 
viewed as being only a remote theoretical possibility.”). The remote possibility soon became 
real. 
31
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. 
Cir. Dec. 22, 2006) (citing, inter alia, Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)). 
Moreover, the term generally should be understood in a nontechnical way. See United States v. 
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936) (“Income within the meaning of the 
Sixteenth Amendment is[,] . . . [w]ith few exceptions, if any, . . . income as the word is known 
in the common speech of men.”). 
32
 Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).  
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considered “gross income” historically and even though Congress had 
not explicitly amended section 61 to expand its scope.33 
Taxation is hard enough to understand without the meaning of 
“income” shifting from one setting to another, and, if the cash 
received by Ms. Murphy was not “income” under the Sixteenth 
Amendment—Murphy II did not repudiate that part of Murphy I—
what was the effect of imposing a tax on the recovery? The Murphy II 
panel said the levy was an “excise,”34 but it looks a lot like a tax on 
wealth. If so, to be constitutional, it should have been subject to the 
onerous direct-tax apportionment rule.35 Never before had a court 
hinted that an unapportioned national tax on wealth, if packaged in 
the right way, might meet constitutional requirements. In its haste to 
correct mistakes in Murphy I—and to be applauded by the legal 
academy—the panel in Murphy II took positions that are harder to 
defend than Murphy I. 
B. The Plan of Attack  
The Murphy litigation is done, but the issues should not go away. 
They are important, interesting, and even fun. In making the case for 
their significance, I shall proceed as follows. Part II sets out the facts 
and procedural posture of Murphy I, and, to help us feel superior to 
the D.C. Circuit, Part III describes some of the howlers in that 
decision. 
The next two parts of the Article examine the issues that made 
Murphy a more difficult case than most commentators think and that 
made the result, if not the reasoning, of Murphy I defensible. Part IV 
discusses the constitutional structure—the direct-tax clauses and the 
Sixteenth Amendment—and explains why the constitutional issues in 
Murphy were serious. Part V considers the role of section 104(a)(2) in 
analyzing recoveries for nonphysical personal injuries, concluding 
that not all such recoveries are fully taxable. 
Part VI argues that treating recoveries in a personal setting like 
Murphy differently from receipts of value in a business or investment 
context is not silly. Finally, Part VII considers Murphy II’s change of 
direction, questions the desirability of having the meaning of “gross 
                                                                                                                 
33 Id. at 180.  
34
 Id. at 186. An excise must satisfy only the uniformity rule, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 
(“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”); see also 
Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184–86 (stating that an excise tax does not need to satisfy the more 
stringent apportionment rule). 
35
 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184–86 (noting that the apportionment rule is applicable to a 
direct tax that is not a tax on incomes); see also infra Part IV (discussing taxation of 
nonphysical personal injuries). 
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income” unmoored from the constitutional meaning of “incomes,” 
and explains why the case bizarrely supports an unapportioned tax on 
wealth. 
II. MURPHY I: THE BASICS 
In 1994, Marrita Murphy complained to the United States 
Department of Labor that a former employer, the New York Air 
National Guard, had violated whistleblower statutes by blacklisting 
her and providing unfavorable references after she had alerted 
environmental authorities to some of the Guard’s suspect activities.36 
The Labor Department determined that unlawful retaliation had in 
fact occurred, and an administrative law judge concluded that Murphy 
had suffered $70,000 in damages—$45,000 attributable to “emotional 
distress or mental anguish” and $25,000 to “injury to professional 
reputation”—which she received in 2000.37 
Although one might think that “injury to professional reputation” 
relates to future earning power, the D.C. Circuit specifically stated 
that “[n]one of the award was for lost wages or diminished earning 
capacity.”38 If the injury was nonphysical and the recovery was only 
for lost earnings, no authority would have supported excluding the 
recovery from gross income. But the litigation proceeded with a 
different assumption about the reasons for Murphy’s compensation.39 
Murphy initially paid federal income taxes on the recovery, but she 
later filed an amended return, taking the position that, under Internal 
Revenue Code section 104(a)(2), the $70,000 was not taxable.40 That 
section had historically provided an exclusion from gross income for 
a recovery “received on account of personal injuries or sickness,”41 
but, in 1996, Congress amended the section to limit the exclusion to 
recoveries for “personal physical injuries or physical sickness” and to 
provide that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical 
injury or physical sickness.”42 The amended version of section 
104(a)(2) applied to Murphy’s award.43 
                                                                                                                 
36
 At the time her name was Leveille, but, like the D.C. Circuit, I will refer to her as 
“Murphy” throughout the Article. See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81. 
37
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38
 Id. 
39
 I am not sure the district court would have agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s 
characterization of the award, but the district court’s resolution of the case made that point 
irrelevant. See Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
40
 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81.  
41
 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994). 
42
 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 1605(a), 1605(b), 
110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (amending I.R.C. §§ 104(a)(2) and 104(a)). 
43
 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008); 
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Once the dispute reached litigation, Murphy argued in the 
alternative that she had suffered a physical injury (“bruxism” or teeth 
grinding) from the harassment or, if her injury was not physical, that 
her recovery was not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment.44 The district court granted the government’s motion for 
summary judgment on both issues.45 
The determination that Murphy’s injury was not physical for 
purposes of the statutory exclusion—affirmed by the D.C. Circuit46—
itself raises interesting questions,47 but I shall focus only on the 
alternative claim.48 The D.C. Circuit panel determined that the 
recovery, although for a nonphysical injury and thus not excluded by 
section 104(a)(2), was not “income” as a matter of constitutional 
law.49 Applying the “in lieu of” test—what did the recovery 
replace?—the panel concluded that no part of the recovery 
compensated for anything that would have been taxable, like lost 
wages.50 Had the recovery been “in lieu of” otherwise taxable  
income, it would have been “income” under the Sixteenth 
Amendment.51 But the panel concluded that was not the case.52 
                                                                                                                 
 
Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81. Murphy settled her claim against the New York Air National Guard in 
1999. See Leveille v. N.Y. Air Nat’l Guard, No. 98-079, 1999 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 105 
(Dep’t of Labor Admin. Review Bd. Oct. 25, 1999). She included the $70,000 as income in her 
income tax return in 2000. Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 171; Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81.  
44
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 80–81. 
45
 See Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d, 
460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 
U.S. 1004 (2008). 
46
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 83–84. 
47
 The required connection between a physical injury and a recovery has yet to be fleshed 
out. The Service has provided limited guidance. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41-022 
(Oct. 13, 2000) (concluding that recovery on a sexual harassment claim was governed by 
section 104(a)(2) when unwanted contact led to “observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, 
swelling, and bleeding”); I.R.S. Off. Mem. (CCA) 2008-09-001 (Nov. 27, 2007) (concluding 
that an adult’s recovery for sexual abuse suffered as child was excludable although physical 
effects were no longer apparent). The Tax Court’s guidance has been similarly limited. See, e.g., 
Domeny v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1047, 1049 (2010) (holding that recovery for a hostile 
work environment that exacerbated symptoms of multiple sclerosis was “on account of” a 
personal sickness, but more was needed). Legal scholars have identified the need for guidance. 
See, e.g., William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Tax Treatment of Sexual Harassment Awards: 
Clarifying the Threshold for Exclusion, 30 J. LEGIS. 275 (2004) (urging regulations). Robert 
Wood has pondered whether false imprisonment is a physical injury, see Robert W. Wood, Are 
False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, 119 TAX NOTES 279 (2008) [hereinafter Wood, False 
Imprisonment], and has objected to the Tax Court’s negative conclusion on a related issue. See 
Robert W. Wood, Why False Imprisonment Recoveries Should Not Be Taxable, 123 TAX NOTES 
1217 (2009) [hereinafter Wood, False Imprisonment] (discussing Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 96 
T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (2008)). 
48
 I shall also not discuss whether the Internal Revenue Service was an appropriate party. 
49
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 88–92. 
50
 Id. 
51
 See id. at 88 (citing Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 
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As a result, if Congress intended to make such a recovery taxable 
when it limited the exclusion from gross income to recoveries for 
personal physical injuries or sickness, the panel determined it had 
acted unconstitutionally: “[W]e hold § 104(a)(2) unconstitutional 
insofar as it permits the taxation of an award of damages for mental 
distress and loss of reputation.”53 A recovery for emotional distress is 
not “incomes” within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, and, 
if the tax was not on incomes, the rule requiring that direct taxes be 
apportioned should have applied. Because Congress had not 
apportioned the tax, it was invalid.54 
“Direct taxes”? “Apportionment”? Those constitutional terms 
require explication if the issues in Murphy are to be understood. I 
undertake that project in Part IV, after I first describe some of the 
howlers in Murphy I. The howlers are important; Murphy I was, in 
some respects, an embarrassment. But I shall go on to argue that the 
D.C. Circuit panel overreacted in Murphy II by jettisoning almost all 
that it had concluded the first time around. 
III. THE HOWLERS IN MURPHY I 
The Murphy I panel did a poor job, but the embarrassing aspects of 
Chief Judge Ginsburg’s opinion were not entirely the court’s fault. 
We cannot expect generalist judges to be experts on every statutory 
regime. They rely on lawyers to get the foundation right, and the 
government, presumably because it had no idea that a bombshell 
might come from an apparently routine case, did not help with the 
basics. 
I here outline a few egregious mistakes Judge Ginsburg advanced 
on behalf of the panel. Some were trivial. A judge should not refer to 
Eisner v. Macomber55 as Eisner,56 but that sort of thing happens.57 
Referring to an “IRS” opinion from 1922 was equally harmless,58 
albeit historically challenged.59 Other howlers, however, illustrated a 
                                                                                                                 
 
1944)). 
52
 See id. at 88–92. 
53
 Id. at 92. 
54
 Id. 
55
 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
56
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 85. Eisner was a Collector of Internal Revenue. Calling the case 
Eisner is like referring to Commissioner v. Popeye as Commissioner. 
57
 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 94 (1977) (referring to “Eisner’s definition 
of income”). The government did not help. See Brief for the Appellees at 21, Murphy I, 460 
F.3d 79 (No. 05-5139), 2005 WL 3598532 (referring to Macomber as “Eisner”). 
58
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 91 (citing Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922)). 
59
 Originally the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the agency did not become the Internal 
Revenue Service until 1953, see T.D. 6038, 1953-2 C.B. 443, although the modern term was 
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striking unfamiliarity with basics of the federal tax system. 
Misunderstanding constitutional authority to enact an income tax. 
Judge Ginsburg focused on the meaning of the term “income” 
because, in the panel’s view, “[t]he constitutional power of the 
Congress to tax income is provided in the Sixteenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1913.”60 As I discuss in Part IV, that statement is as wrong 
as it can be. The power to tax income derives from the Taxing Clause 
in Article I, Section 8: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . .”61 The Amendment 
simply provides that a “tax on incomes” is not subject to the 
apportionment rule for direct taxes.62 In that respect the Amendment 
made the modern income tax possible—an apportioned income tax 
would be a travesty—but authority to enact an income tax has been in 
the Constitution since its inception. 
Failing to look for other constitutional authority for the tax. 
Focused as it was on the Sixteenth Amendment, the court did not 
consider whether the tax on the emotional-distress recovery might 
have been constitutional anyway, without regard to the Amendment. 
After all, most federal taxes are not “taxes on incomes,” but their 
constitutionality is taken for granted.63 
Jumping to constitutional analysis without looking at the statute 
first. The Murphy I panel violated a basic interpretive rule that applies 
whenever the constitutionality of a statute is at issue: see if the 
constitutional issue can be avoided. If the panel had looked to the 
meaning of “gross income” under section 61, and had understood  
how section 104(a)(2) affects that definition, it might not have had to  
reach constitutional issues. Indeed, since Judge Ginsburg had stated  
that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that the word ‘incomes’ in the 
Amendment and the phrase ‘gross income’ in § 61(a) of the IRC are 
coextensive,”64 one might have expected the panel to wonder whether 
                                                                                                                 
 
used earlier on some tax forms. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FORM 1040: 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (1918), available at http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/1040 
forms.nsf/WebByYear/1918/$file/1040_1918.pdf. 
60
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 84. 
61
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. But see Brief for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 28 
(“Congress’s power to tax ‘income’ under the Sixteenth Amendment extends to the receipt of 
anything of value, measured in money (i.e., ‘accessions to wealth’), over which the taxpayer has 
dominion and control.” (emphasis omitted)). 
62
 See infra Part IV. 
63
 In Murphy II, the panel wound up concluding that the tax on the emotional-distress 
recovery was properly characterized as an excise, making the Sixteenth Amendment irrelevant. 
See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008); see also 
infra Part VII. 
64
 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
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a recovery that was not income for constitutional purposes might also 
not have been gross income. Even if statutory interpretation was not 
decisive in Murphy I, the statute was the place to begin. It is always 
the place to begin. 
Holding that section 104(a)(2) as applied to Murphy’s facts  
was unconstitutional. The Murphy I court concluded that amended 
section 104(a)(2) is unconstitutional.65 That conclusion reflects a 
misunderstanding of the statutory structure. As I discuss in Part V, 
section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion from gross income, the definition of 
which is found in section 61. When Congress amended section 
104(a)(2) to limit its application to recoveries for personal physical 
injuries, it was narrowing an exclusion from gross income, not 
expanding the definition in section 61.66 If Murphy’s recovery fit 
within the terms of section 61, but the application of the tax to the 
recovery was impermissible, it was section 61 that must have been 
unconstitutional. 
Misunderstanding returns of capital and returns of basis. Perhaps 
the greatest problem in Murphy I was the panel’s botching of the 
analysis of basis.67 The panel said it has long been recognized that 
mere restoration of capital is not income, either statutorily or 
constitutionally,68 and Murphy characterized her award as a return of 
human capital. She argued she was merely made whole by the 
compensation—a $70,000 loss was replaced by a $70,000 recovery—
and therefore had no income.69 
The government made the obvious response: recovery of basis is 
not taxable,70 but individuals have no basis in human capital. Dispose 
                                                                                                                 
65 Id. at 92. 
66
 More is treated as income when an exclusion is narrowed, but section 61’s boundaries 
were not expanded by amending section 104(a)(2). See Suder v. Comm’r, No. 3245-06S, T.C. 
Summ. Op. 2008–97, at 4 (Aug. 7, 2008) (admonishing a couple who, relying on Murphy I, had 
argued that a settlement payment was not income and that, if section 104(a)(2) made it income, 
that section was invalid: “If the settlement proceeds were not includable in gross income under 
section 61, then the constitutionality of section 104(a)(2) would be irrelevant.”). 
67
 I am not certain the panel misunderstood as much as many have suggested, but, at best, 
the panel did a poor job of explanation.  
68
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 85. 
69
 Id.  
70
 In fact, the government conceded that basis recovery may not be taxed as a matter of 
constitutional law. See id. at 87. I agree with the concession, but not everyone does. See, e.g., 
Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 394–97. Rejecting the idea that a 
“netting principle” is constitutionally required, Professor Dodge sees no difference between 
Congress’s limiting deductions—no one believes it must permit every conceivable deduction—
and its power to “disallow basis or basis recovery.” Joseph M. Dodge, The Netting of Costs 
Against Income Receipts (Including Damage Recoveries) Produced by Such Costs, Without 
Barring Congress from Disallowing Such Costs, 27 VA. TAX REV. 297, 370 (2007) [hereinafter 
Dodge, Netting of Costs]. Congress needs leeway, but disallowing all deductions (or basis 
recovery) is inconsistent with a “tax on incomes.” 
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of an item of capital with a zero basis, and all proceeds will be gain.71 
I will return to the consideration of human capital later.72 Suffice it 
to say for present purposes that the panel in Murphy I did not meet  
the government’s argument head-on,73 a failure that caused scholarly 
dismay. Moreover, passages in the opinion could be interpreted to 
suggest the judges did not understand basis and gain. The court said a 
recovery that merely makes a taxpayer whole—for example, $70,000 
to replace a $70,000 item of converted property—cannot be income.74 
Wrong.75 The appropriate comparison is not between value received 
and value given up, which should be equal in an arm’s-length 
transaction, but between value received and basis of property 
surrendered.76 
On the misunderstanding that gave rise to this howler, the 
government had not been helpful. In its brief, the government 
advanced an argument indicating that it too misunderstood the 
concept of “gain.”77 It said compensatory damages like those  
in Murphy “plainly constitute economic gain, for the taxpayer 
unquestionably has more money after receiving the damages than she 
had prior to receipt of the award.”78 The idea that more money 
                                                                                                                 
71
 Gain is the difference between amount realized and basis. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006). 
If no basis exists, gain will equal amount realized—what the government said the Murphy result 
should have been. 
72
 I am unconvinced that what might be called human capital necessarily has no basis or 
that it is necessarily true that compensation for involuntary losses of human capital were 
intended to be reached by the income tax. See infra Part V.B.3. 
73
 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 88 (“The question in this case is not . . . about a return of 
capital . . . ; the question is whether the compensation she received for her injuries is income.”). 
74
 See id. 
75
 Authority on which critics of Murphy I rely did no better, which is why Murphy’s 
lawyers thought she had a shot. The Glenshaw Glass Court distinguished the “long history of 
departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they 
roughly correspond to a return of capital” from the situation with punitive damages, which 
“cannot be considered a restoration of capital.” Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 
432 n.8 (1955). That distinction was repeated in O’Gilvie v. United States. 519 U.S. 79, 84 
(1996) (citing cases holding “restoration of capital was not income”); see also id. at 86 
(suggesting damages “that aim to substitute for a victim’s physical or personal well-being” are 
not taxable). 
76
 The definitive article is Deborah A. Geier, Murphy and the Evolution of ‘Basis,’ 113 
TAX NOTES 576 (2006). Professor Geier argues that the Murphy I panel got hung up on rulings 
from the early years of the income tax, before the modern concept of basis had been developed. 
See id. at 576–77 (“[T]he panel opinion appears to hold that our understanding of the core 
concept of tax basis (or capital) must be frozen as of 1913 . . . .”). What we would call basis was 
often considered to be fair market value at acquisition. Id. at 580–81. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 
470 (1929), which upheld an argument under the Revenue Act of 1921 that a donee’s basis in 
appreciated property should be the donor’s, moved the system away from 1913 concepts. Geier, 
supra, at 581; see also Taft, 278 U.S. at 484 (“[N]othing in the Constitution . . . lends support to 
the theory that gain . . . can be treated as taxable income in the hands of the recipient only so far 
as the increase occurred while he owned the property.”). 
77
 See Brief for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 28. 
78 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 86 (quoting Brief for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 28). 
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necessarily means economic gain is absurd—and demonstrates why 
the Murphy I panel was able to characterize the government’s 
position as “breathtakingly expansive.”79 The sale of a widget with 
basis of $70,000 for $70,000 in cash gives rise to no income. The 
nature of the assets has changed, but there has been no accession to 
wealth.80 The fact that you have new cash in your hand does not mean 
the transaction is taxable. 
The two sets of lawyers took diametric positions, but both seemed 
to misunderstand basis. The position of Murphy’s advisors, largely 
accepted by the panel in Murphy I, was this: Pay no attention to basis. 
Compensation for conversion of capital is tax-free in its entirety 
regardless of basis. The government’s position was also unfounded: 
Pay no attention to basis. If cash is received, the amount of the cash is 
income. We all ought to be able to do better than this. 
IV. DIRECT TAXES AND THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 
It is finally time to get into the merits of the dispute in Murphy. I 
look first, in this part of the Article, at the constitutional structure that 
was involved in the Murphy litigation. In Part V, I then turn to the 
relevant statutory structure. The panel in Murphy I thought the 
Sixteenth Amendment was decisive: Murphy’s recovery for 
emotional distress was not “incomes” and therefore could not be 
reached by the income tax. What does the Amendment do, and when 
is it relevant? 
A. The Constitutional Structure  
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provides that 
“Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several 
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”81 People 
often say the Amendment authorized an income tax—Judge Ginsburg 
stated this in Murphy I82—but that assumption is wrong. The Taxing 
Clause, granting Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
                                                                                                                 
79
 See id. at 87; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
reaction to the government’s position). The IRS brief said things like “Congress’s power to tax 
‘income’ is broad-sweeping and extends to the receipt of anything of value, measurable in 
money (i.e., ‘accessions to wealth’), over which the taxpayer has dominion and control.” Brief 
for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 15. 
80
 Even those who take an expansive view of amended section 104(a)(2) concede that a 
recovery of cash is not taxable if it reflects recovery of basis. See infra Part V.B.1. 
81
 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
82 See supra text accompanying note 60. 
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Duties, Imposts and Excises,” did that on its own.83 The Amendment 
made possible an unapportioned income tax like we have today. 
An income tax was a problem before the Amendment because of 
the requirement (noted twice in the direct-tax clauses of Article I) that 
a direct tax must be apportioned among the states on the basis of 
population.84 In 1895, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,85 the 
Supreme Court had held that the 1894 income tax was invalid because 
it was direct and Congress had not satisfied the apportionment 
requirement.86 
A response to Pollock, the Sixteenth Amendment exempted “taxes 
on incomes” from apportionment.87 That was critical because the 
apportionment requirement, when it does apply, is a real pain. 
Residents of a state with one-twentieth of the national population, for 
example, must in the aggregate pay one-twentieth of the total liability 
for any direct tax, regardless of how the tax base (real-estate value, 
say) is distributed across the country. 
Because incomes vary from state to state, an apportioned income 
tax could not be based on ability to pay. If an income tax had to be 
apportioned, the numbers could be made to work, but doing so would 
not be easy.88 Some mechanism would have to ensure that each state 
pays the requisite percentage of the national tax liability—probably 
meaning that tax rates would be higher in a poor state than in a rich 
one.89 Even if some other method were used, the bottom line is that a 
higher percentage of a poor state’s income would be taken in federal 
income taxes—a counterintuitive system, to put it mildly. Indeed,  
as the Supreme Court said in Springer v. United States,90 the 1881 
                                                                                                                 
83
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
84
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective 
Numbers . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, 
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). 
85
 157 U.S. 429, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
86
 158 U.S. at 637. 
87
 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1114–23. 
88
 Congress did apportion a number of antebellum taxes on real estate. Apportionment can 
be done, clunky though it is. See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 13, 12 Stat. 292, 297; Act of 
Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 24, § 6, 3 Stat. 255, 256; Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, § 1, 3 Stat. 216, 216; 
Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, § 5, 3 Stat. 164, 166; Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, § 3, 3 Stat. 53, 71; 
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597, 598. 
89
 Suppose state A has two citizens, each of whom earns $100,000 per year. State B also 
has two citizens, each of whom earns $10,000 per year. An apportioned income tax would have 
to collect the same amount of revenue from each state. If the figure is $2,000 per state, the 
income of each state A citizen would have to be taxed at a one percent rate, while the rate in 
state B would have to be ten percent And the targets would be moving. As national income and 
population shift geographically, the rate structures would have to be adjusted, after each census, 
to satisfy the apportionment requirement. 
90
 102 U.S. 586 (1881). 
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decision upholding an unapportioned Civil War income tax, “Where 
the population is large and the incomes are few and small, 
[apportionment] would be intolerably oppressive.”91 
Counterintuitive, oppressive, and even stupid? Well, 
apportionment would seem stupid if Congress were actually to try to 
apportion an income tax or any other tax, the base of which is not 
distributed proportionately to population. If income and population 
were distributed in a more or less proportionate way—if each state 
had about the same percentage of national population and income—
apportioning an income tax would be easy (and pointless92). But 
proportionality of that sort did not exist in 1789, it does not exist 
today, and it is hard to imagine it ever would exist. In the real world, 
an apportioned income tax would be crazy, an object of ridicule.93 
Apportionment is not so bizarre, however, if understood as a 
limitation on congressional power. One hopes that Congress would 
ordinarily not want to appear ridiculous,94 and apportionment 
provides a disincentive to enact a tax with decidedly sectional 
effects.95 Requiring apportionment when the tax base and  
population are not distributed proportionately—when, if there were 
no apportionment rule, representatives of poorer states might try  
to gang up on those from richer ones96—would mean, as a  
practical matter, that Congress would be unlikely to enact the direct 
tax.97 That is the point. 
                                                                                                                 
91
 Id. at 600. 
92
 Professor Johnson has argued that apportionment should apply only to taxes the bases 
of which are distributed proportionately to population. See Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the 
Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295,  
297–98, 314–18 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Constitutional Absurdity]. That would make the 
direct-tax clauses superfluous. 
93
 See id. at 296. 
94
 One would expect an apportioned tax to be used only when revenue needs trump 
everything else. See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption 
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2382–83 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, 
Consumption Taxes]. When Congress enacted apportioned property taxes between 1798 and 
1861, it did so because of war or anticipation of war. See supra note 88 (listing specific acts of 
Congress creating apportioned property taxes). 
95
 Although apportionment has far broader application, southern proponents clearly had 
slavery in mind. If northerners had sought to tax slaves, their own states would have borne a 
share of the national tax liability. Who would have voted for such a tax? (Slaves were in fact 
reached by early taxes on real estate but the theory was that slaves were inextricably linked to 
real property.) 
96
 The uniformity rule has been interpreted to require only that a duty, impost, or excise 
apply in the same way across the country, regardless of whether the tax base is distributed 
uniformly. A tariff is geographically uniform if it applies similarly in all ports even though 
many states have no ports. See Erik M. Jensen, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 77–88 (Jack Stark ed., 2005) [hereinafter JENSEN, THE 
TAXING POWER]. The uniformity rule thus provides no protection against a tax that is uniform in 
this respect but that has geographically discriminatory effects. 
97
 I have made this argument several times. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the 
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With the Sixteenth Amendment on the books, we are so used to an 
unapportioned income tax that thinking in these terms seems peculiar. 
Concerns about sectional taxes, however, were not remote when the 
Constitution was ratified in 1789, or in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, when debates about an income tax were 
vitriolic.98 The 1894 income tax was a reaction to consumption taxes, 
particularly tariffs, which had become the primary revenue source for 
the national government, but were thought to hit low-income persons 
unfairly.99 The income tax was structured to reach only the wealthy, 
and the wealthy were concentrated in the industrial Northeast. There 
was a decidedly sectional aspect to the tax.100 
Because of the 1796 Supreme Court decision in Hylton v. United 
States,101 which had concluded that the direct-tax clauses apply to 
very little,102 and the 1881 decision in Springer, which upheld the 
unapportioned Civil War income tax,103 most commentators at the 
time thought the 1894 tax would easily pass constitutional muster. 
But in Pollock, decided only fourteen years after Springer, a divided 
Court (5–4) held that the 1894 income tax was direct and, because not 
apportioned, constitutionally invalid.104 In some respects, Pollock 
turned the world upside-down, but the majority actually did a nice job 
of connecting with Hylton. 
The Founders said nothing about an income tax, a concept that was 
at best rudimentarily understood in the late eighteenth century. In 
debates, they provided only two examples of direct taxes that had to 
be apportioned—capitation taxes (specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution)105 and real-estate taxes. In dicta in Hylton, which upheld 
an unapportioned federal tax on carriages, three of the four Justices 
intimated that no other tax could be direct,106 and two said also that 
                                                                                                                 
 
Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355 (2004) 
[hereinafter Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment]. 
98
 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1100–07. 
99
 The income tax had populist support, but its appeal was much broader. There was a 
widespread feeling that tariffs were unfair in their application. See id. at 1095–96. 
100
 See id. at 1096–97. An apportioned income tax could not be based on ability to pay: 
rates would have to be higher in poor states than in rich ones. See supra notes 87–90 and 
accompanying text. 
101
 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
102
 See id. (Chase, Iredell & Paterson, JJ., seriatim). 
103
 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881). 
104
 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 
601 (1895). 
105
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
106 See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“In regard to other articles, 
there may possibly be considerable doubt.”); id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“I never 
entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of the 
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apportionment should be required only when it is easy to do—when, 
that is, population and the tax base are distributed proportionately.107 
The Hylton dicta were repeated in many nineteenth-century cases, 
including Springer,108 as if they were unquestionably correct and as if 
an income tax could not possibly be a problem as long as it satisfied 
the Uniformity Clause. The Supreme Court in 1796 was made up of 
Founders, and who better, it was argued, to understand the original 
meaning of the Constitution? 
But the dicta should always have been viewed skeptically. For  
one thing, although the Hylton Justices were Founders, they were  
also Federalists, with every incentive to support the Federalist 
government.109 If apportionment were to be required only when it is 
easy, the direct-tax clauses would be meaningless. Furthermore, the 
dicta were inconsistent with each other110 and with constitutional 
language. If the Founders intended apportionment for only capitation 
taxes and real-estate taxes, it would have been easy to draft the rule 
accordingly. Instead, they used the phrase “Capitation, or other direct, 
Tax,”111 suggesting a broader application for the clauses. 
Even more important, the implicit assumption in Hylton was that 
the Founders intended to constrain only those taxes with which they 
were familiar. Those today who treat Hylton as gospel make the same 
assumption: any levy not envisioned by tax theoreticians in 1789 
must be exempt from apportionment. That is a strange way to 
                                                                                                                 
 
Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and 
a tax on land.”); id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) (stating that direct taxes “contemplated by the 
Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, [s]imply, without regard to property, 
profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND.”). 
107
 See id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is 
evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct, but such as could be apportioned. If 
this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution.”); id. 
at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, 
but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is 
only to be adopted in such cases, where it can reasonably apply; and the subject taxed, must 
ever determine the application of the rule.”). 
108
 See, e.g., Springer, 102 U.S. at 602 (“[D]irect taxes, within the meaning of the 
Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate . 
. . .”); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 543 (1869) (“[P]ersonal property, contracts, 
occupations, and the like, have never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct 
tax.”). 
109
 The Court did not see itself as a check on other branches. See Jensen, Consumption 
Taxes, supra note 94, at 2361. 
110
 Although a tax on real estate could be apportioned—Congress did that several times 
between 1798 and 1861, see supra note 88—it was not easy. There was no reason to think 
population and real-estate value (or any other measure that might be used to tax real estate) were 
distributed proportionately. 
111
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
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interpret a constitutional limitation;112 indeed, it is a dumb way.113 It 
is as if we should interpret the Fourth Amendment as having no effect 
on electronic surveillance because even Benjamin Franklin could not 
have imagined twenty-first century electronics.114 
The result in Pollock was unpopular; a tax structured to reach the 
wealthy was favored by the vast majority not subject to the tax. And, 
it was said with reason, Pollock was contrary to Supreme Court 
authority going back to Hylton. (Although the Hylton statements were 
technically dicta, they had metamorphosed in the minds of many into 
“authority.”) But the Pollock majority made an effort to tie its 
conclusion to Hylton, using the following syllogism: (1) The Hylton 
Court had said a tax on real property is direct. (2) Taxing income 
from real property is constitutionally indistinguishable from taxing 
the property itself, since either tax diminishes the value of the 
property. (3) Because no distinction of constitutional dimension 
would justify treating income from personal property differently  
from income from real property, a tax on any income from property  
is direct. (4) Finally, because the unapportioned income tax was 
overwhelmingly directed at income from property (the income of the 
wealthy), the entire statute had to fall.115 
Whatever Pollock’s merits—even if it was so clearly wrong that it 
should have had no legal weight, as many thought—it was on the 
books,116 and it became apparent there would be no income tax 
without a constitutional amendment.117 It is in that respect that the 
                                                                                                                 
112
 I cannot prove what a Founder would have thought about a new tax. But I am sure that, 
if he had been asked if such a tax would automatically be exempt from apportionment, the 
answer would have been no. Otherwise, the Constitution would not have been ratified. See Erik 
M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct-Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL. 
687, 689 (1999) [hereinafter Jensen, How to Read]; see also Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution 
Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 826–27 (2003). 
113
 Many who see a limited role for the direct-tax apportionment rule show disdain for the 
effort to understand original meaning—except when something, like the Hylton dicta, supports 
their predilections. 
114
 Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend 
that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely 
unaffected by the advance of technology.”); Brian C. Anderson & Adam D. Thierer, Killing 
Talk Radio, NEW CRITERION, Sept. 2008, at 18, 20 (quoting former FCC Commissioner Dennis 
Patrick that the Fairness Doctrine is “unconstitutional on its face”: “[t]o suggest otherwise is to 
suggest the framers of our constitution intended to protect from federal coercion only those who 
used the technology of the day—a proposition absurd on its face” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
115
 See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2369–70. A further benefit of this 
analysis was that, by focusing on income from property, the Pollock Court did not have to 
overrule Springer. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
116
 I do not defend all of Pollock’s anti-revolutionary bombast, but I defend the result: an 
income tax is direct. See infra Part IV.C.1; see also Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, 
at 2372–85; Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1071–73. 
117
 Some income-tax proponents argued that Congress should simply enact a new income 
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Sixteenth Amendment, by providing that the apportionment rule 
would not apply to “taxes on incomes,” made possible the modern 
income tax—an unapportioned income tax.118 
Some congressmen wanted to go further and repeal the direct-tax 
clauses, so that apportionment would never again be an issue for  
any tax, but the Amendment’s sponsor, Senator Norris Brown of 
Nebraska, rejected language that would have done that.119 (Perhaps 
Brown thought a narrow provision—exempting only taxes on 
incomes—made ratification easier.) Although the Amendment limited 
the direct-tax clauses, they remain in the Constitution.120 
B. Does Any of This Matter Anymore?  
The Sixteenth Amendment did not do away with the direct-tax 
clauses, suggesting that some forms of taxation might still be subject 
to apportionment.121 But maybe I have devoted too much effort to 
parsing constitutional text and not enough to understanding reality. 
Perhaps none of this matters anymore—Professor Caron thinks we 
should not have to examine “entrails” of Founding-era debates to 
understand the taxing power122—and maybe constitutional issues 
were not worth discussing in Murphy I. 
The Supreme Court has had no recent occasion to consider the 
meaning of the direct-tax clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment, but 
the general scholarly understanding points toward their irrelevance. 
The conventional wisdom is that the Taxing Clause gives Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 
tax and give the Court the opportunity to ditch Pollock. But this strategy was resisted: doing that 
could offend the Court, and there was no guarantee it would overrule Pollock. Furthermore, a 
reaffirmation of Pollock might have delayed enactment of an income tax indefinitely. See 
Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1109–14. 
118
 An unapportioned income tax would have none of the stupid effects that would come 
from an apportioned income tax (if such a tax could ever have been enacted). But doing away 
with apportionment also meant that Congress could impose a tax with sectional effects: the 
burdens of an unapportioned income tax are disproportionately borne by the wealthier parts of 
the country. 
119
 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1116. 
120
 See id. at 1114–23. Although aimed at Pollock, the Amendment was in form agnostic 
about the case’s merits. If Pollock was wrong, the Amendment was legal surplusage. If Pollock 
was right, the Amendment changed the law. Either way, an income tax need not be apportioned. 
121
 What that should mean, as a practical matter, is that, if Congress were aware of the 
problem, it would not enact a direct tax. 
122
 Caron, supra note 8, at 87 (“Examining the entrails of the constitutional compromise 
between Northern and Southern states over slavery sheds little light on modern day disputes 
over the Government’s power to tax its citizens.”). The form of the apportionment rule might 
have been due to slavery, see supra note 95, but the Constitution would not have been ratified 
without limitations on the taxing power. If apportionment had not been used, something else 
would have been. Should we be able to say, “We do not like this particular mechanism, so we 
will enforce no limits”? 
 2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM 
772 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:3 
nearly unlimited power in taxation; that Pollock was so clearly wrong 
that it can be ignored; and that, if Pollock was wrong, the Amendment 
was unnecessary and, in any event, should not constrain taxation. As 
Professor Caron has put it, “[T]he constitutional limitations on the 
taxing power do not serve the needs of the twenty-first century 
American economy and society.”123 
But Pollock is still on the books and is unlikely to be overturned in 
its entirety.124 And the Sixteenth Amendment did not repeal the 
direct-tax clauses; it merely exempted “taxes on incomes” from 
apportionment. To deal with these inconvenient propositions, which 
suggest that a direct tax that is not on incomes must still be 
apportioned (if enacted at all), proponents of a strong taxing power 
often take another tack to conclude that Congress can do what it 
wants: If Congress says a tax is on income, the Amendment controls, 
and apportionment is not required.125 
The argument effectively is that Congress has the power to  
avoid constitutional restrictions by labeling an enactment in the  
right way.126 If Congress hides an unapportioned direct tax in the  
income-tax provisions of the Code, but characterizes the tax as one on 
income, that characterization generally should end the discussion.127 
                                                                                                                 
123 Caron, supra note 8, at 87. 
124 Part of Pollock was overturned in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) 
(holding that the Constitution does not forbid taxing interest on bonds issued by states), and 
other parts have been chipped away. See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at  
2375–77. But the core of Pollock is unlikely to disappear. It is hard to imagine a dispute that 
would present the question cleanly; apportionment is not required for a “tax on incomes” 
whether or not Pollock was correct. Had the panel not reversed direction, Murphy I would have 
given the Court an opportunity to reconsider Pollock, but Murphy II effectively mooted the 
issue. 
125 As one commentator argues: 
[T]he Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a fully vested power to tax all 
income, however Congress defines it, without worrying about fine distinctions. Such 
an interpretation yields a meaning of income that is broad and evolutionary. 
Income’s meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the Court, and that meaning 
changes over time as congressional conceptions of income change and become more 
sophisticated. 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of 
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 24 (1992); see also Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 
1087–91, 1133–47. 
126
 In Murphy II, the panel took a slightly different tack: mislabeling does not matter if the 
levy would not be subject to the apportionment rule anyway. See infra text accompanying note 
510. 
127
 Could Congress say an ad valorem property tax is on income and avoid apportionment? 
I think not. The Hylton Court thought a real-estate tax was direct, see supra note 106, and early 
Congresses apportioned such taxes. See supra note 88 (citing congressional enactments of 
apportioned real-estate taxes). Nothing in the Sixteenth Amendment’s history suggests its 
drafters intended to affect real-estate taxes. See Germain, supra note 29, at 240 (“[U]nder the 
consistent rulings of the Supreme Court, Congress would still not be able to impose a traditional 
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Professor F. Patrick Hubbard has rightly criticized this 
“constitutional desuetude”—the idea that “taxation is so important 
and complex that the Supreme Court should simply allow Congress to 
make policy choices without interference because, in the modern 
context, constitutional limits on Congress’s power to tax are so 
outmoded, arbitrary, and inapplicable that the proper approach is 
simply to ignore or reject them.”128 Maybe “constitutional desuetude” 
describes what goes on in the real world, and, yes, apportionment is 
cumbersome. But Congress should not have the power, by an artful 
choice of labels, to sidestep constitutional requirements. 
Constitutional desuetude was not the prevailing view after 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. Several Supreme Court 
decisions from that era held that, for an unapportioned direct tax to be 
protected by the Amendment, it really must be on income. The best 
known example is Eisner v. Macomber,129 where the Court in 1920 
struck down an unapportioned income tax as it applied to stock 
dividends that did not change recipients’ percentage interests in  
the distributing corporation.130 In effect, the Court concluded, the 
Amendment presupposes a realization principle: accessions to wealth 
must be “realized” before they may be reached by an unapportioned 
“tax on incomes.” And what had happened in Macomber—slicing  
the corporate pie into more pieces, but with each person’s share 
unchanged—was not a realization event. Although the unapportioned 
income tax as a whole was valid, the stock dividends were not income 
to Macomber.131 The tax as it applied to those dividends thus 
remained direct—Pollock survived to that extent—but it was not 
protected by the Amendment.132 
Through the 1920s, the Court stressed that Congress could not 
circumvent apportionment simply by labeling a levy an income tax, or 
hiding a non-income tax within the income-tax statute. Although most 
commentators think those cases are no longer good law, they have not 
been overruled. In two cases decided shortly after Macomber, the 
Court held the Sixteenth Amendment had controlling effect.133 
                                                                                                                 
 
ad valorem real property tax without apportionment.”). 
128
 Hubbard, supra note 20, at 755. 
129
 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
130
 Id. at 219. 
131
 See id. 
132
 Id. 
133
 See Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, 633 (1925) (concluding that cash subsidy 
payments made by the Cuban government to facilitate railroad construction “were not made for 
services rendered or to be rendered. They were not profits or gains from the use or operation of 
the railroad, and do not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.”); 
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In many other cases, it was taken for granted that “taxes on 
incomes” means something. The Court usually made that point  
when a statute was deemed to meet constitutional standards anyway, 
and the point was therefore dictum in those cases. But the Court 
nevertheless felt it necessary to emphasize that constitutional 
language was being taken seriously. For example, in Burk-Waggoner 
Oil Association v. Hopkins,134 Justice Brandeis, who had dissented in 
Macomber,135 conceded that “Congress cannot make a thing income 
which is not so in fact.”136 
To be sure, the meaning of “incomes” matters, as the panel in 
Murphy I thought it does, only if the term “direct tax” has content. 
We need not care about carving “taxes on incomes” out of the 
apportionment rule if the rule applies to little or nothing anyway. 
Professor Calvin Johnson has argued that the Supreme Court got it 
right in Hylton, recognizing that apportionment was absurd and 
effectively limiting the rule only to taxes that can be easily 
apportioned.137 And Johnson applauds the other Hylton dictum that 
“direct taxes” includes at most capitation and real-estate taxes.138 
                                                                                                                 
 
Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (extending Macomber’s principles to corporate 
reorganizations in which a shareholder maintained a stock interest in a new corporation formed 
under the laws of the same state). The Cuba Railroad Court stressed that “[t]he Sixteenth 
Amendment, like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to 
be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used.” Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 
at 631. 
134 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (holding Congress may impose a corporate income tax on earnings 
of an unincorporated joint stock company denominated a partnership under state law). 
135
 See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220–38 (Brandeis & Clarke, JJ., dissenting). 
136
 Burk-Waggoner, 269 U.S. at 114; see also Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 
371, 379 (1934) (“The rental value of the building used by the owner does not constitute income 
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.”); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929) 
(“[T]he settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to 
define and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not  
have been properly regarded as income.”); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 
(1926) (“It was not the purpose or effect of [the Sixteenth] Amendment to bring any new subject 
within the taxing power.”); Merchs.’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) 
(“In determining the definition of . . . ‘income’ . . . this court has . . . approved . . . what it 
believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the 
minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment . . . .”). In James v. United 
States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), Justice Whittaker (joined by Justices Black and Douglas) 
concluded in dissent that embezzled funds were not income. Id. at 249 (Whittaker, Black & 
Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority relied on the broad taxing 
power, id. at 218 (majority opinion), but Justice Whittaker disagreed: “Equally well settled is 
the principle that the Sixteenth Amendment ‘is to be taken as written and is not to be extended 
beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used.’” Id. at 249 (Whittaker, Black & 
Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. at 631). But 
see Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1952) (“We think the power of Congress to 
tax these [illegal] receipts as income under the Sixteenth Amendment is unquestionable.”). 
137
 See Johnson, Constitutional Absurdity, supra note 92, at 324–27, 333–36. 
138
 Johnson goes further, arguing that the logic of the Founders’ position should also 
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Advocating a tax on wealth, Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued 
that, because the direct-tax clauses were part of a reprehensible 
compromise with slavery, the apportionment rule should apply, at 
most, to capitation taxes.139 If so, the rule is not even a potential 
constraint on the taxing power.140 
Johnson and Ackerman are influential people, but their 
pronouncements are not the law. Their articulation of the term “direct 
tax” is inconsistent with the original understanding of the direct-tax 
clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment.141 The Amendment accepted 
the existence of a body of taxes subject to the clauses—at a minimum 
including a tax on real estate—and excepted only “taxes on incomes” 
from apportionment.142 And the idea that apportionment should be 
required only when easy would gut the clauses.143 
So how should one evaluate the constitutional validity of an 
unapportioned tax? Determine first whether the tax is direct. If the 
answer is yes, the unapportioned tax is invalid, unless it is a tax on 
incomes protected by the Sixteenth Amendment. If, however, the 
answer is no—if, that is, the tax is “indirect” (a duty, excise, or 
impost)—then apportionment is not required. For an indirect tax, the 
only constitutional question is whether the uniformity requirement 
has been satisfied.144 Uniformity is not a problem if a particular item 
                                                                                                                 
 
exempt real-estate taxes, which were understood to be direct but which require dexterity to 
apportion, from the rule. See Calvin H. Johnson, Purging Out Pollock: The Constitutionality of 
Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES 1723 (2002). The Founders’ understanding that 
a real-estate tax is direct is clear from Founding debates and Hylton. If the Hylton Justices, 
disinclined to see limitations on the taxing power, saw real-estate taxes as direct, we should  
pay attention. Moreover, beginning in 1798, Congress enacted several such taxes that were 
apportioned. See supra note 88 (citing congressional enactments of apportioned real estate 
taxes). 
139
 See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58 (1999). 
140
 It is not a constraint if “capitation tax” means a lump-sum head tax. Putting aside 
questions about who gets counted and how—a slave counted as three-fifths of a person for this 
purpose and for representation—a lump-sum tax is by its very nature apportioned. See Jensen, 
Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2390–93. 
141
 Although Professor Ackerman calls what happened a compromise with slavery, 
counting slaves at all in the direct-tax apportionment process was detrimental to slave states. 
The larger the population count, the greater the state’s tax liability. Southern states wanted 
slaves to be counted as full persons for purposes of representation, but not at all for tax 
purposes. 
142
 Many thought Pollock was wrong and, as a legal matter, the Amendment was 
unnecessary. But that is not to say the concept of “direct tax” was without content. At a 
minimum, taxes considered direct historically—real-estate and capitation taxes—should have 
been unaffected by the Amendment. 
143
 The government in Murphy II nevertheless argued (unsuccessfully) that the clauses 
should be interpreted in this way. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
144
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The apportionment and uniformity rules are mutually 
exclusive. Except in unusual circumstances, a tax that is apportioned will not be uniform, and, if 
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is taxed consistently across the country.145 
That sets the stage for the constitutional analysis in Murphy—why 
the definition of “incomes” in the Sixteenth Amendment might 
matter. If an unapportioned tax levied on an emotional-distress 
recovery is direct, it is valid only if it is a tax on incomes.146 
C. What Is a Direct Tax?  
What other than a capitation tax and a tax on property might be a 
direct tax? Might that category include a levy on an emotional-
distress recovery? Those questions obviously have no clear answers, 
but the uncertainty is not as great as many think. I shall argue that, 
under the constitutional structure, an income tax is direct (as the 
Court concluded in Pollock), and a subset of that tax—a levy on an 
emotional-distress recovery—is direct as well. The Murphy I panel 
was correct that, if the constitutional issues had to be reached—if the 
Internal Revenue Code reached the recovery147—the unapportioned 
tax on Ms. Murphy was valid only if it was “on incomes.” 
1. Direct Taxes Are (Would You Believe It?) Not Indirect Taxes  
In several articles, I have argued that the universe of direct taxes is 
far broader than suggested in Hylton v. United States.148 It cannot  
be that the only taxes subject to a limitation are those known in 1789 
and for which apportionment provides no constraint. Certain 
principles were understood to distinguish direct taxes, subject to the 
apportionment rule, from other levies, the so-called indirect taxes 
(“Duties, Imposts and Excises”149), which need to satisfy only the 
uniformity requirement. Those principles should be applied to 
determine whether a modern tax of a sort unknown to the Founders  
is direct or not. 
In introducing what became the direct-tax clauses, Gouverneur 
Morris distinguished between direct and indirect taxes,150 limiting 
                                                                                                                 
 
a tax is uniform, it would almost certainly violate the apportionment rule. See Jensen, 
Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2341–42. 
145
 See JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER, supra note 96, at 77–88. 
146
 If the tax is not direct, however, these issues go away (which is what the D.C. Circuit 
ultimately concluded in Murphy II). See infra Part VII. 
147
 See infra Part V. 
148
 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). The endless series of articles includes Jensen, Consumption 
Taxes, supra note 94; Jensen, How to Read, supra note 112; Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth 
Amendment, supra note 97; Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19. 
149
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
150
 Morris came to regret the clauses, but he was responsible for them. See Jensen, 
Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2386–89. 
 2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM 
2010] MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 777 
apportionment “to direct taxation. With regard to indirect taxes,  
on exports & imports & on consumption, the rule would be 
inapplicable.”151 
In 1876, Judge Cooley drew a distinction that, for the most part, 
Gouverneur Morris would have understood. Taxes are 
Direct, under which designation would be included those 
which are assessed upon the property, person, business, 
income, etc., of those who are to pay them; and 
Indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before 
they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom 
they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market 
price of the commodity. Under the second head may be 
classed the duties upon imports, and the excise and stamp 
duties levied upon manufactures.152 
The “indirect taxes” are generally those the Constitution denominated 
“duties, imposts, and excises,” and in general are taxes imposed on 
articles of consumption. 
Cooley did not say his distinction was constitutionally mandated, 
but I suspect he would have had Hylton not been on the  
books.153 The distinction occurs throughout the Founding debates.  
For example, in Federalist 36, Alexander Hamilton wrote that by 
“indirect taxes” “must be understood duties and excises on articles of 
consumption.”154 Direct taxes are everything else.155 
Indirect taxes may wind up affecting the price, and therefore the 
consumption, of the products to which they relate. In Federalist 21, 
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 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 592 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1937) (1911) (July 12, 1787). While serving on the Supreme Court, Justice Joseph Story 
wrote: “[Taxes] are usually divided into two great classes, those, which are direct, and those, 
which are indirect. Under the former denomination are included taxes on land, or real property, 
and under the latter, taxes on articles of consumption.” JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 472, at 337–38 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak 
eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833); see also id. § 473, at 339 (“It is evident, that 
‘duties, imposts, and excises’ are indirect taxes in the sense of the constitution.”). 
152
 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 5 (1876). 
153
 In a footnote, Cooley wrote, “The term ‘direct taxes’ is employed in a peculiar sense in 
the federal constitution in the provision requiring such taxes to be apportioned according to 
representation, and they are, perhaps, limited to capitation and land taxes.” Id. at 5 n.2 (citing, 
inter alia, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796)). I interpret the “perhaps” as 
acknowledging precedent, but questioning its merits. 
154
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 219 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
155
 Some have wondered whether levies might exist that are neither direct (governed by the 
apportionment rule) nor indirect (subject to uniformity requirements). See, e.g., STORY, supra 
note 151, § 473, at 339. No such levy has been identified, however. See Jensen, Consumption 
Taxes, supra note 94, at 2341–42. 
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Hamilton noted that “[i]mposts, excises, and, in general, all duties 
upon articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will 
in time find its level with the means of paying them.”156 Consumers 
will adjust their behavior to the cost of the products, including the 
taxes—the “imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.”157 The 
assumption of most Founders was that regardless of the party on 
whom an indirect tax was in form laid—an importer, perhaps, or a 
seller—the burden was shifted to the ultimate consumer.158 That 
person could decide, in making his purchasing decision, whether to be 
subject to the tax. 
Because the consumer can avoid an indirect tax by not buying the 
taxed product, the market itself prevents governmental overreaching. 
The government needs revenue, and it has no incentive to raise taxes 
to levels so oppressive that revenue would actually decrease. If a 
taxpayer thinks an impost on imported silk is too high, he can buy 
some other, untaxed product instead, and the government gets 
nothing. Importers and sellers adjust as well. As Anti-Federalist 
Brutus explained, “[I]f [imposts] are laid higher than trade will bear, 
the merchants will cease importing, or smuggle their goods. We have 
therefore sufficient security, arising from the nature of the thing, 
against burdensome and intolerable impositions from this kind of 
tax.”159 
Self-policing as they are, indirect taxes required no constitutional 
limitations beyond the uniformity rule, as Brutus noted. That is why 
Gouverneur Morris limited the apportionment rule to direct taxes, 
which have no similar built-in protection. In general, direct taxes are 
imposed on individuals (as contrasted with a tax on sale, importation, 
or transfer of a product) in a way that prevents shifting the burden to 
someone else. At an abstract level, any tax can be avoided, but one 
cannot avoid a capitation tax or a tax on real estate as easily as one 
can an indirect tax. 
It was because government can more easily abuse direct taxes that 
many Founders wanted explicit restraint on their use. The concern 
                                                                                                                 
156 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 154, at 142. 
157 THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 154, at 93. 
158
 It is not necessarily true that the burden of an indirect tax can be passed on: “It is not 
always possible to raise the price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional 
imposition laid upon it. The merchant . . . is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in 
order to make a more expeditious sale.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 154, at 212. But, as Hamilton observed, “[t]he maxim that the consumer is the payer is so 
much oftener true than the reverse of the proposition.” Id. 
159
 Essays of Brutus, No. 5 (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 388, 392–93 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Smuggling is not a permissible form of 
tax avoidance, see Lawrence Zelenak, Essay, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the 
Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM L. REV. 833, 839 (1999), but ceasing importation is. 
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with direct taxes was partly that individuals could be harmed by an 
overzealous national government. But it was also that direct taxation 
could soak up so much revenue that little would be left to fund state 
needs.160 That danger had not existed with the requisitions used, often 
unsuccessfully, to raise revenue under the Articles of Confederation. 
When the national government, such as it was, requisitioned revenue 
from the states, the states served as filters of national power and 
protectors of their own interests—and thus protectors of their 
residents. Direct taxes, which would reach individuals directly, were 
different.161 
Is the individual income tax a direct tax, so understood? 
Absolutely. The tax is imposed on individuals, in a way that is as 
different from requisitions as can be, and the tax is not avoidable in 
the same manner as an indirect tax.162 An income tax has the dangers 
that apportionment was intended to protect against, and it should 
matter not a whit that the Founders did not explicitly characterize an 
income tax as a direct tax. One should not push counterfactuals too 
hard, but I cannot imagine that the Constitution would have been 
ratified if there had been a sense in 1789 that something like the 
modern income tax could be imposed without protections against 
abuse.163  
If an income tax is direct, a levy that is part of an unapportioned 
income tax must, in fact, be a “tax on incomes” if it is to be exempt 
from apportionment by the Sixteenth Amendment. This is why the 
constitutional issues in Murphy were potentially significant. 
But even if an income tax is generally direct, perhaps there is 
something special about an income tax as it applies to certain types of 
income—earned income in particular—that would keep the tax from 
being classified as direct. To that possibility I now turn. 
2. Pollock and a Tax on Earned Income Only  
I have concluded that an income tax would have been understood 
by the Founders as direct, if they had been in an intellectual position 
                                                                                                                 
160 See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, No. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in COMPLETE  
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 159, at 363, 366 (“[W]hen the [federal] government begins to 
exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the legislatures of the several states will find it 
impossible to raise monies to support their governments.”). 
161
 But see Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of 
Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839 (2009) (arguing that, 
together with capitation taxes and taxes on tangible property, requisitions are direct taxes). 
162
 Of course, an individual can avoid an income tax by having no income, or a capitation 
tax by committing suicide. But avoiding these taxes requires discombobulating one’s life much 
more than avoiding an indirect tax would. 
163
 See Jensen, How to Read, supra note 112, at 689. 
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to think about an income tax in the first place. I therefore have also 
implicitly concluded that Pollock was rightly decided. If a tax would 
be considered direct under Pollock, it could be enacted today in an 
unapportioned form only if it is a “tax on incomes,” which is why 
there was a potentially serious constitutional issue in Murphy. 
But Pollock contains language hinting—more than hinting, with 
Springer v. United States164 on the books—that a tax which reaches 
only earned income would be an excise, not a direct tax. An excise 
would not have to be apportioned even in a world with no Sixteenth 
Amendment. If earned income is fundamentally different from 
income from property, perhaps a tax on an emotional-distress 
recovery, likened by many to a tax on wages,165 would not be direct 
either. If so, we need not consider whether the levy on Ms. Murphy’s 
recovery is a “tax on incomes.” 
In Springer, the Supreme Court upheld the Civil War income tax 
against a challenge that it was an unapportioned direct tax: “[D]irect 
taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation 
taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate . . . .”166 
And, said the Court, the income tax was “within the category of an 
excise or duty.”167 
That the tax as it applied to Springer himself was heavily on 
earned income apparently played no role in the Court’s decision; the 
Hylton dictum was decisive. But the Pollock Court examined the 
Springer record to conclude that, although the tax could have reached 
income from property, little or none of Springer’s income had come 
from that source.168 And that fact might have justified treating the tax 
as it applied to Springer as an excise.169 
We ought to be skeptical when a court characterizes a decision as 
                                                                                                                 
164
 102 U.S. 586 (1881). 
165
 See infra Part VI.E. 
166 Springer, 102 U.S. at 602. 
167
 Id. (citations omitted). 
168
 The Court stated: 
The . . . record discloses that [Springer’s] income was not derived in any degree from 
real estate but was in part professional as attorney-at-law and the rest interest on 
United States bonds. It would seem probable that the court did not feel called upon to 
advert to the distinction between the latter and the former source of income, as the 
validity of the tax as to either would sustain the action. 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 578–79, modified on reh’g, 
158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Court also noted that “a tax on professional receipts might be treated 
as an excise or duty, and therefore indirect, when a tax on the income of personalty might be 
held to be direct.” Id. at 579. 
169 If the aggrieved taxpayer had substantial income from property, the Springer Court 
therefore might have invalidated the Civil War income tax—or so the Court implied in 1895. 
See id. 
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standing for something it clearly did not. But treating Springer as 
involving a tax on earned income provided a way for the Pollock 
Court to overturn the 1894 tax without repudiating precedent.170  
If a levy on income from “professions, trades, employments, or 
vocations” was an excise,171 the only issue in Pollock was whether  
a tax on income from property could be imposed without 
apportionment: “[I]n the case before us there is no question as to the 
validity of this act, except [the] sections . . . which relate to the 
subject which has been under discussion,” taxing income from 
property.172 
Applying the syllogism outlined earlier, the Pollock Court 
concluded that a tax on income from property was direct. With a little 
extrapolation to treat income from personal property the same as 
income from real property, the Court came to a result consistent with 
Hylton173: 
We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on 
income derived from real estate, and from invested personal 
property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears 
on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, 
in view of the instances in which taxation on business, 
privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an 
excise tax and been sustained as such.174 
Taxing income from property was the point of the unapportioned 
1894 tax. For the high-income folks at whom the tax was directed, 
earned income was also part of the base, however, and the Court 
concluded it was impossible to sever the tax on earned income from 
the critically important levy on income from property. If the whole 
statute did not fall, “what was intended as a tax on capital” would 
have been turned into “in substance a tax on occupations and 
labor.”175 
                                                                                                                 
170
 See id. at 578–79. 
171
 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 637. 
172
 Id. at 635; see also 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 1.2.2, at 1–19 (3d ed. 1999) (noting intimation “that a tax on 
salaries, wages, and business profits would not be a direct tax”). 
173
 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
174
 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635. 
175
 Id. at 637. The Court further stated: 
[I]t is evident that the income from realty formed a vital part of the scheme for 
taxation embodied therein. If that be stricken out, and also the income from all 
invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds, it is obvious that 
by far the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, and this would 
leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or 
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For most purposes today, it does not matter whether a tax on 
earned income is direct or not. As long as it is “on incomes,” a tax 
does not need to be apportioned, whatever the source of the income. 
But if Ms. Murphy’s emotional-distress recovery was properly 
included in gross income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, the subject of the next part of this Article, the status of this 
particular levy—whether it was “on incomes” or not—continues to 
matter. 
As I discussed earlier, I have no doubt that a tax on an  
emotional-distress recovery is direct, and that it would be permissible 
in unapportioned form only if the recovery is “incomes” within the 
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. I shall discuss later why an 
emotional-distress recovery is not the equivalent of wages and why, 
therefore, any special treatment for earned income that might be 
found in Pollock should not extend to such a recovery.176 (The D.C. 
Circuit ultimately concluded in Murphy II that the levy was an excise, 
noting that the Pollock Court had said “a tax upon income from 
employment” is an excise.177) 
More important, however, I am doubtful that the passages in 
Pollock dealing with a tax on earned income should be given weight. 
Supreme Court dicta are important, and these dicta are cited regularly 
in commentary on Pollock. But there are at least two reasons to  
be skeptical about their continuing significance. First, let us not  
forget that the Court struck down the tax as it applied to earned 
income. The entire tax was invalidated, and “not comment[ing] on” 
the treatment of earned income (language from Pollock) is not a 
ringing endorsement of Springer.178 Second, given the distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes outlined earlier,179 I see no reason to 
characterize income from property and income from services 
differently. A tax on either is direct—on individuals, not easily 
avoidable, unlike requisitions, and so on. 
Springer was the result of unthinkingly applying one Hylton 
dictum: the Founders did not say an income tax is direct, and 
therefore it is not direct. What the Pollock Court did was rethink the 
                                                                                                                 
 
vocations; and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain in 
substance a tax on occupations and labor. 
Id. at 636–37. 
176 See infra Part VI.E. 
177
 Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635), 
cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
178
 See supra text accompanying note 174. 
179
 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM 
2010] MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 783 
original meaning of “direct tax.” In doing so, it cut the heart out of 
Springer, while leaving to others preparation of the death certificate. 
I hypothesize that members of the Pollock majority were thinking 
as follows: Pollock was going to be a noteworthy, unpopular 
decision.180 If the majority could tie its conclusion to precedent, 
damage might be contained. Focusing on income from property 
provided the link to Hylton,181 and suggesting that a tax on earned 
income might be treated differently obviated any need to overturn 
Springer—as that case had been reinterpreted—while still striking 
down the tax. The result was seen by the public as radical, but in  
form the Court adhered to precedent. In addition, with no political 
inclination at the time to enact a tax on earned income only—the 
point of the income tax was to reach the wealthy’s income from 
property182—the treatment of earned income in Pollock really did not 
seem important. Why sweat the small stuff? 
My conclusion is that a tax on earned income is as direct as a tax 
on income from property. But even if I am wrong about this, I see  
no reason why a tax on a recovery for emotional distress should  
be characterized as indirect. It is not a shiftable tax; it cannot be  
easily avoided by the taxpayer (except by not seeking damages to 
begin with). And, as I shall argue later, wages and emotional-distress 
recoveries need not be seen as functional equivalents. 
D. The Constitution Matters in Murphy—and in Taxation Generally  
No reader needs to agree with a significant percentage of the 
points made above to agree with my conclusion: there are serious 
constitutional issues in Murphy that commentators ignored in the rush 
to condemn the result in Murphy I. The tax on the emotional-distress 
recovery might well have been direct, and, if so, it was critical for the 
tax to be treated as one “on incomes.” Before returning to the 
constitutional issues, however, I turn to the Internal Revenue Code, 
and what it says—or does not say—about emotional-distress 
recoveries. 
V. SECTION 104(A)(2) AND NONPHYSICAL PERSONAL INJURIES 
Murphy was not just a constitutional case. In this part of the 
Article, I address the workings of section 104(a)(2) of the Internal 
                                                                                                                 
180
 One prominent critic noted that Pollock had been characterized as the “the Dred Scott 
decision of government revenue.” See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 589 (2d ed. 
1914) (1911). 
181
 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
182
 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1091–1107. 
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Revenue Code, which was initially struck down on constitutional 
grounds in Murphy I.183 The issues for present purposes are these: 
How did the 1996 amendment of section 104(a)(2) change the way 
we should think about whether a recovery for personal injuries is 
taxable or not? Is it unquestionably the case that, as many have 
argued, a recovery for a nonphysical personal injury is taxable in full 
to the recipient? 
The constitutional issues considered in Murphy need to be 
addressed only if a recovery is taxable under the statutory scheme.  
I submit that the conventional wisdom—that a recovery for a 
nonphysical personal injury is automatically taxable184—is not right. 
It cannot be right, and that should cause us to examine Murphy-like 
recoveries carefully. 
A. The 1996 Amendment to Section 104(a)(2)  
In 1996, Congress amended section 104(a)(2), which had provided 
an exclusion for recoveries received on account of any personal 
injuries or sickness, to limit the exclusion to recoveries for physical 
personal injuries or sickness and to provide that “emotional distress 
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness.”185 The 
conventional wisdom is that, after the amendment, a recovery for a 
nonphysical personal injury is taxable, period, unless it can be tied to 
a physical injury.186 (If the recovery is deemed to be “on account of” a 
physical injury, however, the entire amount, with a couple of 
exceptions, is excluded from gross income.187) If that is right, once 
                                                                                                                 
183
 460 F.3d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 
22, 2006). 
184 See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing Structured Settlements, 51 B.C. 
L. REV. 39, 74 (2010) (“As a result [of the statutory change], damages received on account of a 
non-physical injury now are fully taxable.”). 
185
 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(b), 110 Stat. 
1755, 1838 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006)). 
186
 See, e.g., Germain, supra note 29, at 208 (“If emotional injury recoveries were  
not included in ‘income,’ the amendment to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) would be substantially 
superfluous.”). But the amendment made it clear only that a lost-profits or lost-wages 
component of any recovery would be taxable. That was not a superfluous change, regardless of 
how any additional recovery might be treated. 
187
 The exclusion has never applied to a recovery of medical expenses that had already 
been paid and deducted. See I.R.C. § 104(a). Application of the exclusion to punitive damages 
associated with a personal injury (i.e., amounts not even arguably compensatory) used to be a 
matter of doubt, but, after the 1996 amendments, it is clear that punitives are taxable regardless 
of the nature of the underlying claim. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (creating an exclusion for damages 
“other than punitive damages”). Indeed, it should have been clear under prior law. See O’Gilvie 
v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 81 (1996) (holding that punitives were not received “on account 
of” personal injury under a prior version of section 104(a)(2)). But see id. at 94 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the “any damages” language included punitives). The exception for 
punitives is easy to apply when a verdict specifies a particular amount. With a settlement, 
 2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM 
2010] MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 785 
Ms. Murphy’s recovery was determined not to have been due to a 
physical injury, section 104(a)(2) was inapplicable, and she was left 
with only her argument under the Sixteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, the conference committee report on the 1996 amendment 
contains headings that seem to instruct individuals to “[i]nclude in 
income damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries,” as if that were 
the result of the statutory changes.188 Courts have assumed that to be 
the case. In recent litigation, the Tax Court has routinely concluded 
that, if no physical injury is involved, a recovery is fully taxable.189 
District courts, including Judge Lamberth in Murphy, have made  
the same assumption,190 and appellate courts have agreed.191 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
 
however, one can imagine negotiators taking the possibility of punitives into account. If the 
settlement amount for a physical injury is bumped up, should part of it be includable in gross 
income? The conceptually right answer is yes, and the Service has taken that position. See, e.g., 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (specifying that section 104(a)(2) exclusion 
would be inapplicable to the portion of a settlement attributable to punitives). As a practical 
matter, however, it is hard to see how this issue can be policed. (One justification for the broad 
exclusion for physical injury recoveries is the difficulty of breaking a recovery into components, 
some perhaps taxable without section 104(a)(2), some not.) 
188
 H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741, 
1041. 
189
 See, e.g., Hennessey v. Comm’r, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) 1089 (2009). Hennessey involved 
a class action settlement paid to Air Force officers who were involuntarily separated due to a 
reduction in force. Id. at 1090 & n.3. Hennessey argued his recovery was, at least in part, not 
income because there was no accession to wealth (e.g., compensation for the stigma of 
involuntary separation), id. at 1091, but the court rejected the argument summarily, citing 
Murphy II to the effect that “taxation of awards received for personal, nonphysical injuries was 
within the power of Congress.” Id. at 1091–92 (citing Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008)). The Tax Court in Venable v. Commissioner, 86 
T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (2003), aff’d, 110 F. App’x 421 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), also held that 
the recovery was fully taxable. Venable involved a recovery for malicious prosecution, 
including amounts for lost earning capacity, mental anguish, and loss to reputation. Id. at 255. 
The narrow issue was whether the change in section 104(a)(2) applied to a 1998 recovery in a 
suit begun in 1994. The Tax Court answered this question in the affirmative, but did not 
consider whether part of the recovery might have been tax-free anyway. Id. at 259; see also 
Pettit v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1341, 1344 (2008) (holding recovery in an employment 
dispute taxable because it does not qualify for the 104(a)(2) exclusion); Seidel v. Comm’r, 93 
T.C.M. (CCH) 938, 940 (2007) (holding that the settlement agreement in an unemployment 
dispute was taxable because it did not fall under the 104(a)(2) exclusion). In Phelps v. 
Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336 (2008), the Tax Court concluded that a recovery under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was “not received on account of tort-like personal 
injuries, let alone tort-like personal physical injuries” and was therefore taxable. Id. at 1341. 
190
 Judge Lambreth wrote, “[T]he revised language of § 104(a)(2) indicates that only 
physical injuries and physical sickness [sic] are exempted from the definition of ‘income.’ 
Therefore, anything falling outside this definition is considered income, and is therefore 
taxable.” Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 218 (D.D.C. 2005) (emphases added) (citing 
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992), which stated that “exclusions from income 
must be narrowly construed”), aff’d, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 
(2008); see also id. at 215 (“Because plaintiff’s $25,000 of compensatory damages was based 
on damage to Murphy’s professional reputation, this award is not specifically exempted by 
statute, and thus falls within the broader definition of gross income.” (emphasis added)). 
191
 See, e.g., Allum v. Comm’r, 2007–1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,489, ¶ 50,490 (9th Cir.) 
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the Murphy II panel ultimately concluded that the recovery was 
taxable even if Ms. Murphy had realized no accession to wealth.192 
I question those assumptions. I shall argue that, whatever Congress 
might have been thinking when it amended section 104(a)(2), it 
cannot possibly be the case that all recoveries for nonphysical 
personal injuries are taxable. Most yes, but not all. At a minimum, the 
interpretive questions are more difficult than the conventional 
wisdom suggests, and that fact should have relevance to how we think 
about cases like Murphy. 
When Congress changed the rules governing nonphysical personal 
injuries, it was responding to widely publicized Supreme Court cases 
where the question had been whether recoveries for a nonphysical 
injury, such as one under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
or one for sex discrimination, should have been treated as “received 
on account of [a] personal injury” and thus excludable under the  
old version of section 104(a)(2).193 With no physical-nonphysical 
distinction built into the statute, the arguments for exclusion were not 
baseless. Longstanding regulations, still on the books, had defined a 
personal injury recovery as arising from “tort or tort type rights,”194 
and many torts lead to no physical damage. 
Nevertheless, if a recovery simply replaces something that would 
have been taxable anyway, like lost wages, full exclusion did  
not seem to be the right result. And the Supreme Court concluded  
the recoveries in the discrimination cases should be taxable. (That 
situation seemed no different from recovery in a breach-of-contract 
case.195) Putting aside litigation costs (that is, assuming away the real 
world, as we do in law review articles); assuming that the amount  
                                                                                                                 
 
(unpublished) (concluding that “[t]he tax court properly determined that the settlement . . . was 
not excludable from [taxpayer’s] taxable income because it was received as settlement for 
violation of his civil rights, not physical injury or sickness”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 926 (2007). 
192
 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179–80; see also infra Part VII. 
193
 Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 332 (1995) (holding ADEA recoveries taxable 
because “not ‘received ‘on account of personal injury [sic] or sickness’” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992) (holding Title VII recoveries 
taxable for the same reason). 
194
 Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (2009). A regulation proposed in September 2009 will, if 
finalized, remove the reference to “tort or tort type rights.” The proposal is intended to expand 
the scope of the exclusion, but it would leave us with no definition of “personal injury.” See 
Damages Received on Account of Personal Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness, 74 Fed.  
Reg. 47,152 (Sept. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (promulgating Prop. Reg. §  
1.104-1(c)); Erik M. Jensen, Parsing the Meaning of “Personal Injuries” Under Section 
104(a)(2), J. TAX’N INV., Winter 2010, at 92. 
195
 Whether or not it is the right result conceptually, Congress did provide for full 
exclusion for a recovery on account of personal physical injuries, which is why section 
104(a)(2) is significant. 
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of any recovery is unaffected by taxability;196 and assuming full 
compensation is received for lost wages, a personal injury plaintiff 
would be better off with a tax-free recovery than if no injury had 
occurred to begin with. Replacing a taxable salary of $100,000 with a 
tax-free recovery of $100,000 seems too good to be true.197 If that is 
the law, volunteering to be a personal injury victim might be a good 
tax-planning device.198 
Hence the statutory change, which was intended to deal with  
the recovery-of-lost-profits situation involved in the high-profile 
discrimination cases. The conference committee report on the 1996 
legislation notes the concern Congress was addressing: 
Courts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of 
damages received on account of personal injury or sickness 
broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury  
that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness. For 
example, some courts have held that the exclusion applies to 
damages in cases involving certain forms of employment 
discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no 
physical injury or sickness. The damages received in these 
cases generally consist of back pay and other awards intended 
to compensate the claimant for lost wages or lost profits.199 
The goal is to make the injured party whole, not to make her more 
than whole. If all that is involved is compensation for lost wages or 
                                                                                                                 
196
 Continue to assume away the real world. One might question whether jurors are aware 
of the tax consequences of recoveries, see Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage 
Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43, 55–64 (1987), but plaintiffs and defendants 
consider taxation in settlement talks. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 442 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (affirming a decision that, to make plaintiff whole, had granted an additional award 
to take into account the negative result of being paid a lump sum). Professor Dodge notes that, 
with a full-fledged exclusion, “a compensation regime that ignores the effect of taxes has the 
effect of overcompensating plaintiffs, while taking taxes into account converts a potential 
plaintiff windfall into a reduction in the amount that the defendant must pay.” Joseph M. Dodge, 
Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 146 n.20 (1992) [hereinafter Dodge, Taxes and 
Torts]. State tort law—should the compensatory amount take into account taxability?—and 
federal tax law are inextricably linked. 
197
 Cf. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996) (“[T]he provision can make the 
compensated taxpayer better off from a tax perspective than had the personal injury not taken 
place.”). 
198
 I am kidding, sort of, although favorable tax treatment would generate more 
discrimination litigation. Cf. Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax 
Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1, 26 (1984) (arguing with tongue in cheek that, if accrual-basis 
taxpayers may deduct an undiscounted amount of future liabilities, “well-advised  
accrual-method businesses should cancel their liability insurance and run down pedestrians at 
the rate of at least one a year”). 
199
 H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741, 
1040. 
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lost profits, the recovery ought to be taxable. 
At one level the change was unnecessary. The Supreme Court had 
concluded that no “tort or tort type right” was involved when only a 
recovery for lost wages or profits was available: “one of the hallmarks 
of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of 
damages to compensate the plaintiff.”200 With no “personal injury,” 
section 104(a)(2), even in its pre-1996 Act form, was not implicated. 
But the statutory change presumably made characterization issues 
easier—making physical versus nonphysical injuries the generally 
decisive distinction, rather than having to differentiate between torts 
and other sorts of wrongs.201 
After the 1996 Act, two things are clear: nonphysical personal 
injury recoveries that compensate only for lost wages or profits are 
taxable,202 as are awards that, like punitive damages, are merely 
windfalls.203 But it is not so obvious that a recovery for a  
nonphysical personal injury necessarily compensates only for 
otherwise taxable items or is just a windfall. That might generally  
be the case, but it is not necessarily so.204 If something other than  
lost profits is involved, there might be an argument for excluding all 
or part of a recovery—using a rationale independent of section 
104(a)(2). 
Whatever the staff was thinking in drafting reports about the 1996 
Act, automatic taxability is mandated by neither the statute nor 
common sense. We should interpret changes to section 104(a)(2) in 
light of Congress’s concerns—awards of lost wages or lost profits—
and not cram all nonphysical recoveries into a conceptual system 
designed for a more limited purpose. 
                                                                                                                 
200 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1992). A proposed regulation would do 
away with the idea that section 104(a)(2) is inapplicable unless a broad range of remedies is 
available. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(2), 74 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153–54 (Sept. 15, 
2009). 
201
 With a recovery for lost profits, it is unnecessary to determine whether the injury is 
“personal” if the injury is nonphysical. No exclusion applies, and the recovery is taxable. 
202
 See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006). Recoveries for physical injuries are likely to have a  
lost-income component too, but the probability is higher that other elements will be included. 
Exclusion obviates the need to break recoveries into taxable and nontaxable parts. Professor 
Dodge argues that difficulty of characterization points toward full taxation. See Dodge, Taxes 
and Torts, supra note 196, at 150. I disagree. See infra Part V.B (explaining that automatic 
inclusion of recoveries for nonphysical injuries is bizarre). 
203
 See I.R.C. § 104(a). 
204
 Indeed, the Supreme Court intimated that, if the only remedy is recovery of lost profits 
or wages, the injury is not personal. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 234–35; supra text accompanying 
note 200. 
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B. Why Automatic Taxability Makes No Sense  
Congress might have assumed it was making nonphysical 
recoveries taxable, but the assumption was not the result of careful 
thought. Congress could not have meant, in its institutional heart of 
hearts, to make all such recoveries taxable, and the amended statutory 
structure does not mandate that result. 
1. Basis-Recovery Cases  
At a minimum, the amendment to section 104(a)(2) cannot have 
been intended to make taxable a personal injury award that is merely 
the recovery of basis—at least not if we are talking about an income 
tax. In such a case, there is no income to tax.205 
Sometimes people (read law students) assume that, if a person 
receives cash, he must pay income tax on that receipt. But, if we think 
about the matter for a nanosecond, we know that assumption is much 
too broad. For example, if someone sells a widget for $100 that he 
purchased for $100, he has no gain and therefore no income. (Taxing 
that $100 would effectively turn the tax into one on gross receipts.206) 
If no gain results, despite what the government argued in Murphy I, it 
does not matter that the taxpayer converted his property into cash.207 
This point—that what are in effect basis-recovery situations should 
not be taxable under an income tax—might seem obvious. Indeed, it 
is obvious, which is why the general understanding of the effect of the 
amendment to section 104(a)(2) is so obviously wrong: a recovery for 
a nonphysical personal injury that constitutes nothing but recovery of 
basis does not become taxable just because Congress narrowed the 
exclusion in section 104(a)(2). 
Consider the widely-noted 1939 decision in Clark v. 
Commissioner,208 where a tax lawyer reimbursed a couple because  
the lawyer had made a mistake and, as a result, the couple had paid 
about $20,000 too much in federal income taxes. The Board of Tax 
Appeals concluded the recovery was not taxable to the Clarks, and the 
Commissioner later acquiesced in Clark. 
                                                                                                                 
205
 Professor Dodge disagrees that netting is required to have an income tax, but he accepts 
the idea that recoveries representing recovery of basis should be tax free. See Dodge, Netting of 
Costs, supra note 70. 
206
 Cf. SELIGMAN, supra note 180, at 19 (noting that “[i]ncome is . . . to be distinguished 
from mere receipts or gross revenue. . . . By income is always meant net income, as opposed to 
gross income.”). The goal of the Sixteenth Amendment was to reach higher-income, not  
no-income, persons. 
207
 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (criticizing contrary position taken by 
the government in Murphy I). 
208
 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4. 
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In support of its conclusion, the Board stated, 
It has been held that payments in settlement of an action for 
breach of promise to marry are not income. Lyde McDonald, 
9 B.T.A. 1340. Compromise payments in settlement of an 
action for damages against a bank on account of conduct 
impairing the taxpayer’s good will by injuring its reputation 
are also not taxable. Farmers & Merchants Bank of 
Catlettsburg, Ky. v. Commissioner, 59 Fed. (2d) 912. The 
same result follows in the case of payments in settlement  
for injuries caused by libel and slander. C. A. Hawkins, 6 
B.T.A. 1023. Damages for personal injury are likewise not 
income. Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B.T.A. 1339.209 
That string of citations illustrates that, in the early years of the income 
tax, many folks assumed that certain recoveries for losses did not 
constitute income—at least statutorily—and that judicial and 
regulatory authority supported that assumption. 
I will return to the question of the continuing vitality of those  
old cases,210 but even if they have fallen by the wayside—the 
understanding of income in Clark was narrower than that set out by 
the Supreme Court in 1955 in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co.211—the result in Clark made sense. The couple was compensated 
for a loss that generated no tax benefit: the Clarks could not have 
deducted the extra federal income taxes they had paid.212 After taking 
the effect of taxes into account, the Clarks had lost the full $20,000. If 
they were to be made whole, untaxed dollars had to replace the 
$20,000 of nondeductible dollars paid out earlier. When the dust had 
settled, the tax results should have been the same as if no injury had 
                                                                                                                 
209
 Id. at 335. 
210 See infra Parts V.B.2 to V.B.3. 
211
 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (holding that antitrust treble damages and punitive damages are 
includable in “gross income”). The Board in Clark had said that the theory behind cases holding 
that personal injury (and related) recoveries were not taxable was 
that recoupment on account of such losses is not income since it is not “derived from 
capital, from labor or from both combined.” And the fact that the payment of the 
compensation for such loss was voluntary, as here, does not change its exempt status. 
It was, in fact, compensation for a loss which impaired petitioner’s capital.  
Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335 (citations omitted). But the Court in Glenshaw Glass concluded that 
“income” includes “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion”—even if not derived from labor or capital. Glenshaw 
Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. 
212
 Cf. I.R.C. § 275(a) (2006) (setting out the principle today that federal taxes are not 
deductible).  
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occurred.213 As the Board noted, this was “compensation for a loss 
which impaired petitioner’s capital”;214 the reimbursement from the 
lawyer was equivalent to a recovery of basis.215 
For that reason, regardless of whether the old cases cited by  
the Board remain valid today, most commentators think Clark was 
rightly decided. There was, to use the language of Glenshaw Glass, 
no “accession to wealth.”216 And Clark became the law, accepted  
(albeit grudgingly, eighteen years later) by the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
Let us think about how the changes to section 104(a)(2) would 
affect the Clark analysis today. The Clarks did not have to sue the  
tax lawyer—as a member of a noble profession, he voluntarily 
compensated the Clarks for his mistake—but suppose the Clarks had 
sued for malpractice and recovered $20,000. In many jurisdictions, 
legal malpractice sounds in tort, which probably means it is a 
personal injury—based on a “tort or tort type right”—for purposes of 
section 104(a)(2).217 But surely legal malpractice is not a physical 
injury—at least not if the claim that gave rise to the malpractice had 
no physical component to it, as was true in Clark. Would such a 
recovery, resulting from a lawsuit or a settlement in lieu of a 
lawsuit,218 therefore have to be taxable in a post-1996 world, with 
amended section 104(a)(2) on the books? 
That cannot be the right result. Clark is not the sort of situation 
                                                                                                                 
213
 Or it is as if, after the mistake was discovered, the Clarks had been able to file an 
amended return and had received a refund of the $20,000. Such a refund would not be taxable. 
See IRS, PUBLICATION 525: TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p525/ar02.html (“Refunds of federal income taxes are not 
included in your income because they are never allowed as a deduction from income.”). 
214
 Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335. 
215
 It is presumably important that compensation for the loss came from the responsible 
party (or an insurer). If Clark’s employer had covered the loss caused by the lawyer, we would 
be talking about compensation for services. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 
729, 731 (1929) (holding that an employer’s payment of an employee’s income taxes 
constituted taxable income in addition to the employee’s regular compensation). The Service 
explained Clark as follows: “Payments by the one causing a loss that do no more than restore a 
taxpayer to the position he or she was in before the loss was incurred are not includable in gross 
income because there is no economic gain.” Rev. Rul. 81-277, 1981-2 C.B. 14, 15 (emphasis 
added). 
216
 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. 
217
 See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1956) (stating that “damages received” for 
purposes of section 104(a)(2) means “an amount received . . . through prosecution of a legal suit 
or action based upon tort or tort type rights”). If finalized, Proposed Regulation § 1.104-1(c) 
would expand “personal injury” beyond tort type rights, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(2), 
74 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153–54 (Sept. 15, 2009), but legal malpractice should remain a 
personal injury. 
218
 Whether a lawsuit was actually filed makes no difference in characterizing a recovery. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c). If the malpractice was a tort, the settlement is for a personal 
injury. 
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Congress was focusing on in amending section 104(a)(2). Moreover, 
a change in the Clark result would be inconsistent with statutory 
structure. Narrowing the exclusion under section 104(a)(2) becomes 
an issue only if a recovery would otherwise constitute gross income 
under section 61. If the recovery was not gross income in Clark—if  
it was in effect a recovery of basis, not “income from whatever  
source derived”—it does not become gross income simply because 
the boundaries of an exclusion were narrowed.219 Even though a 
nonphysical personal injury is involved, a Clark-type recovery 
remains excludable from gross income under today’s law.220 And  
that should be true whether or not Eisner v. Macomber221 is still  
good law,222 and regardless of what Glenshaw Glass did to old  
rulings about personal injury recoveries. No accession to wealth, no 
income. 
From the trivial proposition that not every receipt of value is 
income, a lot follows. To the extent a recovery is not income, a 
change in the language of section 104(a)(2) should make no 
difference in the tax treatment. If Congress meant to broaden  
the outer boundaries of “gross income,” the place to do that  
was section 61.223 Instead, when Congress amended section  
                                                                                                                 
219
 Cf. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[The] 
default rule of statutory interpretation [is] that exclusions from income must be narrowly 
construed.” (citing, inter alia, United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 583–84 
(1991)). What I am discussing is whether something would be gross income to begin with, not 
an exclusion, but narrow construal is still probably appropriate. That is not to say, however, that 
all receipts of value are taxable. 
220
 Section 104(a)(2) must exclude some legal-malpractice recoveries. Suppose a lawyer 
misses the statute of limitations for filing a physical-injury claim and is sued. The recovery is 
“on account of” a physical injury, even though the malpractice was not physical. To get that 
result, we would apply the origin-of-the-claim test, or something similar. See Robert W. Wood, 
Tax Treatment of Legal Malpractice Recoveries, 114 TAX NOTES 665 (2007) (arguing for that 
result without clear authority); cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (applying the 
“origin of claim” or “in lieu of” test to determine the extent to which amounts received from an 
insurer pursuant to a bad-faith claim, which had been assigned by the insured to the taxpayer 
who suffered physical injury, would be excludable as “on account of personal physical 
injur[y]”). The assumption that nonphysical-injury recoveries are taxable again oversimplifies 
the world. See Robert W. Wood, IRS Rules Insurance Bad-Faith Recovery Is Tax-Free, 122 
TAX NOTES 1229 (2009) (asking for further guidance on “on account of”). 
221
 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
222
 See supra notes 129–36 and accompanying text. Of course Macomber is still good law! 
See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1133–46; Henry Ordower, Revisiting 
Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. 
TAX. REV. 1, 56 (1993) (noting that the realization “principle has required refinement . . . [, but] 
each clarification left the foundation of the principle intact”). 
223
 If Congress was not inclined to change the language of section 61, but wanted to make 
nonphysical personal injury recoveries taxable, it should have added something to Subtitle A, 
Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II of the Code (titled “Items Specifically Included in Gross 
Income”)—i.e., sections 71–90. But section 104(a)(2) is in Part III, titled “Items Specifically 
Excluded from Gross Income.” 
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104(a)(2), it merely narrowed an exclusion from gross income.224  
A tax professional should not have to look at section 104(a)(2) to 
determine the consequences of a Clark-like recovery.225 
2. Cash Recoveries Outside the Clear Recovery-of-Basis Context  
At a minimum, the basis-recovery situation should not be affected 
by the change in section 104(a)(2), and that by itself is an important 
point. But it is also true that other nonphysical recoveries were 
historically understood not to be taxable, whether or not they could  
be shoehorned into the basis-recovery category. I will use the  
time-dishonored alienation-of-affections tort to begin making my 
point. 
a. Alienation of Affections and Similar (Silly?) Torts  
Robert Wood has written that, as a result of the change in section 
104(a)(2), “recoveries for alienation of affections are generally fully 
taxable under section 61(a).”226 He might be right, but a long time 
ago, first in 1922227 and then in Revenue Ruling 74–77,228 the  
tax authorities concluded that such a recovery is tax-free. If your  
formerly significant other’s affections were alienated, and you were 
compensated for the reduced affection, Revenue Ruling 74–77 helped 
dry your tears. The 1974 ruling is worth quoting in its entirety: 
An individual taxpayer received certain amounts in settlement 
of his suit for damages on account of alienation of affections 
and in consideration for the surrender of the custody of his 
minor child. These items relate to personal or family rights, 
not property rights, and may be treated together. None of  
the amounts received constituted exemplary or punitive 
damages. 
Held, amounts received by the taxpayer as damages for 
                                                                                                                 
224
 Because “gross income” under section 61 is what is left after exclusions have been 
taken into account, narrowing an exclusion does increase the scope of “gross income” as so 
defined. 
225
 A tax professional should be able to rely on statutory structure in doing research. When 
a new issue arises, she should not have to examine the entire Code—impossible anyway—or the 
full U.S. Code—really impossible!—to see whether Congress might have put relevant language 
where it does not belong. Congress may have the power to hide the ball, but the rule of law is 
strained when that happens. 
226
 Robert W. Wood, Post-1996 Act Section 104 Cases: Where Are We Eight Years Later?, 
105 TAX NOTES 68, 70 (2004). I think Wood’s use of “generally” was intended to pick up a 
situation in which alienation of affections is linked to a physical injury claim. 
227
 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922). 
228
 Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33. 
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alienation of affections or for the surrender of the custody of 
his child, whether under agreement of the parties or pursuant 
to judgment of the court, are not income. 
Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922), is hereby superseded since 
the position stated therein is set forth under the current statute 
and regulations in this Revenue Ruling.229 
“Not income”! What was striking about the ruling was that, 
although it was catalogued under section 104 in the bulletin published 
by the Internal Revenue Service and only cross-referenced under 
section 61 (the definition of “gross income”), the result did not seem 
to depend on the old version of section 104(a)(2). The ruling made no 
mention of that section, nor did it quote or paraphrase language from 
it.230 A recovery for alienation of affections, said the Service, was for 
“personal or family rights”—not the same as a recovery for a 
“personal injury”231—and “under the current statute and regulations” 
simply not income. 
And that conclusion was not surprising. It was consistent with 
other rulings that the Service had issued in the 1950s and 1960s 
involving compensation for loss of personal rights in situations where 
section 104(a)(2) was inapplicable.232 
The understanding about recoveries for losses of personal rights 
was one of long standing. The 1922 Solicitor’s Opinion had come  
to the same conclusion, for the causes of action described in  
Revenue Ruling 74–77 and also for slander or libel of a personal 
character: 
If an individual is possessed of a personal right that is not 
assignable and not susceptible of any appraisal in relation to 
market values, and thereafter receives either damages or 
payment in compromise for an invasion of that right, it can 
not be held that he thereby derives any gain or profit. It is 
                                                                                                                 
229
 Id. 
230
 When I first wrote about this issue, I failed to note that, although the ruling did not cite 
section 104(a)(2), or even section 104(a), it was cataloged in the Cumulative Bulletin under 
“Section 104.—Compensation for Injuries or Sickness.” See Jensen, Automatically Taxable?, 
supra note 28. Professor Dodge properly noted my omission, see Dodge, Recoveries for 
Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 986, but then got a lot wrong. He said that “[t]he ruling 
is listed . . . as being ‘under’ section 104 (not section 61), and the caption refers to 26 CFR  
1-104-1 (not any of the section 61 regulations).” Id. But right after the citation to section  
1.104-1 are cites to sections 61 and 1.61-1. See Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. at 33. And the 
ruling is listed under section 61. Id. at 22. 
231
 Cf. infra note 250 (noting that “personal or family rights” was unrelated to section 
104(a)(2)). 
232
 I shall discuss those rulings presently. See infra Part V.B.2.b. 
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clear, therefore, that the Government can not tax him on any 
portion of the sum received.233 
The 1922 opinion reversed an earlier Solicitor’s Memorandum that 
alienation-of-affections recoveries were taxable under the Revenue 
Act of 1918.234 The earlier memorandum had concluded that taxation 
was required because no statutory exception applied,235 but then, in 
1920, the Supreme Court decided Macomber,236 making it clear that a 
“fundamental” question remained “whether such damages are within 
the legal definition of income.”237 
Few today like Macomber, where the Court held that receipt of a 
proportionate stock dividend was not the receipt of “incomes” under 
the Sixteenth Amendment.238 But my argument does not depend on 
the ultimate rightness of Macomber. My point is more limited: it is 
only that not every receipt of value is income, and that is so even if 
cash is received. 
The Service came to the no-income result in the 1974 ruling 
nineteen years after the Supreme Court had decided, in Commissioner 
v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,239 that “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, 
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion” are taxable 
(unless Congress says otherwise).240 That language, broadening an 
earlier definition of income that looked to value derived from labor or 
capital,241 encompassed windfalls like punitives. But a recovery for 
alienation of affections was still not income.242 
Of course, hardly anyone cares about alienation of affections 
anymore, unless it happens to you,243 but I am using the ruling as  
                                                                                                                 
233 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922). 
234
 Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920). 
235
 Id. at 72. It said the statutory reference to recoveries for “personal injuries” was 
probably intended to be limited to physical injuries. Id. at 71. 
236
 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
237
 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. at 93. The opinion also clarified that there was a difference 
between a purely personal recovery and a recovery for libel that affected business income. The 
opinion modified Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919), which—pre-Macomber—had ruled that any 
libel recovery is taxable. See Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. at 93–94. 
238
 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1133–38; supra notes 129–36 and 
accompanying text. 
239
 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
240
 Id. at 431. 
241
 See, e.g., Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (“Income may be defined as the gain derived from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined . . . .” (quoting Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 
231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913), and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918))). 
242
 Although Glenshaw Glass has been interpreted in far-reaching ways, the Court did not 
question that a personal-injury recovery which restores “capital” is not taxable. See supra note 
75. 
243
 But the tort is still recognized in seven states and, on average, 245 suits were filed 
annually in North Carolina in the 2000–2005 period. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The 
Volokh Conspiracy, My Torts Class, and Alienation of Affections, http://volokh.com/posts/1249 
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an example.244 And the 1974 ruling did not stand alone. Many other 
decisions had come to the same conclusion: no income, not because 
of a statutory exclusion, just no income.245 
On the narrow alienation-of-affections point, I must note that the 
Service declared Revenue Ruling 74–77 obsolete in 1998.246 A new 
ruling provided a long list of prior rulings that 
are no longer considered determinative because: (1) the 
applicable statutory provisions or regulations have been 
changed or repealed; (2) the ruling position is specifically 
covered by a statute, regulation, or subsequent published 
position; or (3) the facts set forth no longer exist or are not 
sufficiently described to permit clear application of the 
current statute and regulations.247 
That is the extent of the explanation, but from the timing one 
might infer that the Service had concluded Revenue Ruling 74–77 
ought to be discarded because of the 1996 change in section 
104(a)(2). If that is what the Service was thinking, however, the 
Service was wrong. The controlling statutory provision in the 1974 
ruling was section 61, which, in all relevant respects, was the same in 
1998 as in 1974.248 If Revenue Ruling 74–77 required change, it was 
not because of a statutory amendment, and the purpose underlying the 
change to section 104(a)(2)—to reach recoveries of lost profits—was 
not implicated here.249 
                                                                                                                 
 
502730.shtml (Aug. 5, 2009, 16:05 EST). The tort has received some publicity recently because 
of a threatened suit by Elizabeth Edwards against a political aide of her estranged spouse, 
former North Carolina Senator and Democratic vice-presidential nominee John Edwards. See 
Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, Elizabeth Edwards v. Andrew Young: Can He 
Be Held Liable for Contributing to the Failure of the Edwardses’ Marriage?, FINDLAW, Feb. 
19, 2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100219.html. 
244
 I am sure that Congress was not thinking of alienation of affections when it amended 
section 104(a)(2). The focus was on discrimination cases. See supra notes 193–201 and 
accompanying text. 
245 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 209 (quoting Clark v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 333, 
335 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4). The Clark decision cited to a number of tax cases where the 
determination was made that no income existed. Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335. 
246 Rev. Rul. 98-37, 1998-2 C.B. 133. 
247
 Id. at 133. 
248
 Revenue Ruling 74–77 had relied on Sol. Op. 132, see supra text accompanying note 
229, and the Service issued that opinion because of Macomber, which few now take seriously. 
But Macomber was just as disfavored in 1974 as in 1998. 
249 I can see only one other justification for rendering the 1974 ruling obsolete: affections 
are now so routinely alienated that the tort has disappeared in most jurisdictions. But see supra 
note 243 (noting that the tort is still recognized in seven states). 
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b. More Tax-Free Recoveries for Losses of “Personal Rights”  
The Internal Revenue Service did revoke the alienation-of-
affections ruling after section 104(a)(2) was amended. But what is not 
widely known is that the Service for several years left on the books 
other rulings concluding, without clear statutory authority, that certain 
recoveries of cash were not income—because, as with an alienation-
of-affections recovery, they were reimbursements for the loss of 
“personal rights.”250  
i. Recoveries by Victims of Persecution  
A 1955 ruling, published in a bulletin that also reprinted Glenshaw 
Glass251—exquisite timing!—concluded that payments under the War 
Claims Act of 1948252 to a prisoner of war “are in the nature of 
reimbursement for the loss of personal rights and are not includible  
in the gross income of such individual.”253 A 1956 ruling came to  
the same conclusion, for the same reasons, with regard to payments  
made to Korean War prisoners.254 In neither case had Congress said 
anything about taxability of the reimbursements. 
In 1956, the Service ruled that payments by the German 
government to former German citizens who “were persecuted because 
of anti-Nazi persuasion or for reasons of race, faith, or philosophy of 
life, by the National Socialist (Nazi) regime and thereby suffered 
damage to life, body, health, liberty, rights of property ownership, or 
to professional or economic advancement” were “in the nature of 
reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and [did] 
not constitute taxable income.”255 Indeed, with respect to loss of 
                                                                                                                 
250
 In trying to tie Revenue Ruling 74–77 to section 104(a)(2), see supra note 230, 
Professor Dodge wrote, “The text of the ruling states that the damages were for the violation of 
a ‘personal’ right, and were compensatory in nature,” and “[t]hat characterization of the facts 
brings them directly within the then-applicable version of section 104(a)(2).” Dodge, Recoveries 
for Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 986. But the ruling said the damages “relate to 
personal or family rights, not property rights,” Rev. Ruling 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33, and that 
distinction was not key under regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1956) 
(defining personal injury in terms of “tort or tort type rights”). 
251
 348 U.S. 426 (1955), reprinted in 1955-1 C.B. 207. 
252 Pub. L. No. 80-896, 62 Stat. 1240. 
253
 Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213. 
254 Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20. 
255
 Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25, clarified by Rev. Rul. 57-505, 1957-2 C.B. 50 
(specifying German statutes to which the ruling applies and stating that taxability of payments 
under other statutes “will be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances involved in 
each case”) and amplified by Rev. Rul. 58-500, 1958-2 C.B. 21 (discussing the effect of 
amendments to German statutes). Revenue Ruling 71-477, 1971-2 C.B. 479, noted that these 
rulings had been rendered moot after 1964 by the United States-Federal Republic Germany 
Income Tax Convention, 1966-1 C.B. 360 which made such payments to U.S. citizens or 
residents nontaxable anyway.  
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property, the ruling concluded, without reference to section 1033,256 
that amounts received in excess of basis are not necessarily  
taxable; taxability “will be determined on the basis of the facts and 
circumstances of each case.”257 A 1958 ruling came to the same 
conclusion, for the same reasons, for payments made by the Austrian 
government.258 
Finally, in 1969, the Service ruled that payments of a widow’s 
pension under Austria’s General Social Insurance Law—as a result of 
the restoration of benefits of former citizens “if such benefits were 
placed in jeopardy during the period between March 4, 1933, and 
May 9, 1945, for political reasons (except for national socialistic  
acts) or for reasons of religion or race”—“are in the nature of 
reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do 
not constitute taxable income.”259 
Several things are worth noting. First, none of these rulings  
was aberrational. This was a series of rulings, over a fifteen-year 
period after Glenshaw Glass, which consistently concluded that 
certain cash recoveries for the loss of “personal rights” were not 
taxable because they were not income. Furthermore, none relied on, 
mentioned, or was catalogued under section 104(a)(2), as it then 
existed. Indeed, none of them would have fit within the language of 
that section, if the statutory term “personal injuries” is understood to 
refer to tort-like rights. Instead, all were issued under section 61 or 
regulations interpreting the meaning of “gross income,”260 and all 
concluded that recoveries for “personal rights” were not taxable. 
None had anything to do with recovery of basis, and none fit within 
the “general welfare exception”—the long-time administrative 
practice of the Internal Revenue Service not to treat receipts from 
                                                                                                                 
256
 In any event, the requirements of that section were unlikely to have been satisfied. In 
general, section 1033 permits a taxpayer to defer gain associated with proceeds from the 
involuntary conversion of property if, within a prescribed period, he reinvests an amount equal 
to or greater than the amount of proceeds in property “similar or related in service or use.” 
I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2) (2006). The goal is to prevent gain recognition at an inopportune time to the 
extent the taxpayer does not cash out. Gain not recognized is reflected in a lower basis in the 
replacement property. I.R.C. § 1033(b)(2). 
257
 Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25. Even if recoveries above basis were to be taxed, the 
Service later effectively permitted affected taxpayers to use the open transaction method to 
report gain and to treat interest payments as recovery of basis as well: “Whether or not the 
receipt of an award payment is designated as a recovery of principal or of interest, no part of the 
payment is taxable gain until the taxpayer’s basis is recovered.” I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-18-017 
(Jan. 28, 1983). 
258
 See Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14. 
259
 Rev. Rul. 69-212, 1969-1 C.B. 34. 
260
 The first ruling was issued under regulations interpreting the 1939 Code, when the 
definition of “gross income” had a different section number. Regulations under the 1954 Code 
had yet to be issued. 
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“governmental social benefit programs for the promotion of the 
general welfare” as income.”261 Finally, none seemed to depend on 
administrative difficulties—some receipts of value, while technically 
income, cannot be policed by the Service in an economically 
reasonable way262—rather than principle.263 
These rulings were still on the books when Murphy I was decided, 
and they were obviously embarrassing to the Service given its 
litigation posture.264 Shortly before the Murphy II decision was 
handed down, the Service withdrew the rulings, supposedly as part of 
its 
continuing . . . program of reviewing guidance . . . to identify 
items that are obsolete because (1) the applicable statutory 
provisions have been changed or repealed; (2) the matter  
is specifically covered by statute, regulations, or subsequent 
published position; or (3) the facts on which the position  
is based no longer occur or are not sufficiently described  
 
                                                                                                                 
261
 Rev. Rul. 2009-19, 2009-28 I.R.B. 111, 111 (holding that pay-for-performance-success 
payments made to benefit homeowners under the Home Affordable Modification Program are 
not income); see also Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840 (ruling that relocation payments made 
under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to individuals moving from a 
flood-damaged residence to another residence are not includable in the individual’s gross 
income); Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (ruling that replacement housing payments made for 
the purpose of aiding individuals and families displaced from their homes, businesses, or farms 
are not taxable as gross income); Wood, False Imprisonment, supra note 47, at 287; Robert W. 
Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare Exception to Gross Income, 109 TAX NOTES 
203 (2005). For the exception to apply, the Service generally requires that payments be made 
from a governmental welfare fund, be based on need, and not be compensation for services. See 
Wood, False Imprisonment, supra note 47, at 287; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2000-21-036 (Feb. 
15, 2000), reprinted in Adoption Assistance Payments Excludable, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 30, 
2000, 2000 TNT 104-74 (LEXIS) (concluding that adoption assistance payments are not 
includable in gross income). 
262
 If the Service averts its eyes, then, as a practical matter, a receipt of value is not income. 
For example, after a millisecond’s worth of effort to the contrary, the Service decided not to 
treat receipt and retention of unsolicited samples as income, even though such items are clearly 
“accessions to wealth” and would not be treated as “gifts” under section 102. See Rev. Rul.  
70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6 (holding that a reviewer who donated unsolicited books to charity must 
include value in income if he claims a charitable deduction), superseding Rev. Rul. 70-330, 
1970-1 C.B. 14 (holding that retention of unsolicited books was enough for inclusion). The 
Service had “apparently made an administrative decision to be concerned with the taxation of 
unsolicited samples only when failure to tax those samples would provide taxpayers with double 
tax benefits.” Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1975). 
263 That might be said about the general welfare exception as well. Taxing welfare benefits 
is doable, although the Service would be criticized if it acted unilaterally. Congress understands 
what the practice has been, has not tried to change that practice, and, if it approves, has no 
reason to do anything. 
264
 Lewis J. Fernandez, Associate Chief Counsel, Income Tax & Accounting, Internal 
Revenue Serv., Remarks Before the Committee on Tax Accounting, American Bar Association 
Section of Taxation (Oct. 20, 2006) (calling attention to the rulings, noting how embarrassing 
they were, and stating that the Service had alerted the Solicitor General to their existence). 
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to permit clear application of the current statute and 
regulations.265 
The Service made no claim that statutory changes required this 
decision. It could not reasonably have done so. Indeed, it did not 
mention section 104(a)(2) in this connection, and it was clear in 
context that the silence was not inadvertent.266 The official reason for 
withdrawal of the old rulings must have been that “the facts on which 
the position[s] [are] based no longer occur,” as if withdrawal were 
part of a routine housekeeping process.267 The timing of the 
revocation was obviously dictated by Murphy, however, and the 
revocation should not have hidden a basic fact: the relevant law had 
not changed. 
I have heard it said that those rulings were historical artifacts, 
which had lacked any significance for decades. But the Service itself 
issued a private letter ruling in 1998 that relied entirely on the 
published rulings.268 The significance of those rulings extended far 
beyond the factual situations they described, and beyond 1996, when 
section 104(a)(2) was amended.269 
The private ruling concluded that one-time payments made from a 
fund established by an unidentified country and funded by a national 
bank, private banks, and other companies would not be taxable to 
recipients who met certain criteria270: in general, they had to have 
lived under an oppressive regime; had to be citizens or permanent 
residents of the United States; and had to declare themselves to be in 
need.271 If the criteria were satisfied, a payment was “in the nature of 
reimbursement for the deprivation of personal or civil rights as 
described in the revenue rulings. Accordingly, the payment is not 
includible in your [gross] income.”272 
The 1998 private ruling was not aberrational either. The Service 
had issued other letter rulings to the same effect—one in 1996 to a 
                                                                                                                 
265
 Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747. The Service also declared Revenue Ruling 71-477 
obsolete. See supra note 255. It had become irrelevant if the other rulings were obsolete. 
266
 After declaring the various rulings obsolete, with no mention of section 104(a)(2), the 
Service explicitly relied on section 104(a)(2) in withdrawing its acquiescence in two Board of 
Tax Appeals decisions. See infra text accompanying note 279. 
267
 Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747. 
268
 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-06-004 (Oct. 27, 1998). 
269
 The level of review for private rulings is not as stringent as for published rulings, and 
private rulings are not supposed to be treated as authority for many purposes. My point is only 
that reports of the demise of the published rulings were greatly exaggerated.  
270
 Identifying information is redacted when private rulings are made available under the 
Freedom of Information Act. 
271
 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-06-004 (Oct. 27, 1998). 
272
 Id. Given the need requirement, this situation might have fit under the general-welfare 
doctrine, but the conclusion was based on the published rulings. 
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recipient of payments from the Dutch government associated with 
“persecution and physical and psychological injuries” during the Nazi 
occupation of the Netherlands;273 one in 1993 to an Aleut who 
received distributions from a trust created to reimburse U.S. citizens 
wrongly relocated to internment camps during the Second World 
War;274 and one in 1992 to a former citizen of Holland who received 
payments from the Dutch government under a special pension act to 
compensate for injuries incurred in resisting the Nazi occupation.275 
All concluded that taxpayers had no income because they had merely 
been “reimburse[d] for the deprivation of civil or personal rights.”276 
None of this is ancient history. It was not so long ago that the 
Internal Revenue Service itself assumed that not all recoveries of 
cash, even when no basis offset was involved, were automatically 
taxable.277 If those recoveries were not income in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1990s, with Glenshaw Glass already on the books, nothing  
had happened statutorily in the meantime to change the result. 
Conceptions of income might have changed in the academy, but  
those changed conceptions were not reflected in any congressional 
enactment or judicial reinterpretation.278 
ii. Revocation of Acquiescences in Old Cases  
When the Service declared the rulings discussed above obsolete, it 
also withdrew embarrassing acquiescences to two Board of Tax 
Appeals decisions involving nonphysical injury recoveries. The 
Service gave section 104(a)(2) as the reason for the withdrawal: 
[I]n light of the amendments to § 104(a)(2)[,] certain 
acquiescences to decisions are obsolete. These amendments 
                                                                                                                 
273
 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-29-017 (Apr. 22, 1996) (concluding that the payments “are in 
the nature of reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do not constitute 
income”). 
274
 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-06-011 (Nov. 9, 1993) (holding that the distributions were  
“in the nature of reimbursement for the deprivation of . . . civil or personal rights” and not 
includable in gross income). 
275
 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-23-046 (Mar. 10, 1992) (holding that the payments “are in the 
nature of reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights” and are therefore not 
taxable). 
276 See supra notes 273–75.  
277
 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-27-040 (Apr. 10, 2001) (citing Revenue Ruling 56-518, 
1956-2 C.B. 25, as still valid on an issue ultimately governed by treaty language). It was thus 
not correct to say in 2005 that “there is no doctrinal support for the notion that cash received as 
the result of an involuntary occurrence is excludable apart from statutory exclusions and deferral 
provisions.” Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 132. 
278 For example, Professor Caron described Murphy I as undoing a half century of tax 
jurisprudence, see supra text accompanying note 14, but authority still supported a restrictive 
conception of income in 2007. 
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make clear that Congress intended “that the exclusion from 
gross income [under § 104(a)(2)] only applies to damages 
received on account of a personal physical injury or physical 
sickness,” and thus damages received on account of personal 
nonphysical injuries or nonphysical sickness generally would 
be required to be included in gross income.279 
Note the “generally,” however, a word to which I will return. 
In Hawkins v. Commissioner,280 decided in 1927—cited in Clark281 
and Murphy I282—the Board had concluded that a recovery for libel, 
when the compensation was only for damage to personal reputation, 
was not income absent express congressional indication to the 
contrary.283 Twenty-eight years before Glenshaw Glass, the Board 
suggested that the implication in cases like Eisner v. Macomber284—
that income can arise only from capital or labor—was not necessarily 
right.285 No matter. This recovery was “wholly personal and 
nonpecuniary,”286 and “[s]uch compensation as general damages adds 
nothing to the individual, for the very concept which sanctions it 
prohibits that it shall include a profit. It is an attempt to make the 
plaintiff whole as before the injury.”287 The recovery would have been 
taxable if Congress had made “express provision”288 to that effect—
this was not a constitutional case—but Congress had not done so. 
In McDonald v. Commissioner,289 decided in 1928 and also cited 
in Clark,290 the Board had come to the same result for a recovery of 
damages for breach of a promise to marry—damages that could have 
related, depending on the jury’s determination, to “mortification and 
                                                                                                                 
279
 Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747 (alteration in original) (citing H.R. REP. NO.  
104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741, 1041). 
280
 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq., 7-1 C.B. 1, 14 (1928). 
281
 40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4; see also supra text accompanying note 
209. 
282
 460 F.3d 79, 91 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 
22, 2006). 
283 See Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024–25. 
284
 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
285
 The Hawkins court noted: 
[I]t is conceivable that since the income tax is primarily an application of the idea of 
measuring taxes by financial ability to pay, as indicated by the net accretions to one’s 
economic wealth during the year, there may be cases in which taxable income will be 
judicially found although outside the precise scope of the description already given. 
Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024. 
286
 Id. at 1024–25. 
287
 Id. at 1025. 
288 Id. 
289
 9 B.T.A. 1340 (1928), acq., 7-2 C.B. 1, 26 (1928). 
290
 40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4. 
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pain or distress of mind . . . ; loss of social standing . . . ; injury  
to future prospects of marriage . . . ”;291 and so on.292 The result in 
McDonald was dependent on the result in Hawkins,293 and if the 
Service would no longer follow Hawkins, it would also no longer 
follow McDonald. 
In support of withdrawing the acquiescences, the Service cited to 
the conference committee report on the 1996 legislation, and a 
comment on the legislative history is in order. As I noted earlier,  
the conference committee report used the heading “[i]nclude in 
income damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries” as if receipt of 
compensation for a nonphysical injury were automatically taxable.294 
But the text of the report simply says that, as a result of the statutory 
change, only a recovery for a physical injury is covered by section 
104(a)(2).295 That is true, but not very interesting. The headings 
overstate the conclusion of the text. 
And the Service’s bottom-line conclusion contains that intriguing 
“generally”: “damages received on account of personal nonphysical 
injuries or nonphysical sickness generally would be required to  
be included in gross income.”296 Although this suggests that the 
proposition is not always true, one searches in vain for guidance 
about the exceptional cases. 
Maybe the “generally” had something to do with recoveries that, 
because of transition rules, are not governed by the statutory change, 
or to the possibility that a nonphysical injury might be closely enough 
tied to a physical injury to implicate section 104(a)(2).297 If the 
drafters had these situations in mind, however, the point could have 
been made straightforwardly. 
Another possibility is that the “generally” was inadvertent. 
Lawyers drop “generallys,” “usuallys,” and “ordinarilys” into 
everyday discourse. (If you do not know whether an exception  
exists, cover yourself: “The sun generally rises in the east.”) 
                                                                                                                 
291
 McDonald, 9 B.T.A. at 1341. 
292
 I would have thought that a jury might include something to reimburse an aggrieved 
party for nondeductible amounts spent in anticipation of marriage. See infra Part V.B.3. 
293
 See McDonald, 9 B.T.A. at 1342. 
294
 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741, 
1041; see also supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text. 
295
 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 301. 
296
 Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. REP. NO.  
104-737). 
297
 See supra Part V.B.1. The report discussed two situations: If emotional distress  
arises as part of a personal physical injury, the portion of the recovery attributable to the  
distress would continue to be excludable, while that would not necessarily be true with  
an emotional-distress component of a recovery for a nonphysical injury. See H.R. REP. NO. 
104-737, at 301; see also supra note 226. 
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Habituated to “generallys,” lawyers can forget that some propositions 
are always true, and that a “generally” can be misleading. 
But this “generally” appeared in a written document subject to 
substantial review; it must have been intentional. Did Service 
personnel come to realize that, even as they were reviewing old 
authority to take account of amended section 104(a)(2), a blanket 
requirement that a nonphysical personal injury recovery must be 
taxed in its entirety would be wrong? 
3. How Common Is Recovery of Basis?  
Whatever commentators think about the rulings discussed in the 
preceding section, I know of no one who thinks the amendments to 
section 104(a)(2) were intended to make taxable a recovery of basis 
arising from a nonphysical personal injury—at least not if the 
compensation comes from the tortfeasor or an insurance company.298 
If by basis recovery we mean recovery of previously 
nondeductible outlays, as in Clark, the scope of the basis-recovery 
doctrine is potentially quite broad. I am not sure how damages are 
determined in an alienation-of-affections or breach-of-promise-to-
marry lawsuit, and I hope never to find out, but I can imagine a jury 
or parties negotiating a settlement trying to figure how much a poor 
spouse had spent trying to save a failing marriage, or how much a 
spurned fiancée had spent gearing up for a wedding—dollars that 
were not deductible when paid. Might the analysis of the tax effects 
of a recovery in such a situation be analogous (or more than 
analogous) to a basis-recovery situation? If not, why not?299 If the 
goal was to make someone financially whole by making the 
responsible party compensate for out-of-pocket costs, and the 
compensation amount was determined on the assumption that the 
award would not be taxable, exclusion of the recovery would be 
appropriate.300 That is the Clark case, in different garb. 
Of course, a taxpayer has the obligation to demonstrate basis or its 
equivalent if he is claiming an offset to an amount realized. But even 
if we might question the amount of basis claimed in a particular case, 
                                                                                                                 
298
 If the victim’s employer, say, compensates the victim for a nondeductible loss unrelated 
to employment, there would be income. We would not be talking about recovery of basis in that 
case. 
299
 To the extent of punitives, the recovery would be taxable. See Rev. Rul. 74–77, 1974-1 
C.B. 33 (positing that “[n]one of the amounts received constituted exemplary or punitive 
damages”). 
300
 If a jury were instructed to assume the award would be taxable and it grossed up the 
award, inclusion of the recovery would be the theoretically right result. Absent jury instructions 
on the matter, however, the typical juror would have no idea that an award might be taxed. 
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surely there would be no doubt in an alienation-of-affections or 
breach-of-promise-to-marry situation that some basis existed—some 
nondeductible, out-of-pocket costs were being restored—and that at 
least part of the recovery might be excludable. 
The common argument against an analysis of that sort for many 
tort recoveries is that we are talking about “human capital”—the 
Murphy panel made specific reference to the concept301—and no one, 
it is said, can have basis in human capital. Professor Dodge states that  
[s]ome might argue that a person has a basis equal to the sum 
of human-capital expenditures, which might include such 
items as outlays for food, education, preventive health care, 
vitamins, and minerals. Unfortunately, no one keeps track of 
these outlays, nor would it be feasible to do so. Most (or all) 
of the foregoing are nondeductible personal expenses and not 
capital expenditures.302 
Propositions like that are regularly and forcefully advanced, as if 
there can be no doubt that human capital has a zero basis.303 In 
Murphy I, the government argued that, “[b]ecause people do not pay 
cash or its equivalent to acquire their well-being [sez who?], they 
have no basis in it for purposes of measuring a gain (or loss) upon the 
realization of compensatory damages.”304 And in Murphy II, the 
government was more categorical: “The Code does not allow 
individuals to claim a basis in their human capital.”305 
I do not understand why that is so. Professor Geier has fleshed  
out the “no basis in human capital” argument as it might apply to 
                                                                                                                 
301 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 177–78 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 
(2008); Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 85–87 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
302
 Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 152 (footnote omitted). 
303
 See, e.g., 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 172, ¶ 5.6, at 5-40 (arguing for taxability 
of various recoveries, unless Congress provides otherwise, “[s]ince defamation or alienation of 
affections does not entail the loss of something for which the taxpayer paid cold cash”); Geier, 
supra note 76, at 582 (“[A] tax-free return of capital necessarily entails basis—previously taxed 
dollars—which no one can create in his own body or mind. Because Murphy had no basis in her 
human capital, the entirety of the cash she received was gross income within the meaning of the 
residual clause in section 61.”). 
304
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 87 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
305 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). When I see a statement 
about what “the Code” does not allow, I expect to see a statutory citation. But the citation in 
Murphy II was to a Ninth Circuit decision predating the amendment of section 104(a)(2). See id. 
(citing Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Murphy II court pulled 
the following quotation from Roemer: “Since there is no tax basis in a person’s health and other 
personal interests, money received as compensation for an injury to those interests might be 
considered a realized accession to wealth.” Id. (quoting Roemer, 716 F.2d at 696 n.2). The court 
characterized the quoted language as “dictum.” Id. 
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Murphy, but, as I will explain, it is not convincing: 
[T]here are no previously taxed dollars to recover tax-free 
here. [Murphy] made no nondeductible capital expenditure 
that created her bodily integrity, emotional well-being, and 
professional reputation. Any outlays that she incurred to keep 
her body and mind in good operating condition are current 
expenses (current net wealth decreases, as opposed to capital 
expenditures). Most of those expenses would be “personal” 
[and] nondeductible for that reason. Except in the case of a 
personal expense that is refunded, nondeductible expenses  
do not generally create basis, or else they could provide  
a delayed tax benefit that is inconsistent with the 
nondeductibility of the personal expense.306 
We should have a skeptical attitude about basis claimed in human 
capital,307 but Professors Dodge and Geier go too far. I do not know 
how we can be sure that Murphy made no nondeductible (but 
measurable) capital expenditures to create the human capital that was 
converted. Could there not have been some nondeductible education 
expenses, say—almost certainly “capital” in nature—that contributed 
to her professional reputation, a reputation that was determined to 
have been injured? Had the right questions been asked, perhaps 
Murphy could have substantiated some costs. And even if this would 
not have worked for Murphy, this would be a relevant inquiry in other 
cases where conversion of human capital is claimed. 
In fact, notwithstanding Professor Dodge’s certainty to the 
contrary, people do keep track of expenditures that contribute to 
human capital—not the amount spent on pencils in the first grade, of 
course, but the costs of college are not difficult to track.308 That sort 
of information is not being presented in tax litigation involving 
nonphysical injuries because almost everyone is assuming the full 
                                                                                                                 
306
 Geier, supra note 76, at 580. 
307
 We should therefore not assume that the amount of a personal injury recovery equals 
basis. Professor Dodge has called recovery-equals-basis a “sentimentalist” position: 
On the merits, human capital should not be treated as a conventional asset with 
basis. Not only is it impossible to keep track of costs, but there are also conceptual 
problems. By what coherent principle would one distinguish between the capital 
expenditure and the expense portions of food, education, etc.? Is human capital used 
in business to earn wages, or is it held for personal consumption to enjoy life? 
Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 153. 
308
 There can be other conceptual problems: if Mom and Dad paid for the educational 
expenses of their injured child, should the child have “basis”? I would argue yes, that for these 
purposes the transfer was a gift from parents to child, but I can understand that others would 
disagree. 
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recovery is taxable. If your lawyer tells you that (or tells you nothing 
at all), or if a court says it does not matter what basis you might have, 
why provide information? 
But suppose a damages recovery by its terms reflects an effort on 
the part of the judge, jury, or negotiating parties to determine the 
amount of nondeductible dollars that had been spent developing 
converted human capital.309 To say that basis is difficult to determine 
is not to say that no basis exists. And there is no reason to ignore all 
expenditures because some are difficult to track.310 Remember that we 
are talking about converted capital: Murphy proceeded on the 
assumption that Ms. Murphy had really lost something, and she was 
being compensated for a loss, not being awarded a windfall.311 
I am also unconvinced that the distinction between capital 
expenditures and current expenses is relevant. In a business setting, 
we distinguish between current expenses, which ought to be 
deductible and therefore not create basis, and capital expenditures, 
which are generally not currently deductible but will create basis if 
there is an asset to which they can be attributed. But in the personal 
setting, neither current expenses nor capital expenditures are usually 
going to be deductible. Whether current or capital in nature, the costs 
are after-tax costs. 
If there is a recovery of previously taxed dollars—which is what 
we are talking about with basis—why should we care whether the 
nondeductible expenditures were ordinary or capital in nature? If the 
connection between an expenditure and a later recovery can be 
shown—not always impossible—the key question should be whether 
that expenditure was deductible or not. 
I have always understood Clark as a basis-recovery case, as have 
others, even though no capital expenditure was involved: the tax 
                                                                                                                 
309
 If the expenditures were deductible, then no basis would have been created. No 
expenditure should be both deductible and reflected in basis—unless Congress provides for 
double-counting to provide an incentive for particular activity. 
310
 Even though a taxpayer has the obligation to demonstrate basis that would reduce gain 
on disposition of an asset—just as he must demonstrate entitlement to exclude something from 
income or to take a deduction—the Service will ordinarily not require him to treat the basis as 
zero in the absence of records. For example, if you sell an item that has been passed from 
generation to generation in your family, and you do not have records necessary to apply sections 
1014 and 1015, the Service will generally accept a reasonable figure. See I.R.C. § 1015(a) 
(2006) (setting out rules for difficult situations). Why should the same rule of thumb not apply 
with conversion of human capital? 
311
 Wages are different, as I discuss later. See infra Part VI.E. The arrangement is generally 
voluntary. The performance of services does not necessarily use up human capital, and the 
compensation does not purport to be for capital. In Murphy, the assumption was that human 
capital had been converted. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
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payment was for the current year’s tax liability.312 But if there is 
reluctance to use the term “basis” for a nondeductible current 
expenditure, then let us find a new word. Whatever term is used, the 
recovery of previously taxed dollars, when the recovery is funded by 
the person who caused the loss (or by an insurer), should be tax-free. 
Professor Geier is worried about a deferred benefit from an 
otherwise nondeductible, noncapital, personal expenditure—a benefit 
inconsistent with the idea that personal expenditures are not 
deductible.313 That is a concern in many contexts, but why here?314 
Using a previously nondeductible cost to offset a recovery is a 
benefit, certainly if the baseline for comparison is that a recovery 
ought to be taxable. But, as was true in Clark, the benefit is 
justified—offsetting a nondeductible loss or expenditure with an 
untaxed recovery.315 Indeed, it is the point of this exercise—as in 
Clark—to provide an offset. 
Suppose, for example, you pay your gardener $10,000 to plant 
annuals around your house—a nondeductible current expense. A 
well-heeled thug trashes the yard, and you successfully sue the guy to 
recover the $10,000. Can it be true that the full $10,000 is taxable 
because you have no basis associated with your noncapital 
expenditure, and no statutory provision provides for an exclusion?316 
Assuming the connection between the loss and the recovery can be 
demonstrated, of course the recovery should be tax-free.317 
Is this example too easy and therefore unrepresentative of the  
more typical case, where the relationship between a recovery and 
previously nondeductible expenditures will not be obvious? Maybe 
so, but the difficulties of demonstrating basis in many cases should 
                                                                                                                 
312
 See supra Part V.B.1. 
313
 See supra text accompanying note 306. 
314
 Maybe what happens with recoveries for personal injuries cannot be governed by 
“generally” applicable rules. The events are by their nature unusual. 
315
 Professor Geier says that treating a nondeductible current expenditure as creating basis 
might be appropriate in determining the effect of a refund. See supra text accompanying note 
306. The principle should not be so limited. Indeed, Clark has been characterized as a case 
where the result should have been the same as if Uncle Sam had refunded the extra tax. See 
supra note 213. 
316
 This is not a “personal” injury, but the example still makes my point. Although there is 
physical damage, and the injury might be a tort, the injury is not to the person, and section 
104(a)(2) should therefore be irrelevant. The term “personal” in the statute should have 
reference both to “tort or tort type rights,” as set out in the regulations, and damage to the 
person. 
317
 Make the expenditure capital. The gardener builds a greenhouse for you, cost $10,000. 
Nothing associated with the creation of “horticultural capital” is deductible, however, because 
no Code section provides authority to deduct this personal expenditure. The thug trashes the 
greenhouse, and you recover $10,000. Income? No. The result is the same as in the first 
variation. Tax-free dollars should compensate for the loss of already taxed dollars, whether the 
initial expenditure was capital or not. 
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not affect the analysis where basis can in fact be demonstrated.  
Perhaps the conceptual problem in the personal-injury context is 
exacerbated by the use of the term “human capital,” which covers a 
mishmash of quite different attributes.318 For many commentators, the 
term is used as a shorthand way of concluding that a recovery should 
be taxable. Human capital? No basis. I question that position. 
To be sure, with many of the expenditures that are often described 
as enhancing human capital, we cannot expect people to have kept 
records or otherwise to be able to reconstruct the amounts involved. 
Furthermore, there are relatively few situations in which the idea of a 
“recovery” of the typical expenditure for human capital would make 
sense. We do not want to let expenditures made by Mom and Dad for 
one’s baby food turn into a basis offset forty years later. 
For some expenditures, however, keeping track is not a problem; 
expenses for education are obviously different in that regard from 
expenditures for “vitamins” and “minerals.”319 And viewing the 
benefit of a nondeductible expenditure as having been lost is not out 
of the realm of possibility. These situations might be unusual (and 
might not include Murphy). But it makes no sense to have a 
categorical no-basis rule. The question to ask is whether a taxpayer 
received amounts from the person who caused a personal injury that 
compensated for previously nondeductible outlays. If so, and if the 
taxpayer can demonstrate the amount with an acceptable level of 
precision, recovery of basis is inevitably implicated. 
Suppose a would-be professional pianist pays tuition at a 
conservatory building up “human capital.” He cannot deduct the 
expenditures when incurred because he is not yet carrying on a trade 
or business.320 At best, the expenditures are “start-up expenditures,” a 
form of capital expenditure for which there might ultimately be an 
effect under the Code, but for which there is none currently.321 
Now suppose we are in a world without section 104(a)(2), and the 
                                                                                                                 
318 Professor Dodge defines recoveries for injuries to “human capital” as encompassing 
“damages for lost wage-earning capacity, including recoveries for lost past wages,” Dodge, 
Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 147, and a recovery of that sort should be taxable (unless 
Congress provides otherwise). But the definition used by others is broader, and, in Murphy, the 
panel had concluded that no lost-earning potential was involved. 
319
 But see supra text accompanying note 302. 
320
 The costs are therefore not ordinary and necessary business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162 
(2006). 
321 If the pianist later becomes a professional, he would be able to amortize the previously 
nondeductible costs of creating a business over a fifteen-year period if he can demonstrate the 
expenditures would have been deductible for someone already in the business. See I.R.C. § 195 
(2006). The costs of conservatory instruction should be deductible by a professional pianist. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967) (announcing that certain education expenses are 
deductible as business expenses). 
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musician is injured in an accident and loses a finger on his left hand. 
He sues the tortfeasor and recovers an amount that can reasonably be 
considered to include compensation for the tuition that, because of the 
injury, cannot lead to its desired result. Would that portion of the 
recovery be taxable in a world without section 104(a)(2)? Surely we 
have the equivalent of basis here.322 
Change the facts. Make the injury emotional distress so severe that 
it becomes impossible to carry out the career for which the tuition 
was spent. Section 104(a)(2) is inapplicable by its terms, but assume 
the pianist can show a connection between injury and lost career. 
(Yes, there are emotionally disturbed pianists, but let us assume  
that mental distress might make a concert career impossible.) Any 
recovery ought to be offset by the amount of nondeductible tuition. 
Maybe other offsets can be found as well, but at least the wasted 
tuition should be an offset. 
An unlikely set of facts? Of course. Impossible? Not at all. And 
here is another example, based on a real occurrence, of a basis offset 
in a nonphysical personal injury situation. A couple, nervous about 
messy personal problems, paid a law firm to keep their names out of 
the newspapers. Although it did its best, the firm was unsuccessful, 
and some embarrassing information became public.323 The couple 
sued the privacy-invader and recovered. The couple should not be 
taxed on any portion of the recovery that represents a recoupment of 
the amount paid the law firm. That is a recovery of basis, with no 
difficulty in measuring amount. 
It might be that Ms. Murphy could have demonstrated no basis. 
The amount of her award was based on “awards made in other  
cases involving comparable degrees of injury,”324 rather than a 
determination of actual expenditures made, and Murphy asked for 
more compensation based on severity of the injury, not the amount of 
out-of-pocket costs.325 But we do not know what Murphy would have 
been able to demonstrate had the right questions been asked. And 
there is no categorical reason why a recovery in such circumstances 
should be taxable in the absence of a specific exclusion to that effect. 
                                                                                                                 
322
 I am assuming the pianist would not be entitled to take a deduction when he is forced to 
abandon creation of a business. In any event, the amount of any abandonment loss would be 
limited to basis. 
323
 I cannot reveal further details without invading privacy. 
324
 Leveille v. N.Y. Air Nat’l Guard, No. 98-079, 1999 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 105, at 
*7 (Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Oct. 25, 1999). 
325
 Id. at *7–8. 
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4. Gotcher: “Gross Income” Is Not All-Encompassing  
One might think commentators arguing for a broad conception of 
income, which would pick up the recovery in Murphy, routinely take 
the position that any receipt of value, outside the recovery-of-basis 
context, is automatically taxable, unless Congress provides explicitly 
to the contrary,326 or unless the Internal Revenue Service decides to 
let certain accessions to wealth go.327 One might also think that the 
income-tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code should be 
interpreted on the assumption that, as a multitude of judicial opinions 
have said, Congress meant to exercise its full taxing power.328 
In fact there is widespread understanding that certain benefits are 
not taxable, even though the Constitution would not require that 
result, no Code provision justifies an exclusion, and enforcement 
issues appear manageable.329 
Begin a conversation with a tax professor about in-kind benefits 
that arguably constitute a form of “forced” consumption,330 and the 
prof is likely to respond: “Gotcher!” a reference to United States v. 
Gotcher.331 The Fifth Circuit in 1968 held that an expense-paid trip to 
Germany, paid partly by Mr. Gotcher’s employer, a Volkswagen 
dealership, and partly by the larger Volkswagen organization, was not 
taxable to Gotcher because the trip “primarily benefit[ed] the party 
paying for the trip,”332 even though it had elements of pleasure. 
Volkswagen was trying to convince U.S. dealers and investors about 
the merits of its organization and products.333 
While in Germany, Mr. Gotcher was forced to keep his nose to  
the grindstone, visiting one VW facility after another rather than 
going to Bayreuth: “[T]he personal benefit to Gotcher was clearly 
subordinate to the concrete benefits to VW.”334 (The benefit provided 
                                                                                                                 
326
 Congress has done that, for example, with gifts, municipal bond interest, and various 
employer-provided fringe benefits. See I.R.C. §§ 102, 115, 132 (2006). 
327
 See supra note 262. 
328 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) (“This Court has 
frequently stated that this language [the definition of “gross income” in the 1939 Code] was 
used by Congress to exert in this field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’” (quoting 
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)) (citing Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 
U.S. 161, 166 (1925))). 
329 I say “non-cash” benefits, although many of these cases involve cash reimbursements. 
330
 I have put “forced” in quotation marks because, although the adjective is often used, the 
amount of force involved in these cases is typically minimal. 
331
 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968). 
332
 Id. at 122. 
333 See id. at 121. 
334
 Id. at 123. 
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to Mrs. Gotcher was taxable, however. Her trip was a vacation.335) 
For there to be income, concluded the Fifth Circuit, “[t]here must  
be an economic gain, and this gain must primarily benefit the 
taxpayer personally.”336 
I am not sure how enthusiastic the Internal Revenue Service is 
about the Gotcher doctrine—not very, I suspect337—but Gotcher has 
been interpreted by academics to support not taxing in-kind benefits 
in many different circumstances. For example, should a law student 
have income associated with callback interview trips paid by law 
firms? Because the student is not yet engaged in a trade or business, 
the expenditures would not have been deductible if she had paid them 
herself.338 As a result of the reimbursements, the student receives a 
clear economic benefit—certainly if she winds up employed—from 
someone else’s absorbing her nondeductible costs.339 I am not even 
sure it is appropriate to say, under the circumstances, that “the 
personal benefit to [the law student would be] clearly subordinate to 
the concrete benefits to [the law firm].” But the understanding is that 
there is no income in such a case.340 
If we were drafting a statute from scratch, that might be the 
position we would want to adopt, but where in the Code does that 
principle come from? I have been assured by Gotcher fans that they 
are not making a constitutional argument: nothing in the Constitution 
                                                                                                                 
335
 Id. at 124. With regard to Mr. Gotcher, the facts could be distinguished from Rudolph v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962), where a trip to New York provided by an insurance 
company to its most productive employees and their spouses was clearly nothing but a frolic. 
The trip benefited the employees and not the employer, except in the sense that paying 
compensation has benefits to the employer. Id. at 277. 
336
 Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 121. 
337 In the only published ruling in which the Service has cited Gotcher, Rev. Rul. 81-277, 
1981-2 C.B. 14, it explained that “[i]nherent in section 61 of the Code is the concept of 
economic gain. For a taxpayer to have income under section 61, there must be an economic gain 
that benefits the taxpayer personally.” Id. at 15. That unexceptionable proposition had little to 
do with Gotcher, the point of which was that no income would be recognized even with a 
personal benefit, if the primary benefit was to the payor. Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 122. In private 
rulings citing Gotcher, the Service has simply restated language used in the published ruling, 
see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-04-065 (Oct. 30, 1985) (concluding that a benefit was taxable 
when an employee was primarily benefitted); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-47-003 (Aug. 27, 1985); 
or otherwise distinguished Gotcher’s situation, see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-02-018 (Sept. 
29, 1978). 
338 See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006) (permitting deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses 
of carrying on a trade or business); cf. I.R.C. § 195 (2006) (treating start-up expenditures as not 
deductible, but then permitting amortization in some circumstances). No gift is involved in such 
circumstances. 
339 In one respect, this is like Clark: the compensation replaces nondeductible dollars and 
therefore has a basis-recovery aspect to it.  
340
 The Service agreed, in a pre-Gotcher ruling. See Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177 
(treating reimbursed interview expenses as not includable in gross income); see also Rev. Rul. 
80-99, 1980-1 C.B. 10 (holding that reimbursement of expenses in a non-employment context is 
not gross income). 
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would preclude Congress from taxing such “forced” consumption if  
it wished. And nothing in the language of section 61, which reaches 
“income from whatever source derived,” precludes treating forced 
consumption as gross income to the extent the recipient receives a 
benefit. 
Administrative convenience inevitably plays a role in determining 
what, as a matter of practice, will be included in the tax base, but 
convenience is not an argument grounded in statute or theory. And  
in Gotcher itself, the government had assessed the tax deficiency.341 
No administrative inconvenience was involved there. 
So where did the authority not to tax Gotcher come from? 
Professor Geier attributes the doctrine to courts that have been 
“convinced that Congress would not have intended taxation of  
the receipt. That most often occurs when consumption received in 
kind is not compensation, a dividend, or any other type of specifically 
listed item of gross income.”342 The Fifth Circuit stated that “it has 
been generally held that exclusions from gross income are not limited 
to the enumerated exclusions” in the Code.343 That statement by itself 
supports my thesis—that long-time understandings may trump a 
modern economist’s conception of what ought to be treated as 
income—and perhaps I should just leave it at that. 
But the interesting thing about Gotcher is that the tax professoriate 
generally embraces its result even though the Fifth Circuit’s analysis 
provides no intellectual support. The only authority cited for the 
proposition that “exclusions from gross income are not limited to the 
enumerated exclusions”344 was the “convenience of the employer” 
doctrine, developed judicially and administratively before enactment 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under that doctrine, the value 
of meals or lodging provided by an employer to an employee was not 
taxed to the employee under certain circumstances—if the benefit was 
for the “convenience of the employer” rather than the convenience of 
the employee.345 
It is true, as the Gotcher court emphasized, that the “convenience 
of the employer” doctrine developed without Code language to 
support it, but it is also the case that the 1954 Code included a 
provision, section 119, codifying (with some modifications) the 
                                                                                                                 
341 See Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 120. 
342
 Geier, supra note 76, at 577. 
343
 Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 120. 
344 Id. 
345
 Id. at 120 n.3 (citing I.R.C. § 119 (1964)). Under this striking principle, the full value is 
excludable, even though the employee would otherwise have had to pay for meals and lodging 
with after-tax dollars. 
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judicially and administratively blessed doctrine.346 The existence  
of section 119, which was on the books when Gotcher was decided,  
is hardly support for the idea that Congress intended to preserve 
extra-statutory exclusions from gross income when it recodified 
revenue statutes in 1954. In fact, if I had been on the Gotcher panel,  
I would have inferred the opposite: When a sympathetic case for 
exclusion presents itself, Congress knows what to do. 
In any event, the result in Gotcher cannot depend on the language 
of the Code, and it cannot depend on Congress’s unstated intentions 
in enacting section 61. There must be an “unless” at work here. At 
bottom, the position supporting Gotcher has to be that some economic 
benefits are just not income—in this case, receipts of value that 
primarily benefit the transferor, rather than the recipient. That is my 
point: just because an economic benefit is not explicitly excluded 
from the tax base does not mean it will be taxed. 
Yes, Gotcher is different from Ms. Murphy’s situation. She 
received cash,347 and Gotcher received in-kind benefits.348 And if  
we were to require Gotcher to recognize income, a discount might  
be appropriate to reflect that the benefits were inalienable and the  
trip was partly for business. Although Gotcher was not an employee 
of the larger Volkswagen enterprise,349 what he received was  
similar to what is today called a working condition fringe (a benefit 
paid by an employer that, had it been paid by the employee, would 
have been deductible to the employee).350 Given that Gotcher’s  
trip was overwhelmingly business-related, he would have had a 
plausible argument for deducting most of the cost of the trip had  
                                                                                                                 
346
 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 119 (1954). 
347 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
Professor Geier writes:  
Cash always qualifies as residual gross income [i.e., “income from whatever source 
derived” under section 61] (and thus is includable absent a specific statutory 
exclusion enacted by Congress to exempt this otherwise includable gross income) 
unless (1) it has, in effect, been previously taxed to the recipient, that is, is a recovery 
of basis, (2) it is borrowed money that must be repaid, or (3) it is a government 
welfare payment or similar government payment. 
Geier, supra note 76, at 577 (footnote omitted). As the discussion in Part V.B.2 indicated, 
however, many cash recoveries have been deemed excludable over the years without fitting into 
any of those three categories. 
348
 Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 119. But Mrs. Gotcher also received in-kind benefits, and she had 
income. Id. at 124. And the benefits made it unnecessary for the Gotchers to expend the cash 
themselves.  
349
 See id. at 118–19. 
350
 Part of the cost was paid for by Gotcher’s employer, and that part might have been 
treated as a working condition fringe under today’s law. See I.R.C. § 132(a)(3), (d) (2006). 
Regulations define “employee” broadly. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(b)(2) (as amended in 
1993). 
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he paid for it himself.351 
That is not the way that Gotcher has been interpreted, however. 
Indeed, if Gotcher had been interpreted in that way, we would pay no 
attention to the case today: there is no reason to care about a technical 
inclusion in income if an offsetting deduction would be available 
anyway. Gotcher has been interpreted very differently: Certain 
benefits, the cost of which would not be deductible to the recipient, 
might nevertheless not be treated as gross income. We care about 
Gotcher because it stands for the proposition that not every receipt of 
a benefit is taxable, and that is so even if the Code includes no 
specific exclusion to that effect. 
C. Analyzing a Recovery for a Personal Injury: The “In Lieu of” Test  
How should one analyze a recovery for a nonphysical personal 
injury with amended section 104(a)(2) on the books? Apply first 
principles. Ask questions like those raised in the first weeks of  
the basic federal income tax course, many of which boil down to this: 
Is there gross income? As noted and renoted above, the mere fact  
that you receive cash does not mean that you have income. If, for 
example, the cash merely offsets your basis in an asset disposed  
of, you have no gain on disposition and therefore no income. And 
remember that certain recoveries might be tax-free for other reasons 
even if an economist or other tax theorist would disagree. Maybe we 
think Congress would really not have intended to tax the benefit (one 
interpretation of Gotcher), or maybe we think that imposing an 
income tax on certain sorts of recoveries would be unseemly (one 
way the revenue rulings dealing with recoveries for persecution might 
be understood). 
One way to help with the is-it-income? determination is to go back 
to a test used in many cases and rulings, including Murphy I: ask  
what the recovery was “in lieu of.” The case always cited for this 
proposition is Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner,352 which 
was decided by the First Circuit in 1944. To the extent a recovery 
substitutes for amounts that would have been taxable, like lost profits, 
the recovery should be taxable if section 104(a)(2) does not apply.353 
To the extent it does not take the place of an otherwise taxable item, 
                                                                                                                 
351
 There would be other issues under today’s Code, if the benefit were not treated as 
automatically excludable. Had these expenditures been made by Gotcher himself, they might 
have been treated as start-up expenditures because he was investigating the creation of a trade  
or business. If so, the expenditures might have been amortizable later even if not currently 
deductible. See I.R.C. § 195 (2006). 
352
 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944). 
353
 See id. at 113. 
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however, it should not automatically be taxable—unless it is just a 
windfall.354 In sum, if the amount received is not in lieu of anything, 
and assuming no specific exclusion applies, it should be taxed.355 
The “in lieu of” test has been disparaged in recent commentary. 
For one thing, it has been characterized as arising in the commercial 
damages context, and consequently lacking any obvious relevance to 
personal injury recoveries. Professor Dodge has written: 
The only respectable (if dangerously incorrect) basis for 
excluding compensatory damages from gross income is the 
“substitute for” theory, which may be loosely related to the 
Raytheon case. That case (and its progeny) dealt with the 
issue of whether commercial damages were “for” lost profits 
or a destroyed asset with a basis. Not only were these cases 
concerned with commercial damages, they ultimately hinged 
on a finding (or nonfinding) of recoverable basis. They do not 
stand for the proposition that a cash recovery for personal 
injury is excludible apart from basis recovery or section 
104(a)(2).356 
Raytheon did involve commercial damages, but it is unclear why a 
principle developed in one context cannot apply in another. Whatever 
its origins, the “in lieu of” or “substitute for” test has been used  
often in personal injury cases by courts oblivious to the “danger” 
involved.357 
Indeed, in O’Gilvie v. United States,358 decided in 1996, the 
Supreme Court took application of the test for granted in determining 
whether punitive damages associated with a personal injury were 
excludable under the pre-1996 version of section 104(a)(2). In 
describing that section, Justice Breyer noted that “the language 
                                                                                                                 
354
 See id. 
355
 See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  
356
 Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 987; see also Geier, supra note 76, at 578 
(discussing origins of the “in lieu of” test). 
357
 See, e.g., Delaney v. Comm’r, 99 F.3d 20, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying test to 
determine the consequences of a tort settlement); Robinson v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 116 (1994) 
(same), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1838, as 
recognized in Moulton v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1151 (2009); see also Moulton, 97  
T.C.M. (CCH) 1151 (same); Gibson v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (2007) (applying test  
to determine the applicability of section 104(a)(2)); Connolly v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1138 (2007) (same); Green v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (2005) (same); cf. Getty v. 
Comm’r, 913 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying test to determine that a settlement payment 
made by the Getty Museum to the Getty family heirs was excludable to the extent it was in lieu 
of a gift by J. Paul Getty). 
358
 519 U.S. 79 (1996). 
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excludes from taxation not only those damages that aim to substitute 
for a victim’s physical or personal well-being”—the inference was 
that that portion of the damages might not have been taxable 
regardless of section 104(a)(2)—but also “those damages that 
substitute . . . for lost wages, which would have been taxed had the 
victim earned them.”359 In contrast, punitives substituted for nothing 
and were therefore outside the scope of the exclusion.360 The 
“substitute for” language was dictum, and the language might not 
have resulted from careful deliberation. But the language resonated 
with some Justices. 
The test is not perfect, and it might need tweaking. But it at least 
requires asking some questions we should be asking anyway. What is 
the payment for?361 (Is it basis recovery, a windfall, effectively for 
disposition of an asset with a zero basis?) Or, more generally—this is 
what we ought to be figuring out—what is going on here? Judgment, 
and sometimes guesswork, will be involved, but I cannot imagine 
determining the tax consequences of any event or transaction without 
making the effort to determine what really was going on.362 
If Professor Dodge means only that the cases in which courts have 
applied the “in lieu of” test have not used it as an independent ground 
for exclusion, then of course I agree.363 The test does not lead to any 
particular conclusion. We determine, as best we can, what a recovery 
was for, and then we go from there. If the recovery replaced lost 
profits, then it is taxable (assuming no other basis for exclusion 
exists). If not, keep thinking.364 
                                                                                                                 
359
 Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
360
 See id. 
361
 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (applying test to determine 
the portion of recovery excludable by section 104(a)(2) and the portion attributable to 
punitives). In this ruling, the Service conflated the “in lieu of” and “origin of the claim” tests. 
Cf. Phelps v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336, 1340 (2008) (“If the settlement agreement lacks 
express language stating what the amount paid pursuant to that agreement was to settle, the 
intent of the payor is critical to that determination.”).  
362
 Cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938) (holding that an amount received under a 
compromise about a contested will was received by “inheritance” for purposes of statutory 
exclusion, when Lyeth was able to receive what he did only because he was an heir and he made 
a claim in that capacity). 
363
 See Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 131 (“The ‘in lieu of’ (or ‘substitute 
for’) theory is thrown around as if the mere labels attached to the doctrine lead to obvious 
conclusions.”). 
364
 Professor Dodge thinks an exclusion would be available only if section 104(a)(2) 
applies or recovery of basis is involved. See supra text accompanying note 356. That is a 
respectable point, but it does not speak to the value of the “in lieu of” test. And while Professor 
Geier is right that “Raytheon does not stand for the proposition that a damage award made in 
lieu of an item that would not, itself, be taxable is not gross income,” Geier, supra note 76, at 
578, many hints in cases and rulings suggest we take that factor into account. See, e.g., O’Gilvie, 
519 U.S. at 86. 
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Just as Professor Dodge would like to limit the “in lieu of” test to 
cases involving commercial damages, the district court in Murphy 
restricted the scope of the test: “courts have applied the Raytheon  
test in cases involving settlement, not in cases where damages are 
awarded by an administrative body.”365 
My response is the same as to Professor Dodge: So? The test can 
be hard to apply, and it will often not lead to definitive answers, but 
the distinction drawn by the district court is bizarre. The way the 
administrative law judge broke down the award in Murphy made 
characterization easier than would be true with a settlement 
agreement. The total recovery was divided into two components—
$45,000 for “mental pain and anguish” and $25,000 for “damage to 
her professional reputation”366—a helpful first step, particularly when 
done by a disinterested party. It is hard to see why this situation 
worsens the case for application of the “in lieu of” test.367 
More generally, how might the characterization of a damages 
recovery proceed? Professor Andrews raises a nice conceptual puzzle 
in his income-tax casebook: Assume that a recovery for a physical 
personal injury is broken into various components—lost income, 
medical expenses, pain and suffering, punitives, and so on. Would 
any of the recovery be excludable if there were no section 
104(a)(2)?368 
The issue does not come up in the real world with a physical injury 
recovery because the full amount is generally excludable anyway—
except for the punitives and, if the medical expenses had previously 
been deducted, the amount attributable to those expenses.369 But 
suppose section 104(a)(2) were repealed. Would the repeal indicate a 
congressional intention to tax the full amount of any recovery for a 
physical injury recovery? Would, for example, a recovery of medical 
expenses not previously deducted by the victim suddenly become 
taxable in a world without section 104(a)(2)? Of course not.370 Would 
                                                                                                                 
365
 Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 218 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 493 F.3d 170, 172 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).  
366
 Id. at 215. 
367
 Ultimately the merits of the test did not matter to the district court, which concluded 
that the default rule was “income” and a statutory exclusion did not apply. Moreover, exclusions 
must be “narrowly construed.” Id. at 213 (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)). 
368
 WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 105 (5th ed. 1999). 
The question survives in the new edition. See WILLIAM D. ANDREWS & PETER J. 
WIEDENBECK, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 96 (6th ed. 2009). 
369 See supra note 187. 
370
 If the recovery occurs in the same year as the expense, and the victim is able to deduct 
the expense under section 213 of the Code, the effect is a wash: no net income. To the extent the 
expense is not deductible (if, for example, the threshold under section 213 is not reached), we 
have basis recovery. 
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a pain-and-suffering component of the recovery be includable in  
gross income? I am not sure, but I am sure that the answer is not so 
obviously yes that the question should be ignored. 
One traditional line of analysis concludes that a pain-and-suffering 
recovery should be tax-free because it substitutes for the “right to  
be free from pain and suffering,” which is not included in the income 
tax base. (Justice Breyer hinted at the propriety of that treatment in 
O’Gilvie,371 and the Murphy I panel applied that analysis in 
connection with the emotional-distress recovery.372) If you lose 
$1,000 worth of emotional well-being and are compensated with a 
$1,000 recovery, you will not be made whole if you are taxed.373 
Maybe it does not make sense to talk in these terms, but people do.374 
And if you have really lost something, it does not seem appropriate to 
automatically characterize any recovery as a windfall.375 
However we analyze that part of a recovery, the ultimate question 
is whether there is income; we would not assume that, simply because 
no express exclusion applies, the recovery is taxable. Professor 
Andrews included the alienation-of-affections ruling in his text, 
apparently intending students to ponder whether there might be 
justification for not taxing at least part of a personal injury recovery 
on the ground that there is no income.376 
In the cases and rulings that have applied the “in lieu of” test in  
a personal physical injury setting, the question has usually been 
whether a recovery is “on account of” a physical injury, not to break a 
recovery into components (other than to determine any element of 
                                                                                                                 
371
 See supra text accompanying note 359. Until Murphy, that argument seems not to have 
been raised in post-1996 cases involving recoveries for nonphysical injuries with something like 
a pain-and-suffering aspect. See, e.g., Venable v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (2003), aff’d, 
110 F. App’x 421 (5th Cir. 2004) (not considering exclusion of a mental-anguish portion of 
malicious-prosecution recovery). 
372
 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
373
 The relief provision available for involuntary conversions of property would be 
unavailable in this situation. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2006); see also supra note 256. 
374 Professor Dodge has argued that “pain-and-suffering damages compensate that  
which cannot be purchased. Thus, it is fundamentally misleading to call these damages 
‘compensation’; they ‘replace’ the irreplaceable.” Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 
183. That is a powerful rhetorical point. Nevertheless, we will continue talking about 
“compensation” for irreplaceable losses. (Furthermore, Dodge’s flourish would not strike the 
man on the street as support for imposing tax liability.) 
375
 But see infra note 414 and accompanying text (describing an early Treasury ruling 
concluding that recovery for pain and suffering was taxable in the absence of a statutory 
provision to the contrary). 
376
 That was true in the 1999 edition, see ANDREWS, supra note 368, and, in the new 
edition, Andrews and Wiedenbeck again include Revenue Ruling 74–77, 1974-1 C.B. 33. See 
ANDREWS & WIEDENBECK, supra note 368, at 99. Neither edition informs students that the 
Service has pulled the ruling. 
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punitive damages).377 A further breakdown is generally unnecessary 
because, if it is applicable, section 104(a)(2) potentially makes the 
entire recovery excludable. 
With nonphysical personal injuries, however, the cases and rulings 
after the 1996 amendment to section 104(a)(2) have not even 
mentioned the possibility of breaking down a recovery into clearly 
taxable and possibly nontaxable components. But exactly the same 
analytical structure used with the Andrews hypothetical is appropriate 
with a recovery for a nonphysical injury, where section 104(a)(2) has 
no application. 
One reason this has not happened is because of the pervasive idea 
that a recovery for a nonphysical personal injury is taxable. In 
unthinkingly accepting an all-or-nothing rule—if a recovery is on 
account of a personal nonphysical injury, it is fully taxable; if it is on 
account of a physical personal injury, it is generally nontaxable—
taxpayers, lawyers, and courts have not thought about the possibilities 
that the “in lieu of” test suggests. Or if they have thought about the 
possibilities, taxpayers’ lawyers have decided that fighting city hall is 
pointless. When the facts are right, however, clients should be advised 
to do exactly that. 
One more set of points is worth making in defense of the “in lieu 
of” test. Professor Geier has argued that the test, if taken literally, 
leads to absurd results. Should the punitive damages or antitrust treble 
damages in Glenshaw Glass have been tax-free because they were  
“in lieu of being free from the defendant’s particularly egregious 
behavior”?378 The taxpayers in Glenshaw Glass would not have been 
taxed on the value of the right to be free from egregious conduct. 
This imaginative criticism is unconvincing, for two reasons. First, 
the damages in Glenshaw Glass did not substitute for anything. That 
was the point,379 and it was emphasized in O’Gilvie as well.380 To the 
extent that a “recovery” is a pure windfall, it ought to be taxable. 
Second, if the “in lieu of” test leads to absurd results when taken too 
                                                                                                                 
377
 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (mandating application of a 
test to determine the portion of recovery excludable under section 104(a)(2) as “on account of 
personal physical injuries” and the portion attributable to punitives). 
378 Geier, supra note 76, at 578. 
379
 The Glenshaw Glass Court noted: 
Respondents concede . . . that the recoveries are taxable to the extent that they 
compensate for damages actually incurred [i.e., lost profits]. It would be an anomaly 
that could not be justified in the absence of clear congressional intent to say that a 
recovery for actual damages is taxable but not the additional amount extracted as 
punishment for the same conduct which caused the injury. 
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
380
 See supra notes 358–59 and accompanying text. 
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literally, we should not take it so literally. As I suggested earlier, 
“What is going on here?” works as well as we can expect. Phrased in 
that inelegant way, the test leads to the proper result: if nothing has 
been lost and cash has been received, the damages must be fully 
taxable. We should not expect more linguistic precision, and more 
predictability in result, than is possible in applying legal tests. 
D. The Bottom Line: Not All “Nonphysical” Recoveries Are Taxable  
The discussion in this part of the Article has gone in several 
directions, but with a common theme: those who have assumed that 
the receipt of value is, absent a specific statutory exception to the 
contrary, automatically taxable under the Internal Revenue Code are 
just wrong. And that has been true even in cases when the value 
received was in the form of cash and no apparent basis offset was 
involved. 
There is no reason to assume that a recovery for a nonphysical 
personal injury is automatically taxable. Full inclusion in the 
recipient’s gross income is the likely result in most cases, to be sure, 
but it should not be the result in all. At a minimum, authority—
doctrine!—has supported the propositions that no income arises in 
cases of basis recovery; for recoveries where a personal right was 
lost; perhaps in cases where many might think it unseemly to impose 
an income tax; and who knows what else? When the Internal Revenue 
Service recently pulled authority supporting those positions, it did so 
without adequate justification, and, in some cases, it did so for a 
questionable reason: to further its litigation posture in Murphy. 
Theoreticians might not like all of that authority, but some of it is 
unobjectionable (basis recovery) and all of it has (or had) been around 
for a long time. Doctrine should not be ignored simply because a 
commentator thinks it is theoretically unfounded.  
VI. WHY THE RESULT IN MURPHY I WAS NOT CRAZY 
One of the points I have been making is that the concept of income 
historically was not as all-encompassing as modern commentators 
think it should have been. The case can reasonably be made that Ms. 
Murphy might not have had gross income as defined in section 61, at 
least not to the extent of the full $70,000—a determination that the 
D.C. Circuit did not make in Murphy I, except implicitly, by jumping 
straight to the constitutional issues—and that her recovery was not 
necessarily “incomes” under the Sixteenth Amendment. 
In Murphy I, the panel said it was making two big points. First,  
the recovery was not “in lieu of” anything that would have been 
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taxable,381 and, although that point by itself might not have been 
determinative, it was bolstered by point 2: Damage recoveries for 
personal injuries would not have been understood as “income” by the 
ratifiers of the Sixteenth Amendment, except insofar as the recoveries 
were for lost wages or profits.382 Neither of these points is crazy. A 
third point underlies much of the panel’s discussion: Although the 
panel purported not to rely on any “return of capital” theory, that idea 
clearly played a central role in its thinking about the meaning of 
“income.”383 The point was expressed using howler-like language, but 
it too was not baseless. I will discuss each of these three points. 
In addition, I shall discuss other factors that might have helped 
justify the result in Murphy I, even though the panel did not stress  
(or even mention) them. First, the old cases and rulings in this area 
have distinguished, or have been understood to have distinguished, 
between recoveries associated with voluntary events and those 
associated with involuntary ones—with recoveries for events that fall 
on the involuntary side of the divide less likely to be taxable. The 
voluntary-involuntary distinction has intuitive appeal today, as it 
would have had in 1913. Second, contrary to the position taken by 
several commentators, Murphy’s recovery for emotional distress was 
not equivalent to wages. And I shall discuss the limits of logic in 
understanding legal doctrine—that some see a logical connection 
between wages and emotional-distress recoveries does not mean  
the law must accept their equivalence—and the suspect idea that 
“income” is a legal concept that can evolve on its own, with no 
changes in the underlying statutory or constitutional scheme. 
A. The “In Lieu of” Test Applied to Murphy  
The Murphy I panel applied the “in lieu of” test to determine 
whether Ms. Murphy’s recovery, none of which was for lost wages, 
should have been included in the income-tax base.384 The answer was 
no: the “emotional well-being and good reputation [Murphy] enjoyed 
before they were diminished by her former employer were not taxable 
as income. Under this analysis, . . . the compensation she received in 
lieu of what she lost cannot be considered income.”385 
                                                                                                                 
381
 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 
4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
382
 Id. 
383 
“The question in this case is not . . . about a return of capital—except insofar as Murphy 
analogizes human capital to physical or financial capital; the question is whether the 
compensation she received for her injuries is income.” Id. 
384 See id. 
385
 Id. 
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The panel’s use of the test caused critics to go ballistic, but, as I 
discussed in Part V.C, there was ample authority to support this sort 
of analysis. Put “analysis” in quotation marks if you wish, but in 
O’Gilvie the Supreme Court had implied that this was a relevant 
consideration.386 And it certainly would have been relevant if the “in 
lieu of” test had led to the conclusion that the recovery substituted  
for lost profits and therefore should have been taxable. Had that 
determination been made, no one would be complaining about use of 
the test. 
Judge Ginsburg wrote that, because of O’Gilvie, his panel had 
been “instructed” by the Supreme Court to engage in this inquiry.387 
He overstated the extent to which the Court had required use of  
the test, or had mandated that a recovery should be tax-free if it 
substituted for nontaxable attributes. On the other hand, Ginsburg did 
not make this stuff up. Commentators might think the Supreme Court 
had gotten the analysis bizarrely wrong, or that the D.C. Circuit panel 
might have worked its way around an apparent directive. But the 
panel does not deserve criticism—no howler here—for doing what it 
reasonably thought it was supposed to do. 
B. Return of Capital Ideas  
The Murphy I panel characterized Murphy’s “return of capital” 
argument as follows: 
Murphy argues that, being neither a gain nor an accession to 
wealth, her award is not income and § 104(a)(2) is therefore 
unconstitutional insofar as it would make the award taxable 
as income. Broad though the power granted in the Sixteenth 
Amendment is, the Supreme Court, as Murphy points out, has 
long recognized “the principle that a restoration of capital [i]s 
not income; hence it [falls] outside the definition of ‘income’ 
upon which the law impose[s] a tax.”388 
Murphy then argued that the same principles reflected in the language 
quoted from O’Gilvie should apply to a conversion of human 
capital.389 
I have noted the panel’s unfortunate failure to distinguish between 
                                                                                                                 
386
 See O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84, 86 (1996). 
387
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 88. 
388
 Id. at 85 (alterations in original) (quoting O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 84). 
389 Id. (citing GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1st ed. 1964); Gary S. Becker, The 
Economic Way of Looking at Life, in ECONOMIC SCIENCES 27, 43–45 (Nobel Lecture, Dec. 9, 
1992)). 
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“returns of capital” and “returns of basis.”390 That is a howler of sorts, 
but, as was true with use of the “in lieu of” test, the panel was doing 
what it thought it was supposed to do. Murphy was able to quote 
helpful language not only from O’Gilvie but also from Glenshaw 
Glass: 
The long history of . . . holding personal injury recoveries 
nontaxable on the theory that they roughly correspond to a 
return of capital cannot support exemption of punitive 
damages following injury to property . . . . Damages for 
personal injury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive 
damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a 
restoration of capital for taxation purposes.391 
Glenshaw Glass was a statutory interpretation case, not one arising 
under the Sixteenth Amendment, but, given the historical 
understanding that “gross income” under section 61 of the Code and 
“incomes” in the Amendment should be interpreted in a consistent 
way, it was hard not to make the jump from statutory analysis to 
constitutional interpretation.392 
Critics have ridiculed Murphy I, but the Supreme Court really had 
said that about “returns of capital,” and as recently as 1996.393 Yes, 
those passages were dicta—and, in Glenshaw Glass, dictum in a 
footnote394—but they were Supreme Court dicta. In both cases, the 
Court was making the point that punitive damages could not be 
treated as compensatory and therefore could not be tax-exempt in the 
way that compensatory damages might be (at least to the extent basis 
recovery is involved). If the Court had been more focused, it might 
have seen the important distinction between returns of basis and 
“returns” of unrealized appreciation.395 Or the Court might have said 
                                                                                                                 
390
 See supra Part III. 
391
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 85 (omission in original) (quoting Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co. 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955)). 
392
 The Murphy panel stated: 
Fortunately, we need not rely solely upon the wisdom and beneficence of the 
Congress for, when the Sixteenth Amendment was drafted, the word “incomes” had 
well understood limits. . . . [T]he power to tax income extends only to “gain[s]” or 
“accessions to wealth.” That is why . . . the Supreme Court has held a “return of 
capital” is not income. 
Id. at 88 (alteration in original) (quoting Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430–31) (citing Doyle v. 
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1918); S. Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918)). 
393
 O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 84. 
394
 See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8. 
395
 See 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 172, ¶ 5.6, at 5-39 (arguing that the Court’s 
observation in Glenshaw Glass “was probably intended only to distinguish the rulings, not to 
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that in the personal injury context we should care only about whether 
there has been a return of “capital,” regardless of basis, because that 
is how the law has been understood since the inception of the income 
tax. The Court did none of that. 
Those who assign Glenshaw Glass to the tax-cases hall of fame 
need to realize that this confusing, if not embarrassing, material is in 
that opinion396 and that, if closely read, Glenshaw Glass cannot be 
interpreted as having advanced our understanding of “income” except 
in the most trivial sense.397 The issue in Glenshaw Glass was so easy 
that the case tells us little about difficult interpretive issues. In the 
best tradition of judicial restraint, something he was not otherwise 
known for, Chief Justice Warren challenged precedent only at  
the margins. In getting to the right result,398 he took questionable 
propositions at face value and muddied the waters. 
Given what the Supreme Court had written in O’Gilvie and 
Glenshaw Glass, the D.C. Circuit panel had justification for  
making too much of Murphy’s return-of-capital argument. In 
addition, the panel was reacting to the government’s dumb argument 
that Murphy should have been taxed because she had received  
cash.399 That “breathtakingly expansive claim” gave credibility to the 
return-of-capital idea. A party that takes an extreme position risks 
losing the high ground and endangers the more reasonable result for 
which it might have advocated. 
C. What Did “Income” Mean in 1913?  
The Murphy I panel made a good-faith, although incomplete, effort 
to understand the early history of the tax treatment of personal injury 
recoveries. If we need to understand what “income” meant in 1913 or 
thereabouts, we should use the best authority we can find. 
Many commentators do not care what people thought in 1913, but 
                                                                                                                 
 
endorse them”). 
396
 It is embarrassing unless the rules are different in the personal injury context. Maybe 
we should not have to worry about the application of generally applicable rules in unusual 
situations. See supra Part V.B. 
397
 I find the reverence shown to Glenshaw Glass unfathomable. See, e.g., Joseph M. 
Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass: Towards a Modern Concept of Gross Income, in TAX 
STORIES, supra note 8, at 17, 53 (“Glenshaw Glass . . . is now recognized as a classic for setting 
tax jurisprudence firmly on a modern footing. ‘Modern’ means free of the clutter and 
distractions inherited from the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.”); see also 
supra text accompanying note 14. 
398
 The result was right, but, as he often did in tax cases in which the government 
prevailed, Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 433 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  
399
 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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Judge Ginsburg wrote that the Supreme Court—it does get in the 
way!—had “instructed that, in defining ‘incomes,’ we should rely 
upon ‘the commonly understood meaning of the term which must 
have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth 
Amendment.’”400 On this issue, the judge was right about the 
directive from the higher Court. That quotation was from a 1921 case, 
but it was not dictum and the Court has not repudiated it.401 Whether 
or not the D.C. Circuit had really been “instructed” to apply the “in 
lieu of test” or to use “return of capital” ideas, there was no doubt 
that, on discerning the meaning of the Amendment, the Court had 
issued “instructions.” 
What is a lower court to do when presented with Supreme Court 
statements that contradict propositions that are taken for granted in 
the legal academy? A scholar might answer, “Look to my theory,” 
and certainly a lower court can parse and distinguish Court language. 
On the application of a “return-of-capital” doctrine, for example, a 
Murphy I critic might conclude that the Court could not possibly have 
meant to suggest that a recovery of capital, as distinguished from 
basis, is always tax-free in the personal injury setting. 
But when it comes to understanding the Sixteenth Amendment, 
Supreme Court dictates leave no wiggle room.402 The Murphy I panel 
was required to do what it did, if the term “incomes” was relevant to 
resolution of the case.403 We might think today’s Court would require 
a different analysis, but we cannot know that for sure. And the Court 
has instructed lower courts not to reject its precedents. The Court 
itself must inter suspect authority.404 
                                                                                                                 
400
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Merchs’ Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921)), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 22, 2006). 
401
 Even Justice Holmes, dissenting in Macomber, agreed that the meaning of the 
Amendment at ratification should be given effect. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,  
220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he known purpose of [the Sixteenth] 
Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes”). Holmes 
disagreed with his brethren about what that meaning was. 
402
 When the meaning of “direct tax” was at issue in Murphy II, the panel felt it was 
required to follow Supreme Court precedent—difficult given the unprincipled character of the 
cases—even though it seemed to think that precedent was inconsistent with original 
understanding. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 184–86 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 
1004 (2008); see also infra Part VII. Since the panel cited me, I know it had a good sense of 
what the original understanding was. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 182, 183. 
403
 In Murphy II, the panel avoided this issue by determining that the Amendment was 
irrelevant, but the Amendment was clearly relevant to the Murphy I analysis. See Murphy II, 
493 F.3d at 185; Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 84–92. 
404
 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (reaffirming “that ‘[i]f a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other 
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to 
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
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It is impossible to be certain whether an emotional-distress 
recovery with no lost-income component would have been thought  
of as “income” in 1913. One can be sure, however, that taxing this 
sort of thing was not what motivated proponents of the Sixteenth 
Amendment: the goal was to overturn Pollock and make sure that 
income from property of the rich could be taxed without regard to the 
direct-tax apportionment rule.405 In fact, I am reasonably sure that,  
if we could have asked an Amendment proponent about an  
emotional-distress recovery, the response would have been “Huh?” 
Because there was no direct evidence of 1913 thinking on this 
issue, the Murphy I panel did the best it could, looking to nearly 
contemporaneous authority. Encouraged by passages in O’Gilvie, 
Murphy’s lawyers urged the panel to look at a 1918 Opinion of  
the Attorney General, a 1918 Decision of the Department of the 
Treasury, and a report issued by the House Ways and Means 
Committee on the Revenue Act of 1918,406 all of which pointed 
toward no taxation on statutory grounds, and maybe on constitutional 
ones as well.407 
The panel’s statutory analysis and constitutional analysis were 
collapsed. That is hard to avoid, and, given the assumed relationship 
between the statutory meaning of “gross income” and the Sixteenth 
Amendment meaning of “incomes,” such consolidation was not a 
mark of confusion. After all, it was not until Murphy II that a court 
decided that no connection needed to exist. 
In the first post-Amendment revenue statutes, Congress was silent 
about taxing personal-injury recoveries. Not until the Revenue Act of 
1918 did Congress speak, excluding from gross income “[a]mounts 
received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s 
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, 
plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or 
agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.”408 
That provision is usually understood as having made no  
physical-nonphysical distinction, and that is probably right, although 
                                                                                                                 
 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). 
405
 See supra Part IV.A. 
406
 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 86. 
407
 Unfortunately, other, more negative authority that might have been relevant was not 
brought to the panel’s attention until Murphy II. See infra notes 414–21 and accompanying text. 
It is probably unfair to criticize the government for not having provided these citations to the 
panel; the government could not predict the direction that the Murphy I panel’s deliberations 
would take. Nevertheless, this is another instance in which the panel was flying blind, without 
adequate guidance. 
408
 See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919). 
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not clearly so. On the one hand, the language might be read as having 
no application to most nonphysical personal injury recoveries: how 
could accident or health insurance have anything to do with a  
garden-variety recovery for libel? But some nonphysical injuries 
could be covered by health insurance—those having to do with 
psychiatric or psychological damage—and such a recovery should 
have been nontaxable under the statute. 
Why did Congress adopt such language? According to the House 
report on the legislation, it was to clarify the law, not necessarily to 
change it: “Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts 
received through accident or health insurance, or under workmen’s 
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or sickness, 
and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are 
required to be included in gross income.”409 
The Murphy I panel pointed to two other contemporaneous 
documents—a 1918 opinion of the Attorney General and a 1918 
Treasury Decision—that it said led to the same conclusion, “that the 
term ‘incomes’ as used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not extend 
to monies received solely in compensation for a personal injury and 
unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”410 
The Secretary of the Treasury had asked the Attorney General 
whether proceeds under an accident insurance policy were income 
prior to the 1918 Act. It is here that the restoration-of-capital idea had 
its origins: 
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense 
the “capital” invested in an accident policy, in a broad, 
natural sense the proceeds of the policy do but substitute,  
so far as they go, capital which is the source of future 
periodical income. They merely take the place of capital  
in human ability which was destroyed by the accident.  
They are therefore “capital” as distinguished from “income” 
receipts.411 
The Treasury extended that position in its 1918 decision: “upon 
similar principles . . . an amount received by an individual as the 
result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained . . . 
                                                                                                                 
409
 H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9–10 (1918). 
410 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 89. 
411
 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). Professor Dodge cites one of the fathers of the 
modern income tax, Edwin Seligman, for the proposition that the “notion of income around the 
time of the 16th Amendment and the 1913 enactment of an income tax law excluded 
nonrecurring receipts.” Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 150 n.43 (citing SELIGMAN, 
supra note 180, at 19–22, 677–85). 
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through accident is not income taxable [under the Revenue Acts of 
1916 and 1917].”412 
The result of all of this, concluded the Murphy I panel, is that 
codification of the no-income rule should not be understood to mean 
that the prior understanding was “income.”413 The 1918 statute was 
for purposes of clarification. 
Things were not as straightforward as the Murphy I panel 
suggested, however. In fact, the Treasury’s position before 1918 was 
that such recoveries were taxable. That position was reflected in two 
decisions that the Murphy I panel must not have been aware of. A 
1915 Treasury decision had provided that, under the Revenue Act of 
1913, which included no provision for personal injury recoveries, 
[a]n amount received as the result of a suit or compromise for 
“pain and suffering” is held to be such income as would be 
taxable under the provision of law that includes “gains or 
profits and income derived from any source whatever.” An 
amount thus received would be, in its nature, similar to an 
amount paid to a person insured by an accident insurance 
policy on account of an accident sustained.414 
If a pain-and-suffering component is taxable, then a fortiori any  
lost-income component would be as well.415 Similarly, in 1917 
Treasury announced that, under the War Revenue Act of October 3, 
1917, “[p]ayments made to an injured employee by a corporation 
under the accident compensation laws of the several States constitute 
taxable income of the employee.”416 
One would expect Treasury to be aggressive in defining “income,” 
and its views should not automatically be controlling. In any event, it 
was only with the 1918 decision extending the Attorney General’s 
analysis that Treasury changed direction. The change came about 
because of judicial decisions that, by today’s standards, reflect an 
unsophisticated view of basis. The Attorney General quoted from the 
Sixth Circuit opinion in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.,417 concluding 
that sale of capital assets cannot generate income because a sale is 
value for value.418 The Attorney General ruled such recoveries were 
                                                                                                                 
412 T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457, 457 (1918). 
413 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 88. 
414
 T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915). 
415
 Did Treasury mean to imply that the portion of a recovery relating to medical expenses 
would be taxable? Surely not, unless the recovery was for amounts previously deducted. 
416
 T.D. 2570, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 321, 323 (1917). 
417
 235 F. 686 (6th Cir. 1916), aff’d, 247 U.S. 179 (1918). 
418
 See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 307–08. 
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effectively returns of capital and not taxable.419 
Even then, however, the Bureau of Internal Revenue mounted a 
rearguard action. In 1919 it concluded—this is the full text of a 
memorandum—that “[m]oney recovered as damages in libel 
proceedings is subject to income tax,”420 with no indication that it 
might matter whether a libel action was personal in nature. And in a 
1920 memorandum, noted earlier, the Bureau concluded that the 
statutory exclusion for recoveries for “personal injuries” ought to  
be interpreted to apply only to physical injuries, and that an  
alienation-of-affections recovery was therefore probably taxable 
because nothing like a “conversion of the capital” had occurred.421 
It was only after 1920 that administrative understanding moved 
clearly to the “no income” position reflected in rulings, described 
earlier, dealing with recoveries for alienation of affections and similar 
torts.422 The motivating factor for reversal was Eisner v. Macomber423 
and a new focus on the constitutional meaning of “incomes.” Once 
the Supreme Court had sensitized Treasury officials to constitutional 
issues, Treasury fell into line. 
Because the history is not clear—even as described by the Murphy 
I panel, it was murky—we need to think about how lack of clarity 
should be treated. One possibility is the one commonly advanced by 
commentators: if there is doubt, the taxing power triumphs, and no 
limitation should be inferred. Or one can imagine the other extreme: 
if there is doubt about whether a levy should be exempted from a 
constitutional limitation like the apportionment rule, the limitation 
should be deemed to apply. 
In this case, a middle ground has appeal. The Murphy I panel 
concluded that a lost profits or wages component of a personal injury 
would fit within the Sixteenth Amendment’s meaning of “incomes”—
not Murphy’s situation424—but the distinction between lost profits 
and other possible components of a personal injury recovery was not 
explicit in any of the authorities discussed above. Nor does it seem  
                                                                                                                 
419
 Id. 
420
 Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65, 65 (1919). 
421
 Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920); see also supra notes 234–35 and accompanying 
text. The Bureau did note, however, that, to the extent the award was attributable to “sickness” 
resulting from alienation of affections, the statutory exclusion would apply. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 
C.B. at 72. 
422
 See supra Part V.B.2.a. 
423
 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also supra notes 129–36 and accompanying text. 
424
 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Because, as we have seen, the term 
‘incomes,’ as understood in 1913, clearly did not include damages received in compensation for 
a physical personal injury, we infer that it likewise did not include damages received for a 
nonphysical injury and unrelated to lost wages or earning capacity.”), vacated, No. 05-5139, 
2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
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to have motivated the legislation or discussions in the early  
post-Amendment period. But might we not assume that, had the 
ratifiers of the Amendment thought about the issue, they would have 
agreed that a lost-profits recovery could be taxed, even if a recovery 
for, say, pain and suffering, could not be?425 This distinction may 
have constitutional implications, with Congress left to decide whether 
to impose a tax on the lost-profits component. 
The goal of the tort system was to make the victim of a personal 
injury as close to whole as possible. In the post-Macomber decisions, 
like Solicitor’s Opinion 132, the government was trying to reflect  
the constitutional understanding of Macomber, and concluded that 
someone who recovers for loss of a purely personal right cannot be 
held to “derive[] any gain or profit.”426 With no accession to wealth 
deemed to have taken place, taxing a recovery would therefore have 
not left the victim whole. Similarly, the Hawkins case, concluding 
that a recovery for libel and slander was tax-free when the damage 
was only to personal reputation, stressed the goal as “attempt[ing] to 
make the plaintiff whole as before the injury.”427 
If that is the goal, treating a lost-profits component of a recovery 
as taxable makes sense: tax a recovery of what would have been taxed 
anyway. That would have been understood in 1913, if Amendment 
proponents had been thinking about the issue. Go beyond lost profits 
(and punitives), however, and, reading the authorities informed by 
what the Amendment was intended to accomplish, I am skeptical that 
most folks would have thought of a recovery as income. 
One float in the parade of horribles that started after Murphy I was 
the fear that locking the income-tax system into a 1913 conception  
of income could require removing many items from the modern  
income-tax base.428 We have come to take the taxability of many 
items for granted, whatever the understanding was in 1913.429 
Time has passed some arguments by. But the constitutional issues 
associated with personal injury recoveries have arisen only recently, 
after the 1996 amendment of section 104(a)(2). We do not need to 
worry about other hypothetical horribles, or to tear the income tax up 
by its roots, to get the treatment of this particular item right. 
                                                                                                                 
425
 Treasury had initially treated a recovery for pain and suffering as taxable, see supra 
note 414 and accompanying text, but we would expect Treasury to be aggressive in defining 
income. 
426
 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922); see also supra notes 233–37 and accompanying 
text. 
427
 Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927), acq., 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928). 
428 See supra text accompanying notes 12–15. 
429
 See Caron, supra note 8, at 87–88. 
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D. Involuntariness and “Personal” Rights  
Many of the factual situations in the old cases and rulings 
discussed in Part V, especially those for victims of persecution, are 
unlikely to recur, or so one hopes. And most, if not all, of those cases 
and rulings presented sympathetic sets of facts. Terrible things had 
happened to people, and it would have been unseemly to sic revenue 
officials on someone who had suffered from Nazi oppression and was 
belatedly receiving some “compensation.” 
One might argue that sympathy should have little role to play in 
interpreting taxing statutes. Ms. Murphy, after all, has received no 
sympathy from commentators, even though she was harmed for 
exercising protected rights.430 But many cases involve factual 
situations that evoke sympathy for a reason that has historically been 
deemed important in characterizing recoveries: the harms were not 
attributable to voluntary arrangements. The losses being compensated 
for—of “personal” rights—were arguably unlike those from a 
business or investment transaction. 
Many reasonable folks, including judges, have seen an important 
difference between a recovery for invasion of privacy, say, and 
amounts received for selling one’s life story—a difference that might 
justify different results under Code section 61 and that might have 
been accepted by drafters of the Sixteenth Amendment. If one 
voluntarily relinquishes one’s right to privacy for cash, one has 
income. In contrast, if privacy is involuntarily invaded and the victim 
is compensated, the result is not so clear, except for any lost-income 
component of the recovery—which is what the 1996 amendments to 
section 104(a)(2) were directed at. 
Professor Germain refers to Ms. Murphy’s “transaction,”431 but 
that terminology would strike people who are not tax professionals as 
odd. And it is terminology that is result-driven: we are going to treat 
this event like Joe and Bob signing a contract—just another tax 
happening. 
Professor Dodge has argued that “[i]nvoluntariness may be a 
legitimate rationale for deferral of income or perhaps deductibility  
of outlay, but not for total and permanent exclusion of a clearly  
realized accession to wealth.”432 Not everyone would agree, however, 
                                                                                                                 
430
 Ms. Murphy had engaged in protected whistleblower activity. See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 
at 81. 
431
 Germain, supra note 29, at 192 (“Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she 
exchanged her emotional distress damages for cash.”); see also Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 185 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting Ms. Murphy’s formulation that the receipt of an award in lieu of lost 
mental health or reputation is not a “transaction”), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
432
 Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 183–84. 
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certainly not when a personal right has been converted. (Indeed, many 
would question whether there has been “a clearly realized accession 
to wealth” in a personal injury case with no recovery of lost profits.) 
In some circumstances, the technical language of taxation does not do 
an adequate job. 
We are talking doctrine here, not grand theory. I think grand 
theory can distinguish between voluntary and involuntary situations, 
but, even if grand theory suggests otherwise, the distinction has  
an intuitive appeal that can shape doctrine. The rulings directed at 
losses from persecution are right on point.433 Whatever academic 
commentators think of the importance of voluntariness or the lack 
thereof—ridicule is a common reaction434—many people on the street 
would think you crazy if you suggested taxing a recovery of this 
sort.435 
The position set out in Solicitor’s Opinion 132, issued in 1922 and 
quoted earlier in the discussion of recoveries for alienation of 
affections, makes eminently good sense: 
If an individual is possessed of a personal right that is not 
assignable and not susceptible of any appraisal in relation to 
market values, and thereafter receives either damages or 
payment in compromise for an invasion of that right, it can 
not be held that he thereby derives any gain or profit. It is 
clear, therefore, that the Government can not tax him on any 
portion of the sum received.436 
One thing we can say for sure: that sort of recovery was not what 
ratifiers of the Sixteenth Amendment had in mind in permitting an 
unapportioned tax on incomes. The income tax was intended to be 
directed at the wealthy, not those who “profited” from being victims 
of personal injuries. In my research on the Amendment, I found 
nothing that would indicate an intention to reach personal injury 
recoveries. And this sort of recovery, with no element of lost profits, 
is not what Congressmen were thinking about when section 104(a)(2) 
was amended. 
                                                                                                                 
433
 See supra Part V.B.2.b.i. 
434
 In responding to an article of mine, Professor Dodge wrote, “Jensen indignantly 
disclaims any sympathy with tax protesters, but does not explain how wages are distinguishable 
from cash recoveries for personal rights, except on the basis of involuntariness.” Dodge, 
Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 132. In short, I made no distinction other than the 
distinction I made. 
435
 The Supreme Court had said that “incomes” generally ought to be interpreted in a 
nontechnical way, “as the word is known in the common speech of men.” See United States v. 
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936). 
436
 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922). 
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The involuntary-voluntary distinction is recognized in many 
settings throughout tax law,437 but one argument made to counter  
the significance of the distinction is that Congress has provided a 
specific relief provision for involuntary conversions of property. The 
existence of section 1033, it is argued, implies that involuntary  
events are no less likely than voluntary ones to lead to unhappy  
tax consequences.438 At best, section 1033 permits deferral, not 
forgiveness, of gain on involuntary conversion,439 and section 1033 
shows, as does section 104(a)(2), that Congress knows how to 
provide relief when it wants to. 
This argument gives more weight to section 1033 than it can bear. 
We think of section 1033 as a relief provision, and it is that. But the 
“general rule” of section 1033 is that, if property is converted into 
money in an amount greater than basis, gain will be recognized.440 
The relief part of section 1033—applicable if a taxpayer acquires 
property “similar or related in service or use” within an appropriate 
period and makes an election441—is the exception to the general rule. 
If it were so clear that an involuntary conversion is a taxable event, 
why was it necessary for Congress to state this in section 1033? 
Perhaps because, without section 1033, it might not be clear that gain 
from an involuntary conversion is a “gain[] derived from dealings in 
property,”442 like a “sale or other disposition of property.”443 In any 
event, the fact that one provision in the Code deals with involuntary 
transactions of a particular sort cannot mean the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary is never to be taken into account otherwise. 
                                                                                                                 
437
 For example, United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968), is often 
interpreted as a forced-consumption case. See supra Part V.B.4. Not a lot of “force” was 
involved, but the case is different from one in which taxpayer’s behavior is totally voluntary. 
That factor is also used as a justification for the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine. Another 
example: I noted Professor Geier’s discussion of the significance of Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 
470 (1929), in developing the concept of basis. See supra note 76. One reason the Taft Court 
rejected the donee’s argument that she could not be taxed on appreciation that had occurred 
while the property was held by the donor was that she “accepted the gift with knowledge of the 
statute and, as to the property received, voluntarily assumed the position of her donor.” Taft, 278 
U.S. at 482. 
438
 Cf. Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 132 (arguing that no doctrine supports 
the notion that cash received as result of an involuntary occurrence is excludable apart from 
statutory exclusions and deferral provisions). 
439
 Given the way the basis rules have worked at death, see I.R.C. § 1014 (2006), gain can 
disappear without being taxed. But in theory, gain not recognized under section 1033 is deferred 
only. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2006).  
440
 See I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2). Indeed, the panel in Murphy II cited section 1033 for its 
general rule. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding Ms. Murphy’s 
situation akin to an involuntary conversion of assets), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
441 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1). 
442
 I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2006). 
443
 I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006). 
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E. Wages and Recoveries for Emotional Distress  
Ms. Murphy’s recovery was likened by many critics of Murphy I 
as theoretically indistinguishable from wages, and that is how the  
sky-is-falling commentary got rolling: If an emotional-distress 
recovery (even one that included no lost-income component) is not 
income, then wages are not income either. And, if an unapportioned 
income tax could not reach wages, the tax base would be gutted. 
Taken seriously, it was argued, Murphy I would have led to the death 
of the income tax. Our livelihoods depend on the income tax, so 
Murphy I must be wrong. 
Professor Dodge, for example, has characterized the emotional-
distress recovery in Murphy as “compensation for having undergone 
an unpleasant experience, just as wages are compensation for the loss 
of the psychic benefits of not working.”444 And elsewhere, in 
disputing the legitimacy of the “in lieu of” test, he wrote that 
“[d]amages received for pain and suffering are no different from 
wages received for [a] dangerous and miserable job.”445 
I do not accept the logical equivalence. I understand that Chicken 
Little ruffled feathers, but the sky remained in place after she raised 
her alarm. So too after Murphy I. I can distinguish easily between 
voluntary arrangements, which lead to the payment of wages, and 
involuntary ones, which lead to the payment of something else. 
Yes, as Professor Dodge argues, some employment arrangements 
that are in form voluntary are hardly that. Someone who is desperate 
for work might take any job, and the compensation might seem, as a 
conceptual matter, to fall on the involuntary side of the divide. But 
form can matter, and, in any event, more than form is involved. Ask 
the guy going to the lousy job whether he would prefer to be injured 
and compensated. Maybe you will find an occasional person who will 
volunteer for an injury, but the prevailing view in our society remains 
that work is valued—indeed, that work is a central part of being. Most 
people are satisfied with their jobs, and we should not fashion a 
generally applicable legal rule on the basis of the unusual case where 
employment is truly involuntary. 
Remember, too, that Ms. Murphy was characterized as really 
having lost something. Human capital, whatever it is, does not 
necessarily get used up by working. Professor Germain argues that 
human capital is “depleted,”446 but education does not wear out during 
                                                                                                                 
444
 Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 417. 
445
 Dodge, Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 987. 
446
 See Germain, supra note 29, at 192–93 (“The court of appeals in Murphy did not 
provide a theoretical distinction that would allow Congress to tax wages but not emotional 
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employment. It might become obsolete as time goes by, but that will 
be true whether a person is employed or not. 
1. The Limits of Logic  
Even if, at some level, there is logical equivalence between wages 
and recoveries for emotional distress—something I will concede 
arguendo—it does not follow that the two need to be treated 
identically for income-tax purposes. No matter how similar the two 
categories, drafters of the Sixteenth Amendment could have thought 
the categories had different statuses, and Congress can decide to  
treat the two differently. We know, without doubt, that wages were 
considered income for purposes of the Amendment, and we know 
also that compensation is includable in gross income under section  
61 (unless Congress provides otherwise).447 That some see logical 
equivalence does not mean that Congress is required to see that 
equivalence. 
Of course we should try to interpret the Constitution and any 
statute in as logical a way as possible. If there are uncertainties,  
we should try to resolve them logically. We should seek to make  
the pieces fit together coherently, if we possibly can. And in 
recommending changes in the law, we should roll out logic’s full 
artillery. 
But the law need not be logical. I have heard more than one law 
professor complain about the illogical basis of one statute or another, 
and the complaints are often valid. A legal provision nevertheless 
does not lose its force simply because it is klunkier than we would 
like. As smart as they were, the Founders acted illogically on 
occasion.448 And, as a general matter, Congress has the constitutional 
power to act illogically. 
Sometimes ignoring a statutory provision is necessary because  
two provisions are so inconsistent that they cannot be simultaneously 
enforced: one has to prevail (or perhaps one might decide in such a 
situation that neither should). That sort of situation is not the norm, 
but it does happen.449 
                                                                                                                 
 
distress damages, even though both are recoveries on account of human capital that has been 
depleted.”). 
447
 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1); see also supra note 27.  
448
 Apportionment is a bizarre way to constrain taxation, but it is part of the Constitution. 
A critic of the rule can argue that application of the rule should be limited, but not ignored. 
449
 See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (addressing a conflict 
in the statutory language of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, as codified in 25 U.S.C. § 
2719(d)(1) (2006)); see also Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 
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This sort of statutory disconnect does not exist with emotional-
distress recoveries and wages. It is not at all inconceivable that those 
contemplating the Sixteenth Amendment and those drafting the 
statutory definition of “gross income” might have concluded that 
wages should be taxed and emotional-distress recoveries should 
not.450 The views of theoreticians are not necessarily codified in the 
Internal Revenue Code or reflected in the Constitution. 
The critics get the starting point wrong. They argue that, because 
the two are logically identical in their minds, if we conclude that an 
emotional-distress recovery is not taxable, we would have to conclude 
that wages are also not taxable. 
I would start the analysis at the other end. We know that wages  
are taxable, and no analysis, logical or mystical, can change that 
treatment. If we think wages are logically indistinguishable from 
emotional-distress recoveries (even though the Murphy court 
concluded that no lost-income component existed451), we might 
conclude that such recoveries should be taxed. 
But no logic would require that we come to that result. Our 
conclusion might depend on what the draftsmen thought they were 
doing. And in making that determination, we might very well take 
into account that a lot of people now, as was true historically, think 
taxing an emotional-distress recovery is unjustified, particularly if the 
recovery has no lost-income component.452 
2. Evolving Conceptions of “Income”  
Whatever the merits of logic, it should not be used, without 
constitutional amendment or action by Congress, to expand the 
conception of income beyond what has been accepted in the past. It is 
one thing to determine that an item is logically indistinguishable  
from another item that has historically fallen outside the definition  
of income. In that case, no American taxpayer is hurt by the effects  
of logic. 
The original understanding of emotional-distress recoveries is 
                                                                                                                 
 
60 ME. L. REV. 1, 30–41 (2008) (discussing the canons of interpretation as applied by the 
Supreme Court in Chickasaw Nation); Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw Nation: Interpreting a 
Broken Statute, 97 TAX NOTES 1195 (2002). 
450
 The amendments to section 104(a)(2) clearly meant that a recovery for emotional 
distress is not automatically excludable. But that need not mean that the recovery is 
automatically taxable. 
451
 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 
4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).  
452
 Some think taxing wages is unfair, too, but they are a smaller part of the population. 
And we know that wages were intended to be taxed. 
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unclear, if such an understanding existed at all. And we know that the 
history used in Murphy I was less than pristine. But we also know 
there is reason to doubt whether the Sixteenth Amendment was 
intended to cover such a recovery, and there is reason to wonder 
whether Congress, in amending section 104(a)(2), intended to make 
every such recovery taxable if something other than replacing lost 
income was involved. 
If we are unsure, how do we proceed? The critics of Murphy I 
have no doubts on that score. I have many. At a minimum, it is clear 
to me that young lawyers—old ones too—are being taught by the 
Murphy events to read a statute in a back-asswards way. Find in a 
change to an exclusion from gross income, section 104(a)(2), an 
expansion of the basic idea of what constitutes gross income. That is a 
crazy way to interpret section 61, and we should not encourage 
anyone to read the Code in that way. Ultimately the taxation of 
emotional-distress recoveries does not matter very much, except to 
affected victims and payors of damages, but how Congress writes and 
how we read the Internal Revenue Code matter a great deal. 
As I noted earlier, Professor Dodge has criticized application of 
the “in lieu of” test: 
[O]ne has to enter the realm of theory to claim that a cash 
receipt should be excluded on the ground that it is a 
“substitute for” some kind of nonincome, such as the pleasure 
of normal existence. That kind of argument might be made 
with respect to pain-and-suffering damages. But it won’t fly 
in either the positive-law realm or the tax-theory realm. 
Wages are taxable precisely because the pleasure of leisure 
(which has no basis) is converted to cash by the exercise of 
one’s labor.453 
No, wages are not “taxable precisely because the pleasure of leisure 
(which has no basis) is converted to cash by the exercise of one’s 
labor.” Wages are taxable because Congress has provided specifically 
for that result and has done so in a way that is consistent with 
constitutional requirements. Wages are taxable not because of theory; 
they are taxable because of the law. 
It is often argued that conceptions of “income” in place when  
the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified should have no effect in 
understanding constitutional doctrine. Professor Caron does not want 
to look at the “entrails” of constitutional debates in the late eighteenth 
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 Dodge, Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 987 (footnote omitted). 
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century,454 and I suspect he is no more enthusiastic about studying 
1913 events. We become more sophisticated as time passes—hearing 
popular radio (involuntarily), I do not believe this, but I will pretend 
to—and increasing sophistication in our conceptions of income 
should be reveled in. Should it matter that something we now want  
to treat as income might not have been understood as such in  
1913?455 Should we not take economists’ increasing sophistication 
into account? 
Yes and no. Of course, we should take new learning into account 
in presenting new policy proposals. But when it comes to interpreting 
existing law, I am a skeptic. 
It is weird (and maybe unconstitutional?) to permit an “improved” 
conception of income to expand congressional power. We properly 
interpret the Fourth Amendment as applicable to modern forms of 
electronic surveillance, although (obviously) unknown in 1789, but 
we do so to limit governmental power. It is fundamentally different  
to use our sophisticated understanding of taxation to contract a 
constitutional limitation and thus to expand congressional power. 
It is particularly perverse to delegate constitutional interpretation 
to academic theorists. The Constitution should not be amended  
in faculty lounges. “Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment,” wrote the Supreme Court in 1936, is “[w]ith few 
exceptions, if any, . . . income as the word is known in the common 
speech of men.”456 Academics in Hyde Park or Cambridge might 
understand “income” better than their predecessors did fifty years 
ago, but improved understanding does not translate into law. 
Within constitutional boundaries, Congress can define income as it 
wishes, but it should do so explicitly. Despite the omnipresent 
language to the effect that Congress in section 61 meant to exercise 
the full complement of its taxing power, that has never been the 
case—Congress has provided many exclusions457—and it has never 
been understood to be the case, as cases like Gotcher illustrate.458 
                                                                                                                 
454
 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
455 Folks in 1913 had not thought of all issues that occupy us today, but they were not 
stupid. Might imputed income be taxable? Instructions for the first modern tax return say a 
homeowner shall not be “required to include . . . estimated rental [value] of his home as 
income.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FORM 1040: RETURN OF ANNUAL NET INCOME OF 
INDIVIDUALS 4, at Instruction 10 (1913), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/1913.pdf; see 
also id. at Instruction 17 (“Estimated advance in value of real estate is not required to be 
reported as income, unless the increased value is taken up on the books of the individual as an 
increase of assets.”). 
456
 United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936). 
457
 See I.R.C. §§ 101–39A (2006) (identifying items specifically excluded from gross 
income). 
458
 See supra Part V.B.4. 
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Congress did not expand the potential scope of section 61 by 
narrowing the exclusion in section 104(a)(2),459 and we should not 
interpret the congressional act as doing more than it was intended to 
do: to make taxable recoveries for lost profits or wages. 
Academic theorists might respond that the full amount of a 
recovery for alienation of affections, or some other nonphysical 
injury, ought to be taxed, for reasons A and B, and those reasons 
might be respectable. Maybe the recovery is arguably a windfall, or 
conceptually the conversion of a zero-basis asset. Or maybe it is in 
theory indistinguishable from wages. The theorists might even be able 
to convince me that, on the merits—if we were building a tax system 
from scratch—there would be no justification for excluding a 
particular recovery. 
But that is not the way a practitioner ought to be thinking (and 
academics ought not to be teaching their students to look only for 
conceptually pure results). Congress sometimes intends to adopt a 
position that is conceptually impure, and nothing in the Constitution 
requires Congress to conform to currently prevailing norms in the 
academy. 
VII. MURPHY II: THE DO-OVER 
The original D.C. Circuit panel, after a petition for rehearing en 
banc had been filed, but before it had been acted upon, vacated the 
decision in Murphy I and scheduled the case for reargument.460 When 
it reconsidered Murphy, the panel—with institutional face blushing—
decided several important issues differently and came to a diametric 
result.461 
The panel might very well have been “prodded by the tax 
blogosphere,”462 as Professor Caron suggested, but the result is not a 
strong endorsement for blogging. In fact, the state of the law might be 
worse after Murphy II than if Murphy I had been left untouched. 
Indeed, because of the way the panel pretended it was responding 
only to new arguments, the untouched parts of Murphy I are still 
relevant, even if not authoritative. 
Because Murphy I had been withdrawn, the opinion in Murphy II 
generally reads as if the court were hearing the case for the first time. 
The panel did note the result in Murphy I, but then acted as if it were 
proceeding anew because the government raised a new argument 
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 But see infra Part VII (discussing the decision in Murphy II). 
460
 See Murphy v. IRS, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
461 Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). 
462
 Caron, supra note 8, at 91. 
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“belatedly”: that the Sixteenth Amendment was irrelevant if the tax 
on the recovery was not a direct tax.463 
The panel dealt with three questions in Murphy II. First, was the 
tax imposed on Ms. Murphy within the power granted to Congress 
under the Taxing Clause?464 Despite what the panel had said in 
Murphy I, the answer was yes465—and quite appropriately so. It does 
not matter if the emotional-distress recovery was not “income” as 
traditionally understood. Congress can call an excise an “income tax” 
if it wishes, so long as it has authority to impose the excise. On that 
point, the panel quoted from the Third Circuit’s 1960 decision in 
Penn Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner466: “Congress has the 
power to impose taxes generally, and if the particular imposition does 
not run afoul of any constitutional restrictions then the tax is lawful, 
call it what you will.”467 The real constitutional questions in Murphy 
had to do with application of the apportionment rule, not whether  
an emotional-distress recovery could be taxed at all. 
Question 2: If the levy was permitted under the Taxing Clause, 
was it nevertheless a direct tax required to be apportioned?468 Here  
the panel concluded that the tax was not direct, no apportionment  
was required, and the meaning of “incomes” in the Sixteenth 
Amendment—the key issue in Murphy I—was irrelevant.469 I am 
sympathetic to the constraints the panel was under, given the mass of 
unprincipled authority, but I question that conclusion in Part VII.A. 
The panel concluded in Murphy I that the tax on the  
emotional-distress recovery was not a “tax on incomes.”470 The  
panel in Murphy II said it was dealing with “new” arguments, but no 
new argument called that determination into question.471 Murphy I  
has technically disappeared, but we might assume that the panel 
continued to believe the levy was not on “incomes” within the 
meaning of the Amendment.472 That brings us to question 3: Could 
the levy, incorporated in the income-tax provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code, reach the recovery if it was not “income” in a 
constitutional sense? Or, to put the question another way, could the 
                                                                                                                 
463
 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 173. 
464
 See id. at 180–86. 
465
 Id. at 186. 
466
 277 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960). 
467 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179 (quoting Penn Mutual, 277 F.2d at 20). 
468
 See id. at 181. 
469 Id. at 181–86. 
470 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22). 
471
 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 173. 
472
 If the tax was on “incomes,” the rest of the discussion in Murphy II was unnecessary. 
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concept of “income” in section 61’s definition of “gross income”  
be broader than the meaning of “incomes” in the Sixteenth 
Amendment?473 The panel answered that question affirmatively.474  
I question that conclusion in Part VII.B. 
A. Was the Tax Direct?  
The Murphy II panel could ignore the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, the decisive issue in Murphy I, because it concluded that 
the levy on an emotional-distress recovery was not a direct tax.475 For 
an indirect tax, the apportionment rule and the Amendment are 
irrelevant. 
Looking at case law over the decades, and noting the obvious 
(“cases have not definitively marked the boundary between taxes that 
must be apportioned and taxes that need not be”476), the panel stated, 
“[o]nly three taxes are definitely known to be direct: (1) a capitation, 
(2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon personal property.”477 
Even though the Supreme Court had concluded in Pollock that a tax 
on income from property is direct, the panel questioned “[w]hether 
that portion of Pollock remains good law.”478 “That portion” of 
Pollock is the core of the case, and one wonders why a panel that felt 
“instructed” to follow Supreme Court precedent on many other points 
was doubtful about this one.479 
On drawing the line between direct and indirect taxes, the panel 
properly rejected the government’s argument that only “‘taxes that are 
capable of apportionment in the first instance, specifically, capitation 
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 See 493 F.3d at 176. 
474
 Id. at 181. 
475
 Id. at 186. 
476
 Id. at 181. 
477
 Id. (citation omitted). 
478
 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 181 n.**. 
479
 See supra notes 387–404 and accompanying text (discussing issues the panel was 
“instructed” on). Some cases have been overruled without a definitive statement. The Court in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), did not expressly overrule Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); it “rejected” statements contrary to “modern [psychological] 
authority,” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95, and “conclude[d] that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” Id. at 495. But many cases have said Brown 
overruled Plessy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) 
(plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); id. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, 
Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Nothing like that 
has happened with Pollock. One part of the case was explicitly rejected, with no implication the 
entire case had to fall. See supra note 124 (discussing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 
(1988)). The government argued in Murphy II that, “although [Pollock] has never been 
overruled, ‘every aspect of its reasoning has been eroded,’” Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 183 (citing 
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1916)), but the panel cited post-Stanton 
cases in a way that made it impossible to accept Pollock’s complete demise. 
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taxes and taxes on land,’ are direct taxes.”480 That interpretation 
would make the direct-tax apportionment rule, at least “[i]n the 
abstract, . . . no constraint at all.”481 
But the panel was also unwilling to adopt the principled distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes outlined earlier in this Article,  
and instead looked primarily to whether the incidence of the tax  
can be shifted to someone else and whether, as a result, the typical 
taxpayer is able to avoid the tax if he wishes.482 Murphy had  
made this argument about original understanding, and the panel 
seemed sympathetic.483 But, faced with Supreme Court authority 
characterizing a multitude of levies as indirect, the panel—again 
deferring to Court precedent484—was inevitably going to conclude 
that the tax on the emotional-distress recovery was indirect. 
The case law on direct taxation from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had developed with Hylton as controlling 
authority, and, except for the income tax at issue in Pollock,485  
the Court had characterized no levy as direct. The Murphy II panel 
wrote that 
Murphy makes no attempt to reconcile her definition with the 
long line of cases identifying various taxes as excise taxes, 
although several of them seem to refute her position directly. 
In particular, we do not see how a known excise, such as the 
estate tax, or a tax upon income from employment [citing 
Pollock], can be shifted to another person, absent which they 
seem to be in irreconcilable conflict with her position that a 
tax that cannot be shifted to someone else is a direct tax. 
Though it could be argued that the incidence of an estate tax 
is inevitably shifted to the beneficiaries, we see at work none 
of the restraint upon excessive taxation that Murphy claims 
such shifting is supposed to provide; the tax is triggered by an 
event, death, that cannot be shifted or avoided. In any event, 
[Knowlton v. Moore] addressed the argument that Pollock I 
and II made ability to shift the hallmark of a direct tax, and 
rejected it.486 
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 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 182 (citing Johnson, Constitutional Absurdity, supra note 92, at 
314 (2004)). 
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 Id. at 184. 
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 Id. at 182–84. 
483 See id. at 184. 
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 Cf. supra notes 387–404 and accompanying text. 
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 Later cases like Macomber assumed that an income tax is direct. 
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 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184 (citations omitted) (citing Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 
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Unable to rely on first principles, the panel thought it was required 
to determine “whether the tax laid upon Murphy’s award is more 
akin, on the one hand, to a capitation or a tax upon one’s ownership 
of property, or, on the other hand, more like a tax upon a use of 
property, a privilege, an activity, or a transaction.”487 With the field 
tilted in this way, the result was foreordained: “Regardless what the 
original understanding may have been, . . . we are bound to follow the 
Supreme Court, which has strongly intimated that Murphy’s position 
is not the law.”488 
A tax on ownership? No, the levy was not on Murphy’s ownership 
of human capital.489 On a transaction? Yes. Murphy said no 
transaction had taken place, but this was like an involuntary 
conversion of human capital, and involuntary conversions are 
generally taxable events.490 No profit may have been involved—that 
was determined in Murphy I—but whether there has been an 
“accession to wealth” matters only in determining if a tax is on 
“incomes.”491 Like a tax on a privilege? Yes, Murphy used the legal 
system to secure her recovery, and the tax was like an excise 
permitting access to a commodities exchange.492 
Say what? This levy was an excise on the use of the legal system? I 
can refute none of these points directly because there is no principle 
underlying any of them, except that the apportionment rule should 
apply to little or nothing. I understand why the panel thought it had to 
proceed as it did, given an incoherent body of case law, but the result 
is crazy. 
What in fact was Murphy taxed on? If we ignore the question as to 
whether the $70,000 was income or not, she was not taxed because 
                                                                                                                 
 
81–82 (1900)). The Knowlton Court said only that the Pollock Court had not relied on whether 
the tax could be shifted. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 82. But it is true the Court did not view ability 
to shift as a defining characteristic of an indirect tax. 
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 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184. 
488
 Id. 
489
 Id. (“Even if we assume one’s human capital should be treated as personal property, it 
does not appear that this tax is upon ownership; rather, as the Government points out, Murphy is 
taxed only after she receives a compensatory award, which makes the tax seem to be laid upon a 
transaction.”). 
490
 See I.R.C. § 1033 (2006). 
491
 “Whether she profited is irrelevant . . . to whether a tax upon an award of damages is a 
direct tax requiring apportionment; profit is relevant only to whether, if it is a direct tax, it 
nevertheless need not be apportioned because the object of the tax is income . . . .” Murphy II, 
493 F.3d at 185. 
492
 Id. at 186 (“[T]he facility used in [Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899)] was a 
commodities exchange whereas the facility used by Murphy was the legal system, but that 
hardly seems a significant distinction. The tax may be laid upon the proceeds received when one 
vindicates a statutory right, but the right is nonetheless a ‘creature of law,’ which [Knowlton v. 
Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)] identifies as a ‘privilege’ taxable by excise.”). 
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she had participated in a transaction, engaged in an activity, or had 
been afforded the “privilege” of being able to participate in the legal 
system. She was being taxed because she had $70,000 in cash. Is that 
not a tax on ownership? 
B. Was Murphy’s Recovery Includable in Gross Income?  
The constitutional issues matter only if the $70,000 would have 
been reached statutorily. In Murphy II, the panel concluded that, 
whether or not the recovery was “income” within the meaning of  
the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress intended to include an  
emotional-distress recovery in “gross income,” as defined in Code 
section 61, when it amended section 104(a)(2).493 Whether the 
recovery was also “incomes” under the Amendment disappeared as an 
issue because the D.C. Circuit panel concluded the levy was an excise 
exempt from apportionment.494 
Although the Murphy I panel had noted the long-time 
understanding that the term “income” should be interpreted similarly 
for statutory and constitutional purposes, in Murphy II the panel 
reversed direction: “‘Gross income’ in § 61(a) is at least as broad  
as the meaning of ‘incomes’ in the Sixteenth Amendment,”495 and 
therefore potentially broader. It did not matter that in Murphy I the 
panel had concluded the recovery was not “incomes” within the 
meaning of the Amendment, and that nothing—no “new” argument—
had changed that result. 
That was an astonishing conclusion, backed by astonishing 
reasoning. Step one was the statutory argument. Although it was 
unclear whether the recovery would have been covered by section 61 
before 1996—is there an “accession to wealth” with only a return of 
capital?496—the amendments to section 104(a)(2) effectively amended 
section 61. Judge Ginsburg admitted that, “[l]ooking at § 61(a) by 
itself, one sees no indication that it covers Murphy’s award unless the 
award is ‘income’ as defined by Glenshaw Glass and later cases.”497 
But the boundaries of section 61 had to be understood as changed by 
the amendment to section 104(a)(2).498 Congress intended to tax a 
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 Id. at 176. 
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 See id. at 185. 
495
 Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
496 The “return of capital” material from Murphy I was not rejected in Murphy II. See id. at 
185. 
497
 Id. at 179. 
498
 “For the 1996 amendment . . . to ‘make sense,’ gross income . . . must . . . include an 
award for nonphysical damages such as Murphy received, regardless whether the award is an 
accession to wealth.” Id. at 180. 
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recovery like Murphy’s, and, even though it did not take the 
appropriate steps to amend section 61, Congress’s intentions should 
be effectuated. Read section 61 in conjunction with section 104(a)(2) 
and, voile!, we have gross income. 
Much is wrong here. For one thing, Judge Ginsburg wrote that  
this reading—Congress broadened section 61’s application without 
amending section 61—is necessary because the 1996 amendment, 
“which narrows the exclusion, would have no effect whatsoever if 
such damages were not included within the ambit of § 61.”499 Some 
commentators have made this argument as well,500 but it is wrong. 
The amendment was intended to make taxable a recovery for lost 
profits, and it did that for nonphysical personal injuries—a significant 
effect by itself. It does not follow that a recovery for something other 
than lost profits was picked up. 
It is probably true that congressmen thought they were broadening 
the definition of gross income to include any recovery for a 
nonphysical personal injury. But, as I discussed earlier, that could  
not possibly have been the result of the statutory change unless 
Congress meant to gut many preexisting understandings, including 
the ability to recover basis tax-free.501 
C. Can “Gross Income” Be Broader Than “Incomes”?  
Step two is the constitutional component of the argument. 
Although this addition to “gross income” might not be “incomes” 
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, that does not matter 
if the levy is an excise. And the panel had determined that no direct 
tax was involved.502 If Congress defines “gross income” to impose a 
permissible excise—an indirect tax not subject to apportionment—no 
harm is done by calling the taxed item income. Furthermore, if the  
tax on this enlarged conception of gross income is indirect,  
no apportionment is required even if this is not income within the 
meaning of the Amendment—even, that is, if there is no accession to 
wealth.503 In fact, the result was “so clear,” wrote Ginsburg, “that we 
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 See, e.g., Germain, supra note 29, at 208; see also supra note 186. 
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 See supra Part V.B.1. 
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 See supra Part VII.B. 
503
 In a footnote, the panel noted the heading in the legislative history that read, “Include in 
income damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries.” Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179–80 n.* 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143–44 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, 481–82); see 
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amendment of § 104(a) to ‘make sense,’ gross income in § 61(a) must, and we therefore hold it 
does, include an award for nonphysical damages such as Murphy received, regardless whether 
the award is an accession to wealth.” Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179 n.*. 
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have no occasion to apply the canon favoring the interpretation of 
ambiguous revenue-raising statutes in favor of the taxpayer.”504 
Well. Does it make sense to think that Congress meant to tear apart 
the connection between the meaning of “income” in the Internal 
Revenue Code and the Constitution? If Congress did not mean to do 
that, does it make sense to interpret a statute in a way that leads to  
a counterintuitive result? Are we now to assume that what is called  
an “income tax” in the Code need bear no relationship to what is 
considered an income tax for other purposes? 
Professor Dodge is persuasive on these points. He agrees that, if 
the levy in Murphy was indirect, then Congress could have reached 
the emotional-distress recovery as part of an unapportioned tax.505  
But the issue of constitutional validity arises only if the levy is 
authorized by the Code. The statutory definition of gross income 
includes fifteen enumerated items, none of which includes a personal 
injury recovery.506 The statutory authority to reach this recovery 
therefore must be the catch-all provision “income from whatever 
source derived.”507 The recovery must be “income” if it is to be 
reached by section 61.508 
As Dodge argues, “If ‘income’ in the catch-all clause of section 61 
were construed to include anything that Congress could tax as an 
indirect tax, then it would no longer mean ‘income,’ but something 
broader and perhaps indeterminate.”509 And interpreting the statutory 
change in this way would treat Congress as having legislated 
something it did not legislate. 
To be sure, Judge Ginsburg provided a partial answer to this 
conundrum: 
Principles of statutory interpretation could show § 61(a) 
includes Murphy’s award in her gross income regardless 
whether it was an “accession to wealth” . . . . For example,  
if § 61(a) were amended specifically to include in gross 
income “$100,000 in addition to all other gross income,”  
then that additional sum would be a part of gross income 
under § 61 even though no actual gain was associated with it. 
In other words, although the “Congress cannot make a thing 
income which is not so in fact,” it can label a thing income 
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and tax it, so long as it acts within its constitutional authority 
. . . . [R]ather than ask whether Murphy’s award was an 
accession to her wealth, we go to the heart of the matter, 
which is whether her award is properly included within the 
definition of gross income in § 61(a), to wit, “all income from 
whatever source derived.”510 
I will concede arguendo that Judge Ginsburg’s example could 
expand the definition of “gross income” beyond the boundaries of the 
Sixteenth Amendment. If Congress amends section 61 in such a way 
that it clearly intends to pick up items that are not accessions to 
wealth, so be it (although it would be a bad idea), as long as Congress 
has other authority for the tax. 
But Judge Ginsburg’s example is nothing like what happened in 
1996. Congress did not amend section 61 to include something that 
previously had not been within the catch-all provision, “income  
from whatever source derived.” Congress left section 61 intact, and 
the careful statute-reader would have no reason to know that the 
boundaries of section 61 had been expanded. We should not 
encourage congressional sloppiness by reading more into statutory 
language than it can encompass, particularly when the effect is to 
expand the scope of taxation. 
The example was flawed for an even more fundamental reason: 
Ginsburg was making the case that Congress could impose an 
unapportioned tax on an emotional-distress recovery whether or not it 
was on “incomes.” But Congress has no obvious authority to impose 
an unapportioned tax on the hypothesized $100,000. If not an 
accession to wealth, the $100,000 is not income as traditionally 
understood. And if the tax is not on income, it is hard to see the tax  
as anything but on ownership of property. The time-honored 
understanding is that a tax on property is direct,511 and, if the levy is 
direct and has not been properly apportioned, it is unconstitutional. 
The Murphy panel likened a tax on an emotional-distress recovery 
to one on a privilege. I am unconvinced—characterizing the levy as 
on the privilege of using the legal system is absurd—but at least an 
effort was made. With his hypothetical, however, Judge Ginsburg did 
not explain how a levy on $100,000 is like any judicially blessed 
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indirect tax. Judge Ginsburg gave an example of an unapportioned 
direct tax to illustrate the constitutionality of taxing Murphy’s 
recovery! 
I come to the same conclusion with Murphy’s situation. If the levy 
was not on gross income, as traditionally understood, and Congress 
did not structure the levy in a way similar to accepted excises, 
Congress must have been imposing a tax on the $70,000. If that  
was not an accession to wealth, or something similar—if, that is, it 
was not “incomes”—the levy was a tax on property, and, because 
unapportioned, an invalid direct tax. 
As bad as the howlers in Murphy I were, Murphy II was in some 
respects worse. It seemed to validate the idea of an unapportioned tax 
on wealth—something that had not been accepted before. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
I have an admission: I do not care whether emotional-distress 
recoveries are reached by the income tax. In the vast majority of 
cases, there will be little to argue in support of exclusion anyway. 
Recovery of lost profits? Clearly taxable. I am convinced that such a 
levy would be treated as “on incomes” for constitutional purposes, 
and I have no doubt that every important court would come to the 
same conclusion. And maybe, when push comes to shove, I could be 
convinced that Ms. Murphy, even though she was deemed to have 
recovered nothing for lost wages, still had no strong arguments in 
support of excluding most or all of her recovery. 
But we should still care how we think about these matters in 
general, and a lot of overkill has been used in condemning Murphy I. 
Whatever the merits of the result in that case, we should not be 
proceeding on the assumption that a recovery for a nonphysical 
personal injury is automatically taxable. It is not. Generally yes, 
always no. 
Whatever an economist might think, distinctions between 
voluntary and involuntary events, and between market transactions 
and undesired damage to personal rights, are reasonable factors to 
take into account in distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable 
events. And, whether they are reasonable or not in the minds of 
modern theorists, constitutional and statutory draftsmen could have 
had them in mind. Life would have gone on quite well—the income 
tax would not have imploded—if Murphy I had remained on the 
books. 
Finally, we should question the extraordinary expansion of the 
taxing power that Murphy II, if taken seriously, seems to permit. The 
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D.C. Circuit panel did not mean to do this (and we should read the 
opinion with that understanding), but Murphy II can be read as 
support for an unapportioned tax on wealth. There are those in the 
academy who have argued for such a tax,512 and the world would not 
come to an end if it were permitted. But we should not fool ourselves 
that an unapportioned wealth tax was understood, outside academic 
quarters, to be permissible under the Constitution as ratified, or as 
amended by the Sixteenth Amendment—until now. 
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